



Security Council

Fifty-sixth year

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Friday, 19 October 2001, 10 a.m.

New York

Provisional

<i>President</i>	Mr. Ryan	(Ireland)
<i>Members</i>	Bangladesh	Mr. Amin
	China	Mr. Wang Yingfan
	Colombia	Mr. Valdivieso
	France	Mr. Levitte
	Jamaica	Miss Durrant
	Mali	Mr. Ouane
	Mauritius	Mr. Koonjul
	Norway	Mr. Kolby
	Russian Federation	Mr. Granovsky
	Singapore	Mr. Mahbubani
	Tunisia	Mr. Jerandi
	Ukraine	Mr. Krokhmal
	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	Mr. Eldon
	United States of America	Mr. Rosenblatt

Agenda

The situation in Somalia.

Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Somalia (S/2001/963).

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01-58958 (E)



The meeting was called to order at 10.20 a.m.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

The situation in Somalia

Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Somalia (S/2001/963)

The President: I should like to inform the Council that I have received letters from the representatives of Belgium, Djibouti, Egypt, Ethiopia, Japan, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Nigeria, Qatar, Somalia, the Syrian Arab Republic and Yemen, in which they request to be invited to participate in the discussion of the item on the Council's agenda. In conformity with the usual practice, I propose, with the consent of the Council, to invite those representatives to participate in the discussion without the right to vote, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter and rule 37 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure.

There being no objection, it is so decided.

On behalf of the Council, I extend a warm welcome to the Prime Minister of Somalia, Mr. Ali Khalif Galaydh.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Galaydh (Somalia), took a seat at the Council table.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. De Ruyt (Belgium), Mr. Olhaye (Djibouti), Mr. Aboul Gheit (Egypt), Mr. Hussein (Ethiopia), Mr. Motomura (Japan), Mr. Dorda (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), Mr. Mbanefo (Nigeria), Mr. Al-Nasser (Qatar), Mr. Mekdad (Syrian Arab Republic) and Mr. Al-Ashtal (Yemen) took seats at side of the Council Chamber.

The President: In accordance with the understanding reached in the Council's prior consultations, and in the absence of objection, I shall take it that the Security Council agrees to extend an invitation under rule 39 of its provisional rules of procedure to Mr. David Stephen, Representative of the Secretary-General for Somalia.

There being no objection, it is so decided.

I invite Mr. Stephen to take a seat at the Council table.

The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. The Security Council is meeting in accordance with the understanding reached in its prior consultations.

Members have before them the report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Somalia, document S/2001/963.

As there is no list of speakers for the Council members, I would invite those members who wish to speak or to ask questions to so indicate to the Secretariat as from now.

I shall now give the floor to Mr. David Stephen, Representative of the Secretary-General for Somalia, to introduce the Secretary-General's report.

Mr. Stephen: I wish to thank you, Sir, and members of the Council for affording me this opportunity to present the report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Somalia. As Representative of the Secretary-General, I deal with the political side, whereas we have a resident coordinator and humanitarian coordinator dealing with the operational side.

Members of the Council will be familiar with the report. It tries to set out the salient features of the humanitarian, security and political situation in Somalia today. Inter alia, it highlights the serious humanitarian situation in much of the country. It also makes clear that the security situation remains difficult. It describes recent political events, updating members of the Council since the last report. The Secretary-General also submits some ideas for further consultation and consideration, including the possibility of the establishment of a committee of friends of Somalia.

I should like, if I may, to offer some general observations about the situation in Somalia.

It is 10 years since the collapse of the Siad Barre regime — 10 years during which Somalia has been without effective central institutions of any description. While we know of situations in which States have ceased to prevail in their territory or in which power has slipped away from States in parts of their territory, I do believe that the situation of Somalia is unique: 10 years without any national institutions of any description.

As a result of that situation, the main focus of loyalty and source of identity for many Somalis remains the clan. The task in Somalia is not so much that of negotiating ceasefires, although that was necessary at one stage, but helping the Somalis to devise institutions which are trusted and legitimate and which command the allegiance of the population over and above the clan. This was what the President of Djibouti attempted to do when he convened the Conference in Arta last year, and I think it is still a reasonable aspiration for the international community.

It is, at the same time, complicated, but also rather simple in essence. For example, the clan situation which is described in the latest report of the Secretary-General and in previous reports may seem complicated — the names of the clans and the sub-clans. It sounds complicated, but the crucial question is to find a role for all clans within the future structure of Somalia. As the Secretary-General said in his report of 1998, the restoration of trust is the crucial ingredient there.

The Transitional National Government (TNG), as its name implies, is transitional. It was established as a transition to more permanent arrangements in the country and the future is up for negotiation. That is the way I would see it; that is my personal interpretation. There are those political leaders and others who have not taken part in the Arta process and, for there to be common institutions in the country, it seems that the TNG is a start — as it were, an embryo — on which the future could be based.

Still, we have the problem of suspicion on a clan basis. As I informed members of the Council in the informal consultations on Wednesday, the very bad experience much of the country had of government under the dictatorship means that the notion of government is not a favourable one for many Somalis. They are suspicious, automatically, of what a central authority might be. Therefore, presentation is very important there and we are also stressing the need for regional participation. It is completely open in the future. The Transitional National Charter adopted at Arta says that the future structure of Somalia should be federal and this is therefore, possibly, an important way of bringing on board all those elements.

If the problem inside Somalia is therefore one of trust in common institutions, for the international community there is another problem. That is the

problem of what was identified a few years ago as the proliferation of initiatives. It was remarked by a senior colleague in the Secretariat that there was a phenomenon called "divide and rule" under colonial regimes. We have in Somalia, some people say, a situation of "divide upwards" — in other words, "divide and no rule" — in which the Somalis make pitches to various countries, telling them that they are their favourite negotiators and that they are the ones who understand the country. Other Somalis then go to other countries and we do have this quite serious problem of knowing how the international community will structure itself in order to facilitate the future peace process. That, I think, is clear from the report, but I would draw the attention of members of the Council to it.

The President: I shall now give the floor to the Prime Minister of Somalia, Mr. Ali Khalif Galaydh.

Mr. Galaydh (Somalia): I want to seize this opportunity to congratulate you, Sir, on your assumption of the presidency of the Security Council. I am confident that, under your wise leadership, the Council will continue to be engaged in promoting the principles of the United Nations Charter.

I am delighted to register the profound appreciation of the people and the Government of Somalia at the honour that has been bestowed upon the Secretary-General and the United Nations. Indeed, the award of the Nobel Peace Prize to the Secretary-General is a recognition of his tireless efforts in the search for durable peace in the world.

The events of 11 September alerted peoples and Governments all over the world to the danger posed by international terrorism. The Somali Government has unequivocally expressed its outrage and disgust at the heinous acts of terrorism perpetrated against the Government and the people of the United States. It has expressed its condolences and prayers to the President of the United States and to the families of the bereaved. The Somali Government firmly believes that the international community must be united and strong in the face of this menace. We reiterate our commitment and determination to cooperate with the United Nations, and on a bilateral basis, in the fight against international terrorism.

That commitment and determination to combat terrorism are reflected in recent decisions taken by my Government. First of all, we fully support Security

Council resolution 1373 (2001). That resolution sets out the legal framework of the fight against terrorism and the obligations of Member States in that fight.

Secondly, the Somali Government has recently established an anti-terrorism task force, which will put together a national security and anti-terrorist action plan. The task force will gather intelligence and information, monitor the activities of potential suspects and share information with the United Nations.

Thirdly, the Somali Government has engaged *ulma* — religious leaders — from all sects and schools in the country with a view to enlisting their support in the fight against terrorism.

Fourthly, the Somali Government has also engaged the owners of the money-transfer agencies known as *hawala*, who have assured us of their commitment to transparency. *Hawala* owners have pledged to open their records to the United Nations and other interested parties and to share any insightful information with the Somali Government and others.

Finally, a joint committee of cabinet members and members of the Somali Parliament has recently been formed to review the penal code and other laws as part of the country's national obligations under Security Council resolution 1373 (2001).

For the Government's programmes against terrorism to be effective, it is incumbent upon the international community to provide us with all the assistance needed. That assistance can be in the form of training and the provision of logistics for our security services. Failure to do just that might lead to the creation of a vacuum that could contribute to breeding terrorism.

For our part, and for the purpose of enhancing security, we have been able to put in camps over 25,000 militia members to be trained and reintegrated into society. Moreover, 8,000 policemen drawn from those 25,000 individuals have been deployed in and around Mogadishu. I am happy to report that in the capital city there are neither green lines nor checkpoints run by the warlords.

The Somali national army is being re-established to reinforce security and to strengthen peace and stability within the country. Members of the national army will also be instrumental in bringing about the needed security within the framework of the Government's plans related to decentralization and to

the devolution of power to the regions. In that context, my Government has, for the first time in 11 years, started collecting taxes in the capital, Mogadishu; this has been supported enthusiastically by the public.

The progress made by our Government in the continued pursuit of peace and stability in the country was commended at the seventy-fourth ordinary session of the Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), which was convened at Lusaka in July 2001. In its decision on Somalia, the Council of Ministers

"Expresses satisfaction at the progress made by the Transitional National Government in the establishment of peace and security in the country and requests the OAU and the international community to continue to assist the Government in this regard." (CM/Dec.594 (LXXIV), para. 7)

On the question of national reconciliation, the principles upon which that process is built include the following. First, the outcome of the Arta peace process will continue to be the basis for the pursuit of Somali national reconciliation. Secondly, that process will continue to be a Somali process, and the Somali Government will welcome and embrace every positive effort exerted by neighbouring countries and the world community that can facilitate the process. Thirdly, the engagement of those who are outside the Arta peace process through sustained dialogue and negotiations is a crucial component of the national reconciliation endeavour.

In the light of those principles, the Somali Government has succeeded in bringing on board two out of the five factions based in Mogadishu which had not supported the Arta conference. Intensive negotiations are going on with the remaining factions and with the northern administrative entities "Somaliland" and "Puntland".

My Government has recently established the National Reconciliation Commission stipulated by the interim charter. The Commission will be operating independently of the Government and it will be composed of 25 eminent Somali political and other prominent public figures. Its mandate will focus on reconciling all the parties in Somalia, with a view to attaining lasting peace and stability for all Somalis. It is envisaged that the Commission will facilitate the process of the establishment of a federal Government

which will reflect the desires of Somali society as a whole.

My Government's policies with regard to the National Reconciliation Commission are consistent with resolutions adopted by the United Nations, the Organization of the Islamic Conference, the OAU, the League of Arab States and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development. The decisions on Somalia that emanated from the seventh-third and seventy-fourth ordinary sessions of the Council of Ministers of the OAU called upon member States and the international community to assist the Government in its endeavours pertaining to national reconciliation.

In paragraph 3 of the decision on Somalia adopted at the seventy-fourth ordinary session of the Council of Ministers of the OAU, the Council of Ministers

"Reiterates its earlier call to the Transitional National Government (TNG) to intensify its efforts so as to bring about ... lasting national reconciliation, building upon the outcome of the Arta peace process, and supports the efforts aimed at the establishment of the National Reconciliation Commission". (*Ibid.*, para. 3)

Lack of funds and resources has precluded the beginning of the work of the Commission and continues to constitute a major stumbling block. Given the importance of this independent Commission and the role it can play in bringing about lasting peace and stability in Somalia, the international community is called upon to shoulder its responsibility and provide the resources needed to enable the Commission to carry out its work.

In paragraph 9 of the decision on Somalia adopted at the seventy-fourth ordinary session of the Council of Ministers of the OAU, the Council of Ministers

"Requests the Secretary-General [of the OAU] to work closely with IGAD, the League of Arab States, the Organization of the Islamic Conference and the wider international community to continue to support the Transitional National Government in its efforts to sustain reconciliation and reconstruction in Somalia." (*Ibid.*, para. 9)

It is with deep regret that I must report that the warlords continue to be a major impediment to the

national reconciliation process. They orchestrated and have been held responsible for the kidnapping of humanitarian aid workers. That kidnapping perpetrated by the warlords has been condemned by the United Nations and by the European Union, and has unfortunately caused a setback in the peace process. Moreover, paragraph 8 of the decision on Somalia adopted at the seventy-fourth ordinary session of the Council of Ministers of the OAU strongly condemned the warlords who persist in their stubbornness in blocking the peace efforts in Somalia.

The Somali Government welcomes the report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Somalia (S/2001/963). We thank the Secretary-General and the Secretariat for the support they have extended to the National Transitional Government of Somalia. We have a historical link with the United Nations dating back to the time when part of Somalia was placed under United Nations Trusteeship. We also want to acknowledge the role of the Secretary-General and his continuous interest in my country. We believe that the Secretary-General and the Secretariat are genuinely interested in promoting peace and national reconciliation in Somalia. We wish to thank the Secretary-General for his comprehensive report on the situation in Somalia. However, I would like to highlight some points with respect to this report.

We note with regret that the report does not recommend the establishment of a peace-building mission in Somalia. This decision is based on the result of the security assessment carried out by some middle-level field officers stationed in Nairobi.

We believe the failure to establish a peace-building mission in Somalia will send the wrong signal to the international community, particularly the regional and subregional organizations, donors and the warlords. This will further contribute to the vicious circle of inadequate security and the perpetuation of the benign neglect to which Somalia has been subjected over a decade.

In our view, the establishment of a peace-building mission in Somalia is imperative and critical at this moment. We propose the dispatch of a high-level inter-agency United Nations mission to Somalia, with a mandate to critically examine the work of the security office in Nairobi and to re-evaluate, in an objective manner, the security situation in Mogadishu and the whole of Somalia.

In his report, the Secretary-General expressed his intention to consult all concerned on the feasibility and usefulness of setting up a Committee of Friends of Somalia to focus on ways and means of drawing attention to Somalia's needs in the area of national reconciliation, as well as to help mobilize funds for rehabilitation and development. The Government welcomes the idea of the establishment of this Committee. It must, however, be fully engaged in the consultations necessary for designing the framework within which the Committee would function. Members of the Committee must be supportive of peace and stability in Somalia and be willing to play a constructive role and have a genuine interest in building upon Arta and its outcome. Furthermore, during the process of the formation of the Committee, we must take into account the lessons of experience learned with respect to the mechanism of the Committee of Friends, especially in countries like Angola.

We must also address the issue of reconstruction, rehabilitation and development concurrently. My Government inherited a country that was in a shambles, as is very well portrayed in the Secretary-General's report, without financial resources and infrastructure. For the past year, my Government has been operating on a budget of only \$14 million, despite the daunting challenges. We believe that it is unconscionable for the international community to wait and watch while we struggle with such meagre resources.

Briefly put, Somalia has now moved from the struggle for survival to the struggle for peace. We need the United Nations and its partner aid agencies to reflect this change by planning new initiatives. An operational plan to support good governance and peace-building in Somalia is urgently needed. Peace and security are the key to the agenda of the Transitional National Government (TNG) agenda, and there can be no development without peace and security.

This underpins a process by which the people of Somalia would begin the work of putting the country back together. The United Nations and the international community's role are therefore vital for this endeavour.

I thank the Council very much for affording me this opportunity to brief members on the recent developments in Somalia and to share the ideas of my

Government for bringing lasting peace, stability and development to our troubled country.

The President: I thank the Prime Minister of Somalia for his kind words addressed to me.

I should now like to inform the Council that I have received letters from the representatives of Iraq and Kenya, in which they request to be invited to participate in the discussion of the item on the Council's agenda. In conformity with the usual practice, I propose, with the consent of the Council, to invite those representatives to participate in the discussion without the right to vote, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter and rule 37 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure.

There being no objection, it is so decided.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Aldouri (Iraq) and Mr. Jalang'o (Kenya) took the seats reserved for them at the side of the Council Chamber.

The President: I should like to inform the Council that I received a letter dated 18 October 2001 from the Permanent Representative of Mali to the United Nations, which reads as follows:

"I have the honour to request that the Security Council extend an invitation under rule 39 of its provisional rules of procedure to His Excellency Mr. Mokhtar Lamani, Permanent Observer of the Organization of the Islamic Conference to the United Nations, during the Council's discussion of the item entitled 'The situation in Somalia'."

That letter will be published as a document of the Security Council under the symbol S/2001/984.

I invite Mr. Mokhtar Lamani to take the seat reserved for him at the side of the Council Chamber.

Mr. Wang Yingfan (China) (spoke in Chinese): The Chinese delegation would like to welcome Mr. Galaydh, Prime Minister of the Transitional National Government (TNG) of Somalia, for his participation in the meeting. We thank him for his important presentation. We attach importance to his views and proposals, to which we will give serious consideration. We also thank Mr. Stephen, director of the United Nations Political Office for Somalia, for his briefing just now.

Since the establishment of the TNG in Somalia, in order to promote national reconciliation, improve its relations with its neighbours and gain the recognition and support of the international community, it has done a lot of work that deserves our acknowledgement.

However, the situation in Somalia as a whole is not stable. The country remains divided by the various factions. Recently, the political situation that was relatively stable in "Somaliland" and "Puntland" has become precarious. At the same time, the efforts by the relevant parties to promote reconciliation have been shelved, one after another. The peace process in Somalia, in fact, has come to a standstill. This situation is very worrying.

It has to be pointed out that the armed conflict in Somalia has escalated recently. This is intrinsically related to the spread of small arms in the area. The relations among the various parties of Somalia are already complicated enough. Unless the supply of arms to Somalia is cut off, it will be difficult to achieve peace there.

We call upon the parties concerned to base their actions on the long-term interests of peace and stability in the region, to strictly abide by the relevant resolutions of the Security Council on arms sanctions against Somalia and to work more towards reconciliation among the various parties in Somalia, and not against it. The key to the solution to the question of Somalia lies in the common efforts of the Somali people as a whole to achieve broad-based national reconciliation. We sincerely hope that the parties concerned in Somalia will take to heart the overall interests of the nation and country, set aside their past differences and work together in unity to promote the peace process in Somalia.

At the same time, the international community, including the Security Council, should give the necessary impetus to the process of national reconciliation in Somalia. At present, whether we are going to establish some kind of mechanism for reconciliation such as a Committee of Friends of Somalia, as proposed by the Secretary-General in his report, or send a peace-building mission to Somalia, the relevant plans should be put on the agenda right away so that we can take action as soon as possible. We hope that the Secretariat will make further efforts and improve communications with the parties concerned in Somalia, so as to gain their understanding and support.

We support the African Union, the Arab League, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development and the European Union, and hope they will continue to play a positive role.

The current humanitarian situation in Somalia is very grave, and the support and assistance of the international community are needed. For security reasons, some areas have no access to necessary aid. If this stalemate is not broken, the prolonged suffering of the Somali people caused by the war will continue. We appreciate the tireless efforts of the relevant United Nations agencies, non-governmental organizations and donors. We call upon the donor community to respond positively to the consolidated appeals process for Somalia so as to alleviate the suffering of the Somali people. The Chinese Government will, within its capacity, continue to provide humanitarian aid to Somalia.

Mr. Levitte (France) (*spoke in French*): I, too, warmly welcome the Prime Minister of Somalia, Mr. Ali Khalif Galaydh, whom we again had the pleasure of hearing in the Security Council. His last visit to New York, in January, gave us the opportunity to have a very constructive meeting.

The Transitional National Government (TNG) resulting from the Arta process deserves support. Admittedly, the situation is still very precarious. But, as the report of the Secretary-General emphasizes, the completion of the Arta process remains today

"the most viable option for lasting peace in Somalia." (*S/2001/963, para. 57*)

It is necessary that all factions rejoin the Arta process.

A statement will be made later during this meeting by the Permanent Representative of Belgium on behalf of the European Union. France fully endorses that statement, and I will therefore confine myself to some brief comments.

The current situation could engender lethargy. The Security Council first took up the situation in Somalia at the beginning of 1992. The Council has devoted a great deal of energy to the Somali crisis and has adopted almost 20 resolutions on the subject. Those resolutions made possible the deployment of two peacekeeping operations, at a cost of some \$2 billion and involving a multinational force of 37,000 men.

This is not the time to give up. The humanitarian situation, of course, calls for greater involvement by the United Nations. According to the report of the Secretary-General, 750,000 people are in need of international assistance to make up for shortfalls in foodstuffs due to poor past harvests.

Beyond that, in the context of the new situation after 11 September, it is essential to assist Somalia in order to prevent it from becoming another Afghanistan. It would appear that the Al-Itihad Al-Islamiya organization has not had a military presence in Somalia since 1995 or 1996. That is clearly a good thing. But we must prevent new terrorists from finding refuge on Somali territory in the future. The fight against terrorism in Afghanistan and elsewhere will drive the members of terrorist organizations to seek to settle anew in countries where State structures are the weakest. Somalia must not become one of their sanctuaries. That is exactly the wish of the new Somali Government. We must help them to succeed.

Helping Somalia today simultaneously entails peace-building and conflict prevention. Greater involvement by the United Nations is necessary, particularly in the crucial area of police training. The activities of the United Nations Development Programme in this area should be encouraged. I recall that France favours sending a peace-building mission to Somalia as soon as security conditions allow. Security must be assessed regularly. It is essential that a mission from Headquarters be dispatched shortly.

Mr. Mahbubani (Singapore): I join our colleagues and you, Mr. President, in welcoming Prime Minister Ali Khalif Galaydh to the Chamber. We find his presence here very reassuring. It is a sign that things are on track. We also thank Mr. Stephen for his briefing.

I have a text, Mr. President, but I hope you will allow me to divert from it from time to time to respond to other points that have emerged.

The Council will recall that we suggested here a few months ago that it might be helpful to have a brainstorming session on Somalia. Indeed, we are very pleased that, two days ago in the informal consultations room, we had a very rich discussion on Somalia. It was not the usual exchange of written statements; there was a real, candid discussion. As I said at the end of the discussion, we hope that some of it will feed into the United Nations policy. We hope that today's discussion

will build on it by also focusing on how the international community can play a useful role in forging a lasting peace in Somalia.

Certainly, the establishment of the Transitional National Government (TNG), more than a year ago, marked a significant milestone in the search for peace and stability in Somalia. Indeed, one point that we made in the informal consultations was that we should try to imagine what Somalia would be like if we did not have a Transitional National Government. Clearly, this is an asset that we have. We are therefore pleased that, when the Security Council last met the Prime Minister, in January, the Council sent a strong signal of support and, indeed, welcomed the outcome of the Arta peace process. Now it is time to take stock to see what more can be done to encourage the budding peace process. There have been some improvements, and, indeed, in our text we quote from the report of the Secretary-General, which points out that

"The TNG inherited no personnel, buildings, archives, forces of law and order or tax-collecting capacity."

Despite this, the report continues,

"Ministries are beginning to function and a number of buildings have been rehabilitated for their use. A judiciary is gradually coming into place, with Sharia courts and their militia being absorbed by the TNG. Personnel are gradually being put in place to take charge of a police system in the capital and police have returned to all 14 district police stations in Mogadishu under a command structure." (S/2001/963, para. 8)

However, the report goes on to highlight that the TNG has found it impossible, for the time being, to introduce similar law and order arrangements in other parts of Somalia due to a lack of resources. While the TNG has been able to gradually establish key State institutions, in addition to a functioning administration in and around Mogadishu, more assistance is clearly required. The report has concluded that

"the completion of the Arta process remains the most viable option for lasting peace in Somalia." (*ibid.*, para. 57).

I hope that we will again endorse the Arta process when we come up with a presidential statement.

The Secretary-General's report also states that

"there was broad agreement that the Somali situation required urgent attention and that the TNG could be the basis for completing the Djibouti peace process." (*ibid.*, para. 38)

One of the more encouraging things that Mr. Stephen told us two days ago that the people of Somalia are indeed war-weary and increasingly supportive of a national political solution that is no longer based on clan or factional affinities. As I told Mr. Stephen two days ago, we should try to build on this desire that the Somali people now have to move away from the clan-based system to a restoration of the nation and the national structure. If this is, indeed, the feeling of the Somali people, then we in the Council should send a strong signal of encouragement to the TNG and to the Somali people. As I said earlier, we hope that we will do so with the presidential statement to be adopted later. In this respect, I would like to thank Ambassador Kolby, of Norway, for agreeing to circulate a draft for our consideration.

We would like to make a few brief points with regard to the subject of today's discussion.

First, we stress that there is a need to adopt what we call a "comprehensive" approach for Somalia. We cannot simply drift along; nor can we focus only on the provision of humanitarian assistance and neglect the other critical aspects of peace-building and the establishment of a stable Government. Members of the Council may recall that we advocated similar comprehensive solutions to other problems facing the Security Council, including the situation in Afghanistan.

That brings me to my second, related point, that we really should take a fresh look at the situation in Somalia in the light of the events of 11 September. It is now clearly in the interests of the entire international community to encourage the establishment of stable Governments all around the world. Otherwise, as has already been shown, terrorists and other extremist elements can easily exploit pockets of instability to set up their operations. If I heard the Prime Minister accurately, he mentioned that a vacuum in Somalia could, indeed, provide the sort of pockets that the terrorists are looking for. I hope that the Council will bear that in mind.

We note that comparisons have been drawn, both publicly and privately, between Afghanistan and Somalia. Robert Orr, a National Security Council

official in the Clinton Administration, was recently quoted in *The New York Times* as referring to the present Afghanistan situation as "Somalia-plus". By the same token, we in the Council should be mindful to ensure that Somalia does not become an "Afghanistan-minus" for the international community. Unfortunately, the parallels are compelling. Like Afghanistan, Somalia did not function as a State throughout the 1990s and, as the Ambassador of China said, it remains awash with arms. Indeed, earlier this week, when members of the Security Council met in private consultations to discuss the situation in Afghanistan, they cautioned against allowing Afghanistan to become a "Somalia 1993". By extension, we should ensure that Somalia does not become an "Afghanistan 2001".

Thirdly, we see the restoration of a United Nations peace-building presence as being crucial to Somalia's recovery. We note that the Secretary-General's report concludes that conditions are not suitable for the deployment of a peace-building office in Somalia. Certainly, we agree that the safety and security of United Nations personnel should be a fundamental principle in our considerations. There was also a long discussion of this issue in the informal consultations. While, as everyone agreed, we should emphasize the safety and security of United Nations personnel, we should also ensure that the deployment of a United Nations office is not held hostage by a warlord or two. We must find the right balance to ensure that the United Nations is able to be effectively supportive of the TNG. Here, I am pleased that Ambassador Levitte, speaking earlier, called for regular assessments of the security situation to enable us to decide how quickly we can move forward with the establishment of a peace-building office, because there seems to be a general recognition that such an office could, indeed, play a helpful role in Somalia.

Fourthly, we reaffirm our belief that a solution to the situation in Somalia must be based on respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence and unity of Somalia. Unfortunately, because these words are repeated so often, people sometimes forget that they are actually very important. Indeed, the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence and unity of Somalia must always be respected. We therefore urge all States to refrain from any military intervention in the internal situation in Somalia; Somali territory should not be used to undermine the stability of the region. Any violation of

the arms embargo imposed under resolution 733 (1992) should be reported to the sanctions Committee for the appropriate follow-up.

In conclusion, Somalia has clearly been one the biggest failures of the United Nations — that is a matter of public record. As we said in January, to this day Somalia remains a stain on the conscience of the United Nations. Today, we may finally have the opportunity to turn a new page in Somalia's history and perhaps put it on the right road. We hope that today's discussion will help to establish that. We look forward to hearing the views of other delegations, both members and non-members of the Council, and we hope that our collective wisdom today will prevail over the ghosts of the past.

Mr. Krokmal (Ukraine): I, too, would like to thank you, Mr. President, for convening this meeting. I would also like to thank the Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. David Stephen, for his comprehensive briefing. My delegation welcomes Prime Minister Ali Khalif Galaydh, who is participating in today's meeting. We are grateful for his important statement.

The most recent reviews of the situation in Somalia, including the report of the Secretary-General, enable us to draw the conclusion that, while some improvements have been made, there are still many hurdles ahead. The international media have reported that another tragic incident took place in southern Mogadishu on Tuesday. A truck hired by the International Committee of the Red Cross was attacked at a checkpoint controlled by militia loyal to Mogadishu faction leader Usman Hasan Ali Ato. It has been reported that one of the truck's security guards was killed and that two were wounded. We would be grateful to the Secretariat for providing all the information available with regard to these reports.

We are seriously concerned about the continuing instability in Somalia and its negative impact on the security and humanitarian situation and the well-being of the civilian population. The possible links of some warlords to international terrorist networks are also cause for very serious concern. We are convinced that political dialogue is the only way to achieve a lasting settlement of the conflict in Somalia. In this regard, we believe that the continuation of the Arta process remains the most valuable option in the search for peace and reconciliation in Somalia. We urge the

Somali people to continue down this difficult path and to embrace this opportunity for peace.

I would like to stress the importance of the widest possible participation of the representatives of all parts of Somali society in the efforts to rehabilitate the country. In this regard, we welcome the commitment of the Transitional National Government and of other Somali leaders to engage in a dialogue without preconditions in the interests of the people of Somalia. It is important that the momentum that has been achieved be maintained and that the parties demonstrate their commitment and the flexibility needed to continue the process of national reconciliation.

We firmly believe that the solution of the Somali question is in the hands of the Somalis themselves. It is essential that warlords and faction leaders desist from obstructing and undermining the efforts to achieve peace. It would be absolutely unacceptable to allow the success of reconciliation to depend on the whims of warlords. We therefore need to define the steps to be taken by the Security Council and other international actors to prevent the destabilizing impact of warlords and faction leaders.

International support for Somalia is also of critical importance. A key role for the international community at this stage is to support the peace process, the establishment of the rule of law and the creation of impartial national, political and judicial institutions in Somalia. In this connection, we support the Secretary-General's proposal related to a relevant framework for inter-Somali negotiations, in particular the establishment of the National Commission for Reconciliation and Property Settlement.

We also support resuming periodic ambassadorial meetings on Somalia in New York and the work of the Standing Committee on Somalia in Addis Ababa. We believe that the proposal on setting up a Committee of Friends of Somalia is a helpful one in terms of sustaining that effort. We are of the view that cooperation between the Security Council, the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the League of Arab States and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) are essential for guaranteeing the effective participation of the international community in the efforts to resolve the conflict in Somalia. We believe that the Security Council should study carefully the observations regarding the deployment of a peace-

building office in Somalia, contained in the Secretary-General's latest report.

My delegation fully shares the Secretary-General's security assessment and would like to emphasize that ensuring the safety and security of peacekeeping personnel is a major precondition for effective United Nations activities in this area.

In conclusion, my delegation believes that today's meeting of the Security Council, as well as the recent consultations on Somalia, will demonstrate that there are no forgotten items on the Security Council agenda, and we hope that the Council will help make a real breakthrough in the Somali issue.

Mr. Granovsky (Russian Federation) (*spoke in Russian*): We associate ourselves with the words of gratitude addressed to the Prime Minister of Somalia for his important statement. We also listened closely and with interest to the instructive briefing offered by the Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. David Stephen.

The Russian Federation has always supported the speedy attainment in Somalia of national reconciliation on the basis of respect for the territorial integrity of the Somali State. The success of settlement in that country depends on whether it will be possible to involve in that process all the leading forces of society, including those that boycotted the peace conference in Arta. The Security Council must continue to support the efforts being made in this area, including the efforts made by the new Somali leadership.

We welcome the point made in the Secretary-General's report regarding the willingness of the transitional national Government of Somalia and a number of groups to engage in dialogue without preconditions, and we call upon those who have not yet done so to follow their example. The priority of this dialogue should be to reach agreement on halting violence and securing due security in the field.

We agree with the circumspect approach described by the Secretary-General about the question of establishing a United Nations peace-building mission in Somalia. We support the idea of dispatching to Mogadishu an interagency mission to assess the security situation there. The job of United Nations Members at this stage is to provide favourable external conditions for resolving the protracted conflict in Somalia.

As members of the Security Council, we will follow the situation closely to see that the territory of Somalia is not used to undermine the peace process in that country and to destabilize the situation in the Horn of Africa as a whole. All countries must continue to abide strictly by the arms embargo against Somalia. We welcome the Secretary-General's intention to stimulate an exchange of views within the United Nations between the main external players in the Somali settlement, and we are prepared to participate actively in it.

With regard to the idea of setting up a Committee of Friends of Somalia, in principle that idea merits attention. We deem to be long overdue the need to work out a uniform approach on the part of the international community to provide support for the peace process in Somalia. In this connection, we think it is useful that that body should help resolve the competition between the various peace initiatives on Somalia. Accordingly, its composition, apart from members of IGAD and the Partners Forum, should include other interested players as well, including Security Council members.

While we share the concern at the complex humanitarian situation in a number of areas of Somalia, we welcome the work done by United Nations programmes that provide assistance to that people wherever security conditions exist for that work. We call upon the Somali parties actively to facilitate the work of United Nations humanitarian personnel for the good of their own people. As a member Security Council member and by virtue of its longstanding friendship with the people of Somalia, Russia will continue to promote the restoration of its statehood on terms that are in keeping with the interests of the Somalis themselves and with security interests in the region.

Mr. Jerandi (Tunisia) (*spoke in French*): We think this discussion is extremely important first because of the gravity of the problem of Somalia and because it is an opportunity for us to hear the views of Mr. Ali Khalif Galaydh, Prime Minister of Somalia, whom I welcome.

I would also like to thank Mr. David Stephen, Representative of the Secretary-General, for his instructive and thorough introduction to the Secretary-General's report and for having briefed us on recent developments in Somalia. I wish once again to express

my Government's support for the ongoing tireless efforts made by Mr. Stephen in support of the cause of peace and national reconciliation in Somalia. I would also like to take this opportunity to stress once again the need to keep the Security Council informed at regular frequent intervals about developments in Somalia.

In Somalia we are facing one of the most complex and alarming situations. My delegation has constantly drawn the urgent attention of the Council to this. As a guarantor, under the Charter, of the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, the Council can no longer continue to be a passive bystander in the face of a tragedy that had gone on too long and the result of which has been the de facto dismemberment of the Somali State and almost total marginalization of a nation that has been abandoned to its fate, riven by a struggle whose finer points escape it and bereft of the dignity to which it is entitled, like any other nation.

Today the world has finally become aware — unfortunately, at the heaviest price — of the multitude of threats to international peace and security. This awareness will have served no purpose if we continue to turn a blind eye to the real risks inherent in the situation that prevails in Somalia.

The Secretary-General has given a sombre account of the situation and has concluded, because of security considerations, that it was impossible for him at this stage to recommend the dispatch of a peace-building mission to Somalia.

We appreciate the reasons adduced by the Secretary-General. We are also aware of the unique nature of the situation in Somalia compared to other situations where the United Nations has intervened without demanding ahead of time full security guarantees.

But maintaining the status quo in Somalia is not an option, and the Secretary-General's recommendations are not sufficient to advance a solution to the crisis in Somalia. It is time now to define the roles of the various external actors and, in particular, the role of the Security Council in the Somali problem. I wish to state here that we are in no way suggesting that it is up to these actors to decide on the future of Somalia, because this is the responsibility of the Somalis themselves. What I mean is that it is the duty of these actors to help Somalia resolve the

deadlock in which it has found itself for almost 10 years.

The Arta process provides us the most viable context in which to act in order to bring about peace and national reconciliation in Somalia. The Transitional National Government has acted diligently to draw up concrete programmes to that end and has sought the support of the international community and the United Nations to implement those programmes. The Government has managed — although its appeal for financial assistance has not elicited the desired response from the international community — to start to implement these projects in the urgent areas of security and recovery. It continues to make efforts to involve the recalcitrant parties in the peace process, which, I stress, has been endorsed by the entire people of Somalia.

The success of the Transitional National Government is certainly limited, but any Government would have been in the same situation had it not been given the necessary support and had its efforts met with such fierce resistance, which has prevented an international presence in the country.

The future of Somalia is a great unknown, and we need urgently to try to define it. This discussion should be used to produce a common specific vision of the role of the United Nations and the Security Council.

Tunisia believes that this role should be based on the following main elements: first, specific action should be taken in order to preserve the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and unity of Somalia, all of which should be non-negotiable. Secondly, we must prevent and put an end to any attempts to interfere, whatever form they may take, in the internal affairs of Somalia, in keeping with the provisions of the United Nations Charter. Thirdly, we must prevent and discourage the proliferation of initiatives and processes parallel to the Arta process, which remains the only viable process for achieving lasting peace and national reconciliation in Somalia.

Fourthly, we must mobilize the necessary assistance for the Transitional National Government so that it can establish and implement its plans to rebuild the country. Fifthly, we must continue to discuss the matter of the United Nations presence in the field in Somalia, and we need to start to study in depth the mandate of the Political Office for Somalia with a view to expanding it so that it can duly support the process

towards peace and national reconciliation in the country.

The problem of Somalia can no longer be addressed without placing it in the context of the world today — a world that cannot and must not tolerate the existence of forgotten areas of tension. We must all act without delay to prevent such a situation, thus guaranteeing the restoration of the Somali State and its rehabilitation within the international community.

The challenge is clear, and the need to meet that challenge is obvious. The time for action is now. The Security Council must act robustly and play its role. This is our conclusion, and it is the appeal we make today.

Mr. Eldon (United Kingdom): I would like to thank David Stephen for his very useful introduction to our discussion today and to welcome the Prime Minister to the Security Council and to New York. It is a real pleasure to see you here again, Sir.

I would like, as you did, Mr. Prime Minister, to start my intervention with a reference to terrorism and to the situation that we all face in the aftermath of the 11 September attacks. I know that Sir Jeremy Greenstock was very pleased to hear from you directly, not least in his capacity as Chairman of the counter-terrorism Committee of the Security Council, about the initiatives that you have taken to start moving towards the implementation of resolution 1373 (2001), which you announced to us today. I think this is very important, not least because, as Ambassador Levitte, said, terrorists are going to get squeezed. And it is very important to deny them havens where they can operate somehow with impunity.

This has implications for us all, and it will be particularly important to avoid pockets of vacuum where they are able to operate because there is no authority to stop them from doing that. That in turn underlines to me the importance in the context of Somalia of making sure that we do achieve peace and reconciliation in a way that will bring into play all the various elements and forces in the country on an inclusive basis.

Sadly, in terms of the security situation at least, the positive signals from the Somalia Reconciliation and Restoration Council and from the Transitional National Government, before the Organization of African Unity (OAU) summit in Lusaka in July, do not

seem to have borne fruit. As Ambassador Wang of China said — and I have a great deal of sympathy with everything in his statement — fighting has increased, and we are concerned in particular about the political instability in "Puntland". We need to find a way to stop this continuous cycle of violence, and that cycle of violence will be stopped only through dialogue.

In this connection, Mr. Prime Minister, it was very helpful to hear of your commitment to engaging those outside the Arta process. Taken together with what David Stephen had to say about the basis of the Transitional National Government being a transition towards the solution that we would all like to see, I think that makes for an encouraging background. We will be very interested to see how the independent Commission to which you referred, Mr. Prime Minister, performs in terms of providing a nucleus to bring together all the forces in Somalia towards a final settlement of the sort we all want.

David Stephen referred to "divide and rule" in the context of external initiatives. I would only partly agree with him. I think external initiatives, where they can help, are useful, and we would encourage the Ethiopian and Kenyan Governments to restart their facilitation efforts, as mandated by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development. It is vital that Somalia's neighbours and other States in the region play a constructive role in efforts to bring peace and stability.

In this connection, we very much welcome the recent meeting in Nairobi between academics from the Transitional National Government, "Somaliland" and "Puntland" aimed at exploring how federalism might work in Somalia. We strongly believe that this approach, drawing on local structures and encouraging wider involvement in the reconciliation process, is a realistic way forward. We should, I think, be seriously looking at the idea of a federal devolved model for a future Somalia as a realistic way of breaking the political deadlock.

This brings me to the United Nations role. It seems to me that the essential requirement, however it is achieved in practice, is for the United Nations to be able to contribute actively towards facilitating the sort of future structures, future settlement and future solutions to which we have all referred in this debate. On the question of a peace-building office, I think we have no option but to accept the Secretary-General's

advice that, for security and other reasons, the time is not yet right to establish such an office. I have listened carefully to those who have argued, like Ambassador Levitte, that there should be a security assessment mission to look again at the possibilities for this. We would have no difficulties with that, but it is very important, not least in terms of our own commitment as a Council to the security of United Nations staff, that the process should remain an objective, technical process that correctly balances the risks. The pressures to move in are understandable, but we must, I think, respect the views of the professionals as we take decisions in this tricky area.

On the proposal for a Committee of Friends, again, we are prepared to look at this. But, as I think the Prime Minister himself hinted in his statement, it is important that the Committee of Friends should have clear objectives and be able to demonstrate exactly how it would advance the peace process.

Sustainable improvements in the humanitarian situation in Somalia will be impossible without political reconciliation. We note that development programmes, though nascent, are active in Somalia. The work of the United Nations Development Programme in supporting good governance programmes and in stimulating pro-poor economic growth strategies are important elements in the long-term peace-building process. We support them, and we hope others will too. We also agree with the Secretary-General's observations that further steps need to be taken to assist in the building of a sustainable peace.

The United Kingdom believes that the robust framework that is needed must continue to include a strong development perspective and to recognize the fundamental contribution of development activities to lasting peace in Somalia.

None of what I have just said should be taken as detracting in any way from the statement which will be made later on in the debate by the representative of Belgium on behalf of the European Union, to which my delegation, of course, fully subscribes.

Mr. Valdivieso (Colombia) (*spoke in Spanish*): I also wish to begin by welcoming in our midst the Prime Minister of Somalia, Mr. Ali Khalif Galaydh, and his participation in the discussion on the situation in Somalia — in this open format, which is a very good development.

We also wish to thank Mr. Stephen, the head of the United Nations Political Office for Somalia, for his presentation of the Secretary-General's report. Aside from this week's consultations, the last time the Security Council took up this issue in depth was in August, when we received extensive information on the humanitarian situation. On that occasion, an exhaustive study was done and we were able to appreciate the immense potential that a decisive involvement of United Nations agencies had.

Now, we wish to present some general considerations that might contribute to the discussion on a well-defined and appropriate role for the Security Council in Somalia's national reconciliation process.

We are convinced that Somalia poses a series of challenges for the international community in the political and humanitarian domains, in which the United Nations system cannot completely avoid involvement. We are completely convinced of this, though aware that recent history and the conditions of security prevalent in several areas of Somalia do not favour the carrying-out of sustained multilateral activities that could have substantial impact on the ground.

However, we wish to affirm that it is precisely this complex context in which we are acting that must collectively motivate us on the Council to take decisions contributing to the strengthening of the efforts made by other regional and national actors, keeping in mind that all of us desire the reconstruction, the cohesion and the reconciliation of the country.

That is why Colombia considers that the Secretariat and the Security Council must offer sustained political support to the transitional Government. This is the only visible and viable effort on the national level, and if we do not offer the Government the necessary support, we will find ourselves in the same situation as before, but without a legitimate interlocutor inside the country.

At the regional level, we appreciate the various regional initiatives, and we believe that they must be the centre of attention of any effort that is taken from New York. We do not conceive the Council as a substitute for regional activities. On the contrary, we believe that the Council should complement and politically reinforce the solutions proposed by Africans in response to African problems. In this sense, we welcome the efforts extended by the Intergovernmental

Authority for Development, and the political coordination extended by the Organization for African Unity, including the possibility of convening a national reconciliation conference.

We do not know if these regional initiatives will produce the desired results, but we firmly believe that this is the best way to guarantee that the Arta process can move forward in the right direction. For that reason, we call for examining the situation in Somalia from a regional focus that involves all internal and external actors in the search for a common result: the attainment of peace, stability and normality in the entire territory.

I wish to conclude by articulating three specific considerations on the humanitarian situation, the presence of the United Nations and the creation of a Committee of Friends, as has been suggested.

First, with respect to humanitarian activities and development, the Security Council must demonstrate its commitment to the work already being carried out by United Nations agencies and by other humanitarian organizations. Even when it is evident that the Council's action is not essential to the work of these organizations and agencies, the Council's total inaction and isolation could be counterproductive for carrying out these humanitarian and development activities.

Secondly, we have taken note of the Secretary-General's opinion that the security conditions necessary for opening a peace-building office do not exist. Given the importance this office has for the process of unification and reconciliation in Somalia, we wish to encourage that a thorough review of security in Somalia, as suggested by the Secretary-General in paragraph 71 of his report, be undertaken without delay.

Finally, we have noted the proposal to create a Committee of Friends. Colombia, of course, does not oppose an idea of this kind, especially in the absence of political alternatives for Somalia. However, we want to point out that a Committee of Friends is recommendable only as long as it strengthens the regional capacity for resolving the situation in Somalia; strengthens political and financial support for the transitional Government; contributes to defining an appropriate role for the Security Council in dealing with this situation and prevents a greater breach between the Council and the situation on the ground.

Mr. Rosenblatt (United States of America): We would like to welcome our Somali friends, Prime Minister Ali Khalif Galaydh and other members of the transitional Government back to the Security Council, and express to them our desire to work with all Somalis of goodwill on the difficult but necessary task of rebuilding their country. We thank them for the update on developments in their country and note in particular Prime Minister Galaydh's words with regard to the implementation of our common struggle against terrorism.

We also thank the Secretary-General for his recent report on Somalia and share his concern about the suffering of the Somali people. We should also like to note our appreciation for Mr. Stephen's introduction of that report.

We have heard reference to the suggestion of establishing a friends of Somalia group here this morning and in our informal consultations. We welcome further discussion of the feasibility and utility of such a grouping and look forward to our own active engagement in this regard.

We also note the Secretary-General's conclusion that the current security situation in Somalia precludes the establishment of a peace-building office at this time. The key phrase is "at this time". We have complete confidence that the Secretariat will balance its deep concern for the welfare of the Somali people with its equally deep concern for the safety of United Nations personnel in gauging the feasibility of such an office. The message to those who wish to see an expanded United Nations presence is that their advocacy efforts need to be focused on Somalia, not on New York.

Even as we have this discussion, we will continue to work with the Secretariat and with our partners to identify programmes that can be undertaken for the benefit of the Somali people, within acceptable risks. We should not set the bar so high that nothing can be done inside Somalia; rather, we must do what we can in current conditions. At the same time, we must all do what we can to improve the situation.

We believe that the people of Somalia control their own political destiny. A future expansion of the United Nations presence in Somalia, however important, cannot substitute for the will of the Somali people to reclaim their country from chaos. The search

for political legitimacy must proceed inside Somalia, and it must go Somali by Somali.

In our view, no single group has yet succeeded in achieving that legitimacy. It is not for the United States Government, the Security Council or any other outside power to determine who is the legitimate representative of the Somali people. The United States will support Somali leaders, organizations and individuals who are committed to peaceful political reconciliation and the rule of law.

A critical mass of Somalis determined to work together in peace and democracy to rebuild their shattered country is the only legitimizing force that means anything. Our responsibility as the Security Council and as individual member States is to figure out how we can support the coming together of that critical mass.

The tragic conditions that originally spurred us to action in Somalia still exist. When the United Nations peacekeeping mission went into Somalia, it did not seek to conquer or occupy. It went to save lives — African lives, Muslim lives, human lives — an imperative that remains central to all our efforts. The sabotage of the peacekeeping mission was not done by the people of Somalia, nor was it done for the people of Somalia.

I want to assure the Council that my Government remains deeply committed to and concerned about the plight of our friends, the people of Somalia. We look forward to additional discussions on this issue.

Mr. Kolby (Norway): Norway welcomes this opportunity to exchange information and views with concerned Member States regarding the situation in Somalia and the efforts to bring lasting peace to the country. We are pleased to welcome, once again, Prime Minister Galaydh of the Transitional National Government (TNG) to the Council.

Norway commends the United Nations Political Office for Somalia and the Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. David Stephen, for their tireless support towards peace in Somalia. We emphasize the importance of sustained and comprehensive United Nations efforts for Somalia on the political, humanitarian and development levels.

Norway views efforts to further peace-building and stability in Somalia in a long-term perspective. Completion of the Arta peace process remains a key

priority and the only available option for lasting peace in Somalia. We encourage the Transitional National Government, political parties and leaders, traditional leaders and factions in Somalia to continuously make every effort to complete the Arta process through dialogue and the involvement of all parties in a spirit of mutual accommodation and tolerance. We call on all parties to refrain from actions that serve to undermine the outcome of the Arta peace process. While the search for a national solution continues, it is also important that unwavering attention be paid to achieving local political settlements in Somalia.

Concerted involvement on the part of the international community could help facilitate this process and we welcome the intent of the Organization of African Unity to field a mission to Somalia in this regard. We also value the efforts of the United Nations, the Red Cross and Red Crescent movement and other humanitarian and development agencies in assisting the Somali people in all regions of the country.

Continuous and unimpeded humanitarian and development assistance is now more than ever essential to meet humanitarian needs, to secure and strengthen the fragile stability already obtained in some regions and to build the basis for stability in other regions. We strongly encourage the Members of the United Nations to contribute generously to the Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeals for Somalia.

We further support the process initiated by the United Nations to review the functions of the Somalia Aid Coordination Body in order to facilitate a concerted approach towards Somalia by the international community.

A central task in the peace-building process is disarmament, not least with respect to small arms, within Somali society. We acknowledge the Transitional National Government's efforts in this regard. The international community needs to discuss how the TNG's efforts for broad disarmament, demobilization and rehabilitation in Somalia can best be supported.

Norway strongly condemns the attack this past weekend on a police station in Mogadishu, resulting in the deaths of a number of officers and civilians. We note, however, that there nonetheless seems to have been some improvement in the security situation in Somalia recently and stress that peace-building in Somalia should not be held hostage to deliberate

actions by a small subset of Somalis to prevent the country from returning to normalcy and rehabilitation of its governing structures. Against this background, we encourage the United Nations to carry out a comprehensive security assessment in Somalia, which we understand would be the first of its kind since 1995.

We must seek to introduce appropriate support structures in Somalia, *inter alia*, to avoid the country's becoming a safe haven for terrorists. The 11 September events have changed the world and we cannot pretend otherwise.

We call on the concerned States in the Horn of Africa to contribute constructively to the peace efforts in Somalia. The situation in Somalia and the objective of long-term regional stability can most effectively be addressed if neighbouring States reinforce the process of national reconciliation and the process of rebuilding national institutions in Somalia. We call on all States and other actors to comply scrupulously with the arms embargo established by resolution 733 (1992).

We recognize Ethiopia's genuine right to patrol its border with Somalia, but also encourage Ethiopia to use its influence with the Somalia Reconciliation and Restoration Council and its members to promote reconciliation with the Transitional National Government.

We acknowledge Djibouti's major contribution to the Arta process and welcome its continued role in furthering peace and reconciliation in Somalia.

We encourage the Secretary-General to consult all concerned on the feasibility of setting up a committee of friends of Somalia to facilitate exchange of information and coordination of efforts among regional actors and to focus on ways and means to draw attention to Somalia's needs in the area of national reconciliation. Such a committee should be based in the region. It should facilitate concerted approaches and should contribute to the regional capacity to explore and advance national reconciliation in Somalia. It should consolidate support for completion of the Arta process and should interact closely with the Security Council in that regard. We also strongly support the role of the OAU and of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development in this context.

Mr. Koonjul (Mauritius): My delegation would like to join you, Mr. President, and previous speakers in extending a very warm welcome to His Excellency

Mr. Galaydh, Prime Minister of the Transitional National Government (TNG) of Somalia, and to the other members of his delegation. We sincerely hope that today's meeting will provide an opportunity to have a thorough exchange of views on the situation in Somalia and will pave the way for a vigorous renewal of the United Nations relationship with the Transitional National Government in the larger interest and welfare of the Somali people. I also wish to thank Mr. David Stephen, the Representative of the Secretary-General, for his useful briefing this morning.

The report of the Secretary-General (S/2001/963) comes at a very opportune moment, especially since the last one was issued in December of last year. During the intervening period, we have witnessed quite a few developments in Somalia, some very positive and others not quite so positive. Since its installation, the TNG has been confronted with the enormous and daunting challenge of the political reconciliation, reconstruction and development of Somalia. We are all aware that for 10 years Somalia was devoid of any formal national institutions; the TNG inherited an extremely poor legacy, and it had to start from point zero.

Today, the problems faced by Somalia and by the TNG fall mainly into two categories: achieving national reconciliation on the political front while respecting the sovereignty, territorial integrity and unity of Somalia; and achieving the socio-economic reconstruction of the country.

It is encouraging to note from the report that the TNG has begun to set up national institutions. Ministries have started to function, a judiciary is gradually coming into place, and militia members are being demobilized and reintegrated. We also find that the Transitional National Government is doing the needful to have a police system in the capital. These are all indications that the TNG is proceeding, slowly but surely, in the right direction in the reconstruction process. The progress so far achieved may not quite meet the expectations of the international community. But we need to ask ourselves whether the international community has remained sufficiently engaged to help and support the TNG, as it committed itself to doing following the conclusion of the Arta process. In accordance with the Transitional National Assembly constitution, democratic elections are scheduled for 2003. The TNG therefore needs to address the basic political problems, particularly national reconciliation,

and the country's economic and development challenges, in anticipation of the elections.

The humanitarian situation in Somalia continues to be very precarious: 750,000 people are today in need of assistance to cover food shortfalls stemming from past harvest failures. Furthermore, the report states that in the current year, programmes linked to the TNG received virtually no assistance from international donors. It also states that in 2000, of the \$115.5 million resulting from international donor assistance, 42 per cent went to projects in the "Somaliland" and "Puntland" areas, 31 per cent went to the South and the remaining 27 per cent was spent on programmes implemented on a country-wide basis. Those facts give the impression that the efforts made by the TNG are not being given full and due recognition. Unless there is clear, genuine engagement by the international community to help the TNG in moving ahead in this perilous endeavour, we feel it will be difficult to see the results expected from the TNG.

The TNG has made several calls for greater involvement by the international community in Somalia in the form of a peace-building mission. It has so many times been said in this Chamber that post-conflict peace-building seeks to prevent the resurgence of conflict and to create the conditions necessary for a sustained peace in war-torn societies. This is extremely relevant in the case of Somalia. My delegation considers that the TNG should be given maximum support to sustain its current policies of administrative rehabilitation in the country. That will in turn enhance its ability to initiate dialogue with the other factions in the process of national reconciliation.

There is another important security aspect that has become particularly significant since the 11 September incident. Paragraph 56 of the Secretary-General's report refers to the Somali-based organization Al-Itihad Al-Islamiya and to its suspected terrorist links. Past events have shown us that failed States are more prone to be a breeding ground for terrorist activities. We have even seen reports alluding to the possibility of some notorious terrorists seeking other safe havens. In that regard, we welcome the actions taken by the TNG to combat terrorism, which were announced earlier by the Prime Minister. It is thus in the interest of us all to have a strong, stable Government in Somalia, especially when the world is showing its commitment and is getting fully geared up to combat terrorism. That is an additional reason why

the TNG should today be given all the assistance and help it deserves.

Following the conclusion of the Arta process, the United Nations declared its intention to assist in the Somalia peace-building process with the possible deployment of a peace-building mission. Unfortunately, in view of the negative security assessment, this has not so far been effected. My delegation believes that the security situation in Somalia, since the installation of the TNG, has improved in many ways. We note, for example, that some countries have opened up resident missions in Mogadishu, and we believe that the United Nations should consider opening an office in the country. In my delegation's view, the incidents of 14 October, almost on the eve of our deliberations here, were not coincidental and were designed to affect the credibility of the TNG. My delegation fully supports the appeal made by others at this table to the Secretary-General to arrange for a thorough security assessment by an inter-agency team from United Nations Headquarters, so that the much-awaited peace-building mission can be deployed in the near future. We also feel that such a mission should work closely with the TNG.

On the political front, we believe that the completion of the Arta process remains the most viable option for a lasting peace in Somalia. We once again call upon all the political groups in Somalia to engage in peaceful and constructive dialogue with the TNG. The TNG was formed last year with the blessing of the United Nations, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and several of the other countries of the region, and we strongly condemn any other force or so-called alliance which attempts to supplant the TNG. We believe that the people of Somalia are now more willing to move away from clan-based groups; we encourage the TNG to win the confidence of more Somalis and faction leaders. However, the TNG should be fully committed and determined to achieve its goals of bringing peace, reconciliation and economic prosperity to the country. To attain those objectives, the TNG cannot afford to bring about any split within its ranks.

In this process, the cooperation and collaboration of the countries of the region, in particular the neighbours of Somalia, will be of the utmost importance. We call upon them to have in mind, above all, the interests of the Somali people and the importance to their own countries of regional peace

and stability when they frame their policies vis-à-vis their neighbour.

We support the proposal of considering the establishment of a Committee of Friends. But we must ensure that this does not result in a greater proliferation of initiatives which can further impede the search for a comprehensive solution.

Before concluding, I would like to put a couple of questions to Mr. David Stephen. The first one relates to the flow of arms. Does he consider that, following the lifting of the arms embargo on Ethiopia and Eritrea, there has been any impact on the flow of arms into Somalia? With regard to the security situation, given that he has been on the ground for some time, I would like to get his own assessment as to whether he feels that there has indeed been any improvement.

Miss Durrant (Jamaica): The Security Council is meeting today to examine the situation in Somalia with a view to advancing the peace-building process and consolidating the peace. We are therefore pleased to welcome the Prime Minister of Somalia as well as the Representative of the Secretary-General, and thank them for their important contributions to our debate. We also wish to express appreciation to the Secretary-General for his report, which provides an account of the political developments and an assessment of the security and humanitarian situations, and examines the possibility of establishing a United Nations post-conflict peace-building presence in Somalia.

When we met last January, the Transitional National Government (TNG) had just taken office. We are now pleased to salute the Prime Minister of the Transitional National Government, and wish to express our solidarity. We recognize that although many challenges remain, there is little doubt that there have been several advances. We agree with the Prime Minister that there can be no development without peace and security, and the question that we must ask ourselves is, what can the international community and the Security Council, in particular, do to assist the people of Somalia?

From our perspective, the first thing we need to do is to underline our strong support for the Transitional National Government and its efforts for national reconciliation. We take our cue from the Organization of African Unity (OAU), and we note that paragraph 33 of the Secretary-General's report states,

"The OAU Council of Ministers ... reiterated, inter alia, the OAU commitment to the unity, territorial integrity and sovereignty of Somalia; called on the TNG to intensify efforts to build upon the outcome of the Arta process; supported the efforts aimed at the establishment of the NCRPS (National Commission for Reconciliation and Property Settlement); and reaffirmed that a lasting solution to the conflict in Somalia could be found only through dialogue and the involvement of all the parties in a spirit of mutual accommodation and tolerance. The Council of Ministers also commended those political forces in Somalia that had agreed to engage in this process without preconditions, and strongly condemned the warlords who persisted in their stubbornness in blocking the peace efforts in Somalia. Finally, OAU requested its Secretary-General, in close cooperation with the regional organizations concerned, to continue to support the TNG in its efforts to sustain reconciliation and reconstruction in Somalia."

It is against this background that my delegation would be prepared to support the Secretary-General's proposal for the establishment of a Committee of Friends. We have noted that consultations involving Djibouti, Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya, Saudi Arabia, the Sudan, Yemen, the League of Arab States and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) were carried out, and that there was broad agreement that the Somali situation required urgent attention, and that the TNG could be the basis for completing the Djibouti peace process.

The report says that there was also a widely shared view on the need for a mechanism that would facilitate a uniform approach and exchange of information among States and organizations with interest in the Somali peace process. We do agree, however, with the Prime Minister that this has to be done within the framework of close collaboration with the Transitional National Government.

A strong point of the Arta process was the involvement of civil society, and we believe that it is important that this should also continue to be the focus of reconciliation efforts. In this context, we agree with the Secretary-General that much more attention could be paid to local political settlements, and that there is a need to strengthen United Nations programmes to enhance capacities at the community and local levels.

The report pays considerable attention to the humanitarian and development situation in Somalia. It notes that economic and social systems sustaining both lives and livelihoods in Somalia have been disrupted by more than a decade of conflict, as well as by recent droughts and flooding. As a result, some 750,000 persons are in need of international assistance to cover the food shortfall. The report also notes the persistence of high malnutrition rates, and child mortality rates as high as 224 per 1,000. We have taken note of the fact that United Nations agencies are elaborating a multisectoral strategy to protect and rebuild livelihoods, to prevent and respond to emergency situations and to support the transition towards peace and reconciliation.

But the report stresses the need for adequate financial and material resources to be made available. We hope that there will be greater response to the Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal so that the comprehensive approach proposed by the Secretary-General can be supported. We must, however, express our concern that, as stated in the report, programmes linked to the TNG have received virtually no assistance from international donors, including the United Nations agencies themselves, and we hope that this matter can be addressed speedily.

Security continues to be of concern. We have heard from the Prime Minister of the steps taken by the Transitional National Government in a situation in which there was no government infrastructure, such as a civil service, for more than 10 years. Further action has been taken in regard to the police and judiciary, but this has been hampered by the lack of funds.

We agree with the Secretary-General that a key role for the international community is to support the establishment of the rule of law and the emergence of impartial national political and judicial institutions in the country. We also agree with those who have referred to the fact that without adherence to the arms embargo, it will be impossible to stop the fighting which has been ongoing recently.

The Secretary-General has reiterated that the political, humanitarian and development challenges faced by Somalia are of such magnitude that the peace-building process is likely to take a long time to complete. Jamaica strongly supports the establishment of a peace-building mission in Somalia. But we have taken note of the Secretary-General's conclusion that

the security situation does not make it possible for him to recommend the deployment of such a mission at this time. We share the concerns of the Secretary-General for the safety and security of United Nations staff and associated personnel. We therefore hope that a comprehensive assessment of the security situation can be carried out in the near future and the results made available to the Security Council.

In conclusion, we agree with the Secretary-General that the Somali parties should dedicate themselves entirely to efforts to achieve the ultimate objective: the return of their country to peace, stability and overall normalcy. We have been heartened today by the expressions of the Prime Minister on behalf of the Transitional National Government. The international community must continue to support these efforts. The people of Somalia deserve this.

Mr. Ouane (Mali) (*spoke in French*): My delegation is grateful to you, Mr. President, for organizing this public meeting to consider the situation in Somalia, thereby giving us an opportunity for an open discussion of a matter that has led to criticism of the Security Council has been criticized for lack of proper attention.

I am pleased to welcome the participation of Prime Minister Ali Khalif Galaydh of Somalia, and I thank him for his important statement. My thanks also go to the Secretary-General for his excellent report, and to Mr. David Stephen, Representative of the Secretary-General in Somalia for his supplementary briefing.

Much progress has been made since our last meeting on the situation in Somalia, but, given the Somali people's tremendous need for peace, insufficient progress. The report of the Secretary-General describes a complex reality that calls for action by both Somalis and the international community.

Another source of concern is the serious humanitarian situation across the country. As the Secretary-General underscores in his report, the country's economic and social systems have been compromised by more than 10 years of war and by a series of national disasters. This situation is compounded by the effects of food insecurity, which is likely to intensify between now and the end of the year. There is therefore a need to continue to monitor the situation.

The security situation is also worrisome, particularly in "Puntland", as is the serious human rights crisis, especially in southern and central Somalia.

Nevertheless, the prospects for the peace process in Somalia continue to be encouraging. Here I would like to mention first the results of the Arta Peace Conference and the establishment of a Transitional National Assembly and a Transitional National Government, as well as the forthcoming setting up of a National Commission for Reconciliation and Property Settlement.

In the same vein, we welcome the important regional peace initiatives, in particular the one led by President Omer Hassan Ahmed Al-Bashir of the Sudan, current Chairman of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD). We also welcome the involvement of the Organization of African Unity, whose Council of Ministers at their most recent meeting extended the Organization's support to the Arta process and reaffirmed its commitment to the unity, territorial integrity and sovereignty of Somalia.

Likewise, the Secretary-General's initiative to set up a Committee of Friends of Somalia is also welcome, and we fully support it. That Committee will make a useful contribution to resolving the immense problems that Somalia will have to overcome in its reconstruction and development process. Perhaps Mr. Stephen could give us more information about how it will operate. In addition, at an appropriate stage, the establishment of a peace-building mission would contribute to Somalia's stabilization and development process. In that connection, sending an inter-agency mission to Somalia in the near future also seems necessary.

In conclusion, I wish to note that we support the Secretary-General's proposal to renew the mandate of the United Nations Political Office for Somalia for two years, and to pay tribute to the Representative of the Secretary-General and all his staff for their important work for Somalia's reconstruction.

Mr. Amin (Bangladesh): It is a distinct honour to have the Prime Minister of Somalia with us today. We welcome his statement and recognize his Government's pragmatic approach and commitment to the peace process. We are also grateful to Representative of the Secretary-General, David Stephen, for his presentation

of the Secretary-General's report and for his extremely valuable insights into the situation in Somalia.

I would like to add my delegation's voice on two basic principles or policies. First, I reaffirm our support for the sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of Somalia; secondly, I wish to assert that, as several members have underlined, the Arta peace process remains the only viable option, and that all Somali factions and parties should support the peace process.

Afghanistan has been mentioned in the context of our consideration of the situation in Somalia. The Security Council should weigh the risk of delay, or procrastination, in ensuring an effective engagement in Somalia. Much has been said about peace-building needs. We would also link those needs with preventive measures required by the Somali situation. We would remind ourselves of the commitments made under resolution 1366 (2001). Clearly, we should take a lesson from history and not repeat the experience with Afghanistan.

I will go a step further and say that a substantive engagement of the United Nations in Somalia would be consistent with the recent recommendation of the Secretary-General in favour of the phase III deployment of the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), starting with Kindu as a forward base, which would also involve high risks and high costs.

We have taken note of the conclusions of the last two security assessment missions. They spoke of marginal improvement, but improvements have been made. We have also taken note of the Secretary-General's recommendation not to open a United Nations peace-building office in Somalia at this time. The United States put stress on the timing. The only point we would make in that regard is that at this time we should not project too far into the future.

The proposed Committee of Friends of Somalia could be a critically important instrument. In that regard, we hold the view that the opinions of the Transitional National Government (TNG) of Somalia should be taken into account in setting up the Committee and in defining its policies and objectives. It will also be extremely important to have some kind of mechanism or arrangement for a sustained relationship with the Security Council. The Council should be in the know about the activities of the Committee once it is established.

As in any other conflict situation, possibly the regional countries are very important. We share the view that they can play a more helpful role.

We would also flag the continued menace posed by the flow of small arms into the country. Ways and means should be found to halt arms supplies to the warlords.

As the Representative of the Secretary-General informed us, Somalia has undergone a very fundamental change. The warlords have lost ground vis-à-vis the people. Now is the time for the United Nations to step up its support for the peace process.

It is deeply disturbing to note, as the Secretary-General observed in paragraph 48 of his report — this was also flagged by Jamaica — that programmes linked to the TNG have received virtually no assistance from international donors, including United Nations agencies. May I, through you, Mr. President, ask for further information in this regard from the Representative of the Secretary-General. We would also be interested to know the reasons for the meagre response to the appeal for \$130 million in assistance — only about 20 per cent of that amount has been provided. Is that because of security, fiscal, administrative or other considerations on the part of the donors? How can the Council help the situation? The engagement of the United Nations in the economic recovery of Somalia at this stage is critical, and we should explore ways and means of supporting it.

The President: I will now make a statement in my capacity as the representative of Ireland.

I thank Mr. David Stephen for introducing the report of the Secretary-General. Ireland has long viewed Somalia as an inadvertently lost member of the international community. As the President of the Security Council for the month of October, Ireland therefore considered the inclusion of Somalia on the agenda to be a priority. We are gratified to see the wide interest in the discussion today. I believe that this reflects the growing conviction of Member States as to the need for the international community to re-engage, and to be seen to be re-engaging, in helping Somalia.

The basis of any role for the United Nations and the international community in Somalia is that we can only help Somalia to help itself. Certainly to date there has not been a great deal by way of indigenous political initiatives that we can step in and support. We

recognize the excellent work that is being done by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the other United Nations agencies that are operating in Somalia. Their efforts, both humanitarian and developmental, have been the focus of United Nations involvement in Somalia in recent years. We strongly commend their recovery and development activities, which have contributed to creating an environment more conducive to peace and reconciliation. However, we believe that the time has now come for the wider United Nations system to become more involved. For its part, the Council should not settle into a syndrome of limited ambition, even as our full determination is daily evident elsewhere.

We agree with the Secretary-General that the completion of the Arta process provides the most viable route towards durable peace in Somalia. We believe that the people of Somalia have begun to commit themselves to the peaceful reconciliation of their difficulties. We may expect that some spoilers will continue their violent efforts to thwart peace efforts. But we must show solidarity with the people of Somalia as they seek to make their way back to rejoin the family of nations.

The Secretary-General suggests that the National Commission for Reconciliation and Property Settlement, an integral element of the Transitional National Charter, could be an option for promoting national reconciliation. Ireland fully supports the establishment of such an independent commission as a means of bringing Somalis together to complete the Arta process. In this regard, we call on the Transitional National Government (TNG) and the Somalia Reconciliation and Restoration Council to enter into constructive dialogue in a spirit of compromise and mutual respect to bring about national reconciliation. We call on all countries with influence on the Somali parties to encourage them to establish such a commission and to cooperate fully with it.

I said earlier that we can only support the efforts of the Somalis themselves. While the pace of the political process has been slow, we must acknowledge that there has been measurable progress. In very difficult circumstances, the TNG has registered achievement. We agree with the assessment of the Secretary-General that any Government in Somalia would face problems similar to those faced by the TNG. We welcome the proposal of the Secretary-General to establish a Committee of Friends of

Somalia. It is clear that Somalia has many friends. A closely coordinated effort on the part of external actors, including the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), would be to the advantage of the process. We believe that the proposed Committee of Friends would greatly enhance the regional capacity to facilitate national reconciliation. In this regard, we commend the efforts of IGAD and the Organization of African Unity.

We have long recognized the positive role that the regional actors can play, and have played, in supporting peace in Somalia. However, my delegation is very concerned about the potentially destabilizing role that neighbouring States play in Somalia. On 11 January last, the Council adopted presidential statement S/PRST/2001/1, in which we insisted that all States should refrain from any military intervention in the internal situation in Somalia, and that the territory of Somalia should not be used to undermine the stability of the subregion. It is a matter of great concern to us that not all States seem to have heeded that injunction. Once again we call on all States to refrain from interfering in the internal affairs of Somalia. Furthermore, we call on all States to use their influence over the various groups in Somalia to encourage them strongly as to the need to complete the Arta process.

We are very concerned about the grave humanitarian situation in Somalia. We fully support the multisectoral strategy adopted by United Nations agencies, focusing on rehabilitation, prevention, preparedness and supporting peace and reconciliation, as well as purely emergency humanitarian needs. We encourage donors to respond generously to the Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal. As the Secretary-General's report makes clear, the international community must respond much more urgently to the humanitarian needs of Somalia. The United Nations development agencies, especially UNDP, have a crucial role to play.

We note the decision of the Secretary-General that he will continue to monitor the security situation in Somalia with a view to establishing a peace-building mission. We owe it to the people of Somalia, who have drifted away from the international community for 10 years, to assure them that our commitment is serious. In this regard, we believe that the time is now right for the United Nations to undertake an in-depth security assessment directed from Headquarters in New York. In this regard, I would like to ask the Representative of

the Secretary-General if there is anything the United Nations could do to assist the TNG to provide the security necessary for a peace-building mission in Somalia.

For too long we have allowed the people of Somalia to struggle alone on, or virtually over, the horizon of Security Council attention. The negative consequences have been too great. It must weigh on the collective conscience of the international community. Ireland believes that the time has come for the Security Council to take a comprehensive approach to Somalia.

I now resume my function as President of the Council.

The next speaker inscribed on my list is the representative of Djibouti. I invite him to take a seat at the Council table and to make his statement.

Mr. Olhaye (Djibouti): I should like at the outset to congratulate you, Sir, on your assumption of the presidency for this month. Given your openness and clear insights and your sensitivity to the causes and consequences of many conflict situations before this body, as well as your vast diplomatic experience, we are, indeed, in good hands. May I also express our deep gratitude to your predecessor, Ambassador Jean-David Levitte of France, for steering the Council's deliberations last month to a successful conclusion.

It is also with great pride and a distinct feeling of honour that I welcome Prime Minister Ali Khalif Galaydh and his delegation here this morning. I commend him for his patience and strength in the face of formidable odds and for his strenuous and tireless efforts. He has made tremendous personal sacrifices in pursuit of national reconstruction, cohesion and reconciliation.

It is important to mention that the Arta Peace Conference and the subsequent formation of the Transitional National Government attracted hundreds of qualified, talented and highly experienced Somali professionals from all parts of the world, particularly from Europe and North America. These individuals left behind their families, careers, well-paying jobs and secure and comfortable lifestyles, in order to meet the challenges and to nurture the nascent Government in its crucial task of nation-building.

Like the international staff in Somalia, they have a deep sense of appreciation of the true dimension of security. They deeply care about security as they toil

daily to restore a semblance of hope, sustenance and normalcy. Obviously, there is no better barometer of security than these patriotic individuals, who are not there for pay, comfort or power. More than anybody, they know what is at stake and what is justifiable or reasonably risky. They know what is exaggerated or irrational. We need to take into full consideration the sacrifices and determination of this truly international staff in determining the broader scope of security in Somalia.

After a long wait and anxious moments, we have the Secretary-General's report on Somalia at last. We wish to express our gratitude to the Secretary-General, who has always displayed keen interest in restoring peace and stability to Somalia. We also recognize the Secretariat's efforts, in particular, those of Mr. David Stephen and his staff, including the many humanitarian aid workers in Somalia. It is almost a year since we last had a report on Somalia, and that long interval itself says much about where the international community stands in its support for the new institutions in Somalia.

The entire world is too familiar with the events in Somalia over the last decade, in particular, its plunge into chaos, civil strife and near disintegration. No one will deny the contribution of numerous factors to this spectacle. Yet, likewise, no one will deny the overwhelming share of blame that must be placed at the feet of self-serving, greedy and criminal individuals. Through their domestic terrorism, divisiveness and continuous assaults on peace and security, they succeeded in driving Somalia beyond ruin to a virtual pariah status. So catastrophic were the suffering and national unravelling that the international community had to intervene. As the Secretary-General's report (S/1999/882) on Somalia of 16 August 1999 stated, the country had degenerated into a "black hole" of anarchy.

Time and time again the so-called leaders of Somalia, the rabble of warlords, were brought together in attempts at reconciliation, disarmament and restoration of government. We recall the successive conferences held until the end of 1997. The more they met and signed agreements, the more they disagreed subsequently. Many countries and organizations have worked tirelessly and relentlessly to restore a measure of governance in Somalia. The focus, though, has always remained on ways to bring together these feuding warlords in order to assist them to reach an

agreement that will end their stalemate. All these efforts, however, as we all know, ended in vain. In Somalia, as in similar conflict situations elsewhere, more than 90 per cent of casualties in the last decade have been civilians. A whole generation of Somalis has grown up in cultures of warfare.

It was against this backdrop that my President initiated a series of proposals at the General Assembly in September 1999. In a nutshell, he stated plainly that appeasing the warlords had not worked and never would. He exhorted the people of Somalia to come together to consider his proposals as an alternative to the never-ending squabble, prevarication and impotence of warlords. In initiating this national dialogue, Djibouti was unambiguous. The process would be comprehensive in addressing all facets of Somalia's ills; it would be transparent, inclusive and independent of undue influences.

The participation of leaders of factions and administrative regions was sought and aggressively pursued directly and indirectly throughout the Conference and since the formation of the new Government. The criteria for their participation were never spelled out in advance. The door has always been open, and it will continue to be open. But it was implicit that they had to affirm the unity and territorial integrity of the country, that they had to agree to peace, reconciliation and the primacy of law, and that they had to commit to complete and verifiable disarmament. Not only did they opt to stay away, but they also embarked on obstructing and undermining the Conference in order to maintain the status quo. Despite their absence, genuine representatives from every district, region, clan, sub-clan and minorities converged at Arta, Djibouti. Indeed this was a people-oriented, people-led and people-driven process, embracing all segments of Somali society.

This Council followed the Arta process with great interest from its inception. In its first statement on the matter, in November 1999, the Council welcomed the initiative of President Guelleh aimed at restoring peace and stability in Somalia. It endorsed the President's call on warlords to recognize fully and accept the principle that the people of Somalia are free to exercise their democratic right to choose their own leaders.

In June 2000 the Council's statement urged States and international organizations in a position to do so to give the Arta process political support. Furthermore,

the Council expressed its readiness to consider taking appropriate steps against warlords and faction leaders who continued to obstruct and undermine efforts to achieve peace. In its press statement of 11 July 2001, the Council called upon all armed groups in Somalia to put down their weapons and to engage in peaceful dialogue with the Transitional National Government. As the Secretary-General's report states, the Organization of African Unity summit in Lusaka strongly condemned warlords who persist in their stubbornness in blocking the peace efforts in Somalia.

That brings me to share our views on the Secretary-General's report. In a number of paragraphs mention is made of the so-called Somalia Reconciliation and Restoration Council (SRRC) and its formation, objectives and communications with the Secretary-General. As far as we are concerned, this is not an entity that has an existence, context or relevance. If there is anything there, it is the rehabilitation, reincarnation and resuscitation of the otherwise vanishing phenomenon of warlordism in Somalia. The objective is nothing other than to hasten and bring about the early demise of the Transitional National Government itself.

Let us not forget that the TNG represents the will of the people of Somalia, irrespective of its fragility, its lack of resources and the lack of meaningful and credible support from the international community despite being the only recognized Somali national framework in existence today. The so-called Reconciliation and Restoration Council, in other words, has been condemned many times and has been warned to desist from obstructing and undermining efforts to achieve peace. Suffice it to say that we are deeply concerned not only by the casual manner of according a parallel status to this bunch of discredited criminals, but also by the dilution of and utter disregard for the popular will of Somali civil society, which has throughout borne the full brunt of egregious human rights violations perpetrated by the same individuals.

On the proposal for setting up a Committee of Friends, we have no objection in principle, if the overriding motivation behind it is to support the TNG in consolidating peace, stability and reconstruction, and if the TNG is seen, as it should be, as the cornerstone of future activities. The TNG, first and foremost, needs to be supported by all and accorded the requisite legitimacy, as this Council has done and continues to

do, in Guinea-Bissau, the Central African Republic, Sierra Leone and Liberia. We therefore cannot accept any equivocation, destruction or diversion from this central prerequisite. Normally a group of friends of a certain country constitutes a voluntary get-together of like-minded countries, as opposed to a gathering of divergent viewpoints and interests. No doubt, such a group could help to facilitate the exchange of information about Somalia among interested parties, and we welcome that, but the TNG's paramount role need not be compromised.

We strongly encourage the Council to forge a common view on Somalia with regard to assisting the people, including a reasonable and flexible response to the security issue, which is becoming the stumbling block to establishing a post-conflict peace-building mission. It would also be constructive to make a comprehensive security assessment, directed from New York Headquarters.

Somalia today means different things to different people. For many, the wounds and misfortunes of eight years ago remain raw, as if inflicted only two or three months ago. Somalia had undergone tremendous cycles of bust and promise at that time. And, believe it or not, the people of Somalia are determined to press on for attention, even if they continue to receive indifference, neglect or bias. Somalia will not go away. Like many other nations emerging from long periods of conflict, Somalia remains a challenge that we ignore only at our own peril. Beyond moral and humanitarian concerns, Somalia has continued to be shunned; it has become yet another threat of unfathomable security dimensions, a breeding ground of terrorism and drug-trafficking and a centre of arms trade. So as we build a global coalition to root out international terrorism, we also need to think seriously about restoring hope and rebuilding shattered societies into tolerant, stable and peaceful places, rather than watching them degenerate slowly into cells of extremism, fundamentalism and terrorism.

The transition from war to consolidated peace is not without its problems. Quite often, it is associated with insecurity, an uncertain future and repeated cycles of violence. That is what Somalia is. This is not a situation never seen before. So it all depends on how the international community comes to look at Somalia again — in a different light. We hope it will do so, and do so soon, to avert the re-emergence of violence.

For all genuine regional and international efforts to succeed in Somalia, it becomes necessary that all actors reach a common, objective and unbiased vision about the real tasks ahead. The TNG will need to continue to reach out to all concerned, with a view to achieving lasting peace.

Finally, the President, the Government and the people of Djibouti have made the utmost efforts in every possible way to create a climate conducive to the re-emergence of Somali nationhood. Thanks to the tireless efforts and sacrifices of Somalis themselves, we have a national representative outfit that deserves this Council's unswerving support.

Members of the Council, it is in your hands for this entity to survive, to grow and to usher Somalia into tangible peace, reconciliation and stability. We have no doubt you will also play your part.

The President: I thank the representative of Djibouti for his kind words addressed to me.

The next speaker inscribed on my list is the representative of Egypt, whom I invite to take a seat at the Council table and to make his statement.

Mr. Aboul Gheit (Egypt) (spoke in Arabic): Mr. President, allow me at the outset to extend our thanks to you for organizing this meeting and for giving States that are not members of the Security Council the opportunity to express their views on the situation in Somalia and on the collective role that we must play in order to assist this friendly Arab African country to regain its natural place in the fold of the international community. Permit me also to express our appreciation to the Secretary-General for the important report that we are deliberating today. Our appreciation also goes to his Representative in Somalia, Mr. David Stephen, for his exemplary efforts in support of the national reconciliation process there and for his valuable briefing to the Council this morning.

Almost six and a half years have passed since the departure from Somalia of the United Nations peacekeeping troops serving in the United Nations Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II). Unfortunately, since then the international community has remained idle and excessively hesitant in addressing the situation in that country, in shouldering its collective responsibility to bring about lasting peace in Somalia, in preserving the country's sovereignty and territorial

integrity and in putting an end to the crisis raging there for over 10 years.

We understand the specific circumstances of the problematic situation in Somalia, which would discourage the Council from displaying the political will to support the country, as provided for under the Charter. We also find, however, that the time has come for us to take courage from the numerous positive developments in Somalia following the peace process, and since the Transitional National Government (TNG), led by President Abdikassim Salad Hassan, was established. We have to build upon the momentum generated by the Arta Conference and its results.

In addressing the proposals made by the Secretary-General in his report, I wish to make some specific comments that we think we should highlight.

First, before addressing the specific steps that the international community should take towards Somalia, we must remind the Security Council of what it has previously pledged in such circumstances.

In the declaration it adopted at the Summit meeting in September of last year, the Council reaffirmed its determination to give equal priority to the maintenance of international peace and security in every region of the world, while paying special attention to the promotion of durable peace and sustainable development in Africa, in view of the special needs of the continent and the specific characteristics of the conflicts raging on its territories. In its presidential statement on peace-building, adopted last February, the Council also reiterated that efforts to ensure lasting solutions to conflicts and to maintain the momentum for peace in any given country or region require increased solidarity, sustained political will and timely and adequate resources on the part of the international community.

Secondly, while we support all that the Council has pledged to undertake in this regard and, in fact, welcome the efforts it undertakes in relevant fields, we find that the Council has completely failed to implement these pledges in the case of Somalia. Somalia did not receive the same priority that the Council has given to other conflicts within or outside Africa. The Council did not give special attention to the specific peculiarities characterizing the Somali conflict. The international community did not display the increased solidarity or necessary political will to maintain the momentum towards peace in Somalia and

the attainment of a lasting settlement to the conflict there.

Thirdly, all these observations lead us to renew our appeal to the Security Council to assume its responsibilities under the Charter and to undertake a more positive and effective role in resolving the conflict in Somalia, and not to merely rely on the role played by neighbouring and interested States or on the efforts that the relevant regional organizations are keen to undertake. The Council must throw its weight behind the Transitional National Government and compel the rest of the Somali factions that remain outside the Arta process, including the members of the so-called Somalia Reconciliation and Restoration Council, to join the national reconciliation efforts currently under way and cooperate with President Hassan in his efforts to rebuild and rehabilitate the governmental institutions destroyed by the civil war. President Hassan should be helped in establishing a credible police force and in disarming and demobilizing the militias operating in the capital, Mogadishu. From this standpoint, Egypt welcomes the statement in the Secretary-General's report that the completion of the Arta process remains the most viable option and expresses its hope that this conviction will serve as the point of departure for the efforts that the United Nations must undertake from this time onwards to assist and support the Transitional National Government.

Fourthly, at the same time, the Council cannot ignore the fact that there is an arms embargo imposed on Somalia, under resolution 733 (1992), which has not been respected for many years and whose enforcement the Council has not taken any concrete measures to ensure. No lasting peace can be attained in Somalia when any of the factions opposed to peace can obtain arms and ammunition, which allow them to sabotage the current reconciliation efforts and resist the popular yearning for peace and security. We have seen that the Security Council is indeed capable of enforcing the sanctions regimes it has imposed in different areas if it has the necessary political determination and willingness to do so. This was the case in Sierra Leone, when the Council established a Panel of Experts to investigate the extent of the implementation of the sanctions imposed on the Revolutionary United Front; in Angola, with the establishment of the Monitoring Mechanism for the sanctions imposed on UNITA; and in Afghanistan, with the creation of a specific

mechanism to monitor the implementation of the measures imposed against the Taliban. We therefore see no justification for the Council to stand back, evade its responsibilities and not take the appropriate measures to ensure the implementation of the embargo imposed on Somalia and the enforcement of the relevant resolutions that the Council itself has adopted.

Fifthly, the delegation of Egypt takes note of what was mentioned in the Secretary-General's report on the establishment of a post-conflict peace-building mission in Somalia. While we appreciate the reasons and justifications that led the Secretary-General not to recommend the deployment of such a mission at this stage, we would also like to reiterate that the United Nations must be ready to confront the challenges and dangers that it may face in Somalia, just as it does in other regions or States where United Nations personnel are present. We cannot wait until perfect security conditions prevail before deploying the mission, especially since such a logic will only lead us into a vicious cycle in which any real hopes of providing security and peace to the Somali people will evaporate — a people who have known only war and poverty for the last decade.

Finally, on the other hand, Egypt welcomes the proposal put forward by the Secretary-General to establish a Committee of Friends for Somalia to explore ways and means of drawing attention to Somalia's needs in the area of national reconciliation and to mobilize the required funds for the rehabilitation and development process. We therefore look forward to the consultations the Secretary-General intends to hold to implement this initiative. There is no doubt that such a mechanism will enhance coordination among the external States and organizations that have a role in the reconciliation process and have influence over the Somali parties. Egypt, for its part, will be fully ready to participate in this mechanism, not only because of the historical relations and strategic interests that bind it with Somalia but also because of the efforts it is keen to undertake at the national level and within the League of Arab States, the Organization of African Unity and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development Partners Forum.

The President: I thank the representative of Egypt for his kind words addressed to me.

The next speaker inscribed on my list is the representative of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. I invite

him to take a seat at the Council table and to make his statement.

Mr. Dorda (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya) (*spoke in Arabic*): Allow me to express our thanks to you, Sir, and to salute you for convening this meeting dedicated to the discussion of the situation in Somalia. I am very pleased to see you presiding over the Council, in view of my deep respect for you and my estimation of your abilities. I also thank you for making this an open meeting, held in the only natural and right forum. I am not the only one who is pleased to see the Council in session here. I would presume all Members of the United Nations and the international community, on whose behalf you are acting, are, as well. I can assure you that the seats of this Chamber have lost the warmth of living bodies and have become bored with that artificial warmth of the lifeless heating system.

Let me pay tribute to the Prime Minister of the brotherly country of Somalia. I would like to thank him for his statement, which was extremely important and useful for all of us, and for the Council in particular. Also, I would like to commend the Secretary-General, who was the one most interested in the question of Somalia, and who has submitted many reports to the Council, including the report under discussion in today's meeting. I would also like to thank the Representative of the Secretary-General for his valuable statement.

It is common knowledge that my country was the only one to maintain its embassy in Mogadishu. We have never closed our diplomatic mission there for a single day, other than on official holidays, from the start of the crisis to this very day. My country has also called for convening meetings on Libyan territory among all factions involved in the conflict in Somalia over the past decade. We have tried by all possible means to enable those factions to reach a peaceful solution that would ensure the stability and territorial integrity of Somalia and the unity of its people.

We pay tribute to the efforts of Djibouti and its President for their tireless efforts leading to the convening of the Somalia National Peace Conference in Arta, where, for the first time, a sound and correct foundation was laid for achieving consensus among 5,000 Somalis representing all social, religious, ethnic and regional factions throughout Somalia. The approach resulting in that consensus and in the adoption of the Transitional National Charter and

Government is the essential one if we wish to support and strengthen that country and ensure the stability and unity of the Somali people and homeland.

I believe that one of the most important functions of the Security Council in this regard is to achieve the objectives embodied in its name — the maintenance of international peace and security — in considering such questions. I believe that the fears arising from past experiences in Somalia are no longer valid and that the Council can therefore have no excuse to hesitate, because the conditions that prevailed in those years were very different from those prevailing today. In those days, there were no Somalis with whom to maintain cooperation. Today, however, there is a Transitional National Government, an Assembly and popular support among all Somalis for this new beginning.

All sectors of the Somali population are fed up with war and tired of living in such unstable conditions. The most skilled workers of Somalia have left the country and now live abroad. Only the warlords want to abort the outcome of the Arta process, certainly out of self-interest. If they felt that the Security Council and the United Nations system were serious in supporting the Transitional National Government, they would have retreated from their current positions and accepted the advice to join the Arta process. However, their perception that the Council and the United Nations were not serious led them to believe that the former conditions in Somalia could be restored. War and violence have become the sole profession of these warlords and they know no other.

Will this Council allow those factions to achieve their own selfish goals to the detriment of the interests of Somalia? Let me cite one example. The representative of France, Ambassador Levitte, raised a very important point that should be given the Council's full attention. Outlaws — be they terrorists, drug lords or arms dealers — along with the forces of their countries, may perceive Somalia as an ideal haven. Should we allow Somalia to become a base for all these outlaw forces and only then consider mounting a campaign like that staged by the Security Council and the United Nations a few years ago, with all its potential dangers, sacrifices and loss of life?

The best option is to support the Transitional National Government, but what role is there for the Council in requesting that Government to establish

peace? What justification is there for the United Nations to intervene if the Transitional National Government can attain peace by itself? What party can intervene if the Transitional National Government alone has the power to achieve peace?

Furthermore, I have found in the Koran the answer to the conundrum of the chicken-and-egg. When Noah boarded the ark that God had ordered him to build, he was told to bring a pair of animals of each species. I believe that religion has a basis in reason. The pair of chickens was composed of a hen and a rooster, not two eggs. Eggs would have broken in the tumult of the flood that later deluged the ark. I mean to suggest that a peace-building mission could be permanently deployed in Somalia in order to lay the egg of peace, but calling upon the Transitional National Government to establish peace, then having the Security Council guarantee that peace, would be acting like those who would place the cart before the horse.

Why do we set aside a budget for peacekeeping and pay our annual contributions to the United Nations budget? Do we do so in order to maintain peace in one region and not in others? This is the subject of discussion in the African Group and other forums. We should like to see the Council act uniformly in all cases that require peacekeeping or peace-building.

In brief, my country, which has made every possible effort, remains willing to work, through the Council and the African Union, to ensure that stability is restored to Somalia. I call on the Council to do the following. First, a Security Council mission, similar to those sent to many other countries, should be dispatched to Somalia and submit a report, on the basis of which, I would hope, the Council would be able later to deploy a peace-building mission.

Secondly, I hope that the Council would agree to fund the National Commission for Reconciliation and Property Settlement. The Government of Somalia cannot convene that Commission, if I have understood the Prime Minister, quite simply because it cannot afford the travel costs of the participants, who live in the United States, Europe, Arab countries, Africa and some Asian countries. Sufficient funding should be made available to enable the National Reconciliation Commission to convene as soon as possible and to meet any other relevant expenses that could facilitate the work of the Commission.

I would ask the Council to support the Transitional National Government of Somalia in creating and operating vital infrastructure facilities that are important to the work of the United Nations as well, such as the airport and the seaport. Those facilities could also be a source of income for the Transitional National Government; moreover, the United Nations and its missions could make use of them in the event of any threat to the work of United Nations staff members in Somalia.

Mr. President, I am in fact optimistic that, under your stewardship, and thanks to the convening of today's meeting, there will be follow-up to these matters among members of the Council. This meeting is giving us greater understanding and optimism with respect to the Council's future work on the question of Somalia.

The President: I thank the representative of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya for the kind words he addressed to me.

In view of the lateness of the hour, and with the agreement of members of the Council, I shall now suspend the meeting until 3 p.m.

The meeting was suspended at 1.15 p.m.



Security Council

Fifty-sixth year

Provisional

4392nd meeting

Friday, 19 October 2001, 3 p.m.
New York

<i>President:</i>	Mr. Ryan	(Ireland)
<i>Members:</i>	Bangladesh	Mr. Amin
	China	Mr. Wang Yingfan
	Colombia	Mr. Valdivieso
	France	Mr. Levitte
	Jamaica	Miss Durrant
	Mali	Mr. Ouane
	Mauritius	Mr. Koonjul
	Norway	Mr. Kolby
	Russian Federation	Mr. Granovsky
	Singapore	Mr. Mahbubani
	Tunisia	Mr. Jerandi
	Ukraine	Mr. Krokhmal
	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	Mr. Eldon
	United States of America	Mr. Rosenblatt

Agenda

The situation in Somalia.

Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Somalia (S/2001/963).

This record contains the text of speeches delivered in English and of the interpretation of speeches delivered in the other languages. The final text will be printed in the *Official Records of the Security Council*. Corrections should be submitted to the original languages only. They should be incorporated in a copy of the record and sent under the signature of a member of the delegation concerned to the Chief of the Verbatim Reporting Service, room C-178.

01-59138 (E)



The meeting was resumed at 3.15 p.m.

The President: The next speaker inscribed on my list is the representative of Japan. I invite him to take a seat at the Council table and to make his statement.

Mr. Motomura (Japan): I would like to thank you, Mr. President, for giving me the opportunity to participate in today's discussion on this important issue. I would also like to thank the Representative of the Secretary-General and the Prime Minister of Somalia for their statements on the current situation in Somalia.

Let me begin by commending the Government of Djibouti for its painstaking efforts to assist the people of Somalia to resolve their conflict by peaceful means. Indeed, it was at the initiative of President Guelleh that the Somalia National Peace Conference was held in Arta, Djibouti, last year, which led to the eventual establishment of the Transitional National Government (TNG) in Somalia. Today's public meeting of the Security Council provides a valuable opportunity for interested Member States to review developments in Somalia over the past year.

Before I comment on the political developments and the humanitarian situation, I would like to announce today that the Government of Japan has decided to provide, through the United Nations, assistance amounting to \$4.8 million in the fields of national reconciliation and humanitarian assistance. I will describe how this assistance will be used in the course of my remarks.

Deep-seated divisions among clans and the competing ambitions of clan-based armed groups have caused the people of Somalia unspeakable hardships, and pose the major obstacle to the reunification of the country. Although the TNG was established as a result of national reconciliation efforts with grass-roots participation, armed confrontation among the clans has not diminished, and the power configuration among them seems to be exceedingly fluid. Some warlords have established coalitions to fight against the TNG. At the same time, northern regions, "Somaliland" and "Puntland" still refuse to engage in dialogue with the TNG. They are also in political turmoil, with groups competing for internal political power in their own self-governments. Thus the situation throughout the country is still extremely fragile and volatile.

Japan has long advocated a comprehensive political settlement to the conflict and national reconciliation, with the goal of achieving a unified Somali State. In our view, the establishment of the TNG is but the first step in the daunting task of national rehabilitation. Building an effective, permanent and functioning representative Government will be far more difficult; and it can only be achieved with the commitment and agreement of the Somali people themselves, as well as with adequate assistance provided by the international community.

Under these circumstances, the rehabilitation of Somalia will require an approach that seeks to rebuild the Somali polity from the bottom up, including support to entities that emerge in different parts of the country through a participatory process. Japan thus attaches importance to enhancing the role of civil society in building peace and in the subsequent reconciliation process. Toward that end, I am pleased to announce today that Japan will contribute \$500,000 for a project to be implemented by War-torn Societies Project, a non-governmental organization (NGO). The contribution will be made through the United Nations Trust Fund for Somalia.

Somalia has been ravaged by conflict, drought, flooding, epidemics, famine and the absence of governance. Many of its people have been displaced; all are suffering from grinding poverty. This grave humanitarian situation is, and indeed must be, of deep concern to the international community.

Japan pays high tribute to the brave and tireless efforts of the humanitarian personnel working in this unstable and challenging situation, and insists that they be adequately protected. The abduction by members of armed faction groups of NGO members and United Nations personnel from the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the World Health Organization (WHO) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in March of this year was a despicable crime and cannot be tolerated. The international community, and particularly the Security Council, should call upon all parties to acknowledge the impartiality of relief agencies and NGOs, and to cooperate with and ensure the safety of their personnel.

I would also like to commend the extremely effective and useful activities carried out by such United Nations humanitarian agencies as the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

(UNHCR), the World Food Programme (WFP) and UNICEF, which are coordinated by the able direction of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. Japan, for its part, has been providing emergency assistance, mainly through the WFP and UNHCR, to help ease the plight of the Somali people.

Japan attaches great importance to the educational and training needs of children of displaced families. In addition to helping sustain their families, they will also have to assume the future tasks of national reconciliation and rehabilitation. I am therefore pleased to announce that Japan will provide — again through the United Nations Trust Fund — financial support in the amount of \$3.9 million for the UNICEF project in Somalia, which provides children with learning opportunities and prepares them for the restoration of peace, law and order. In addition, Japan recently decided to provide emergency assistance amounting to \$420,000 in response to the WFP's appeal for drought-relief assistance.

With respect to the request contained in the Security Council's presidential statement of 11 January 2001 — that the Secretary-General prepare a proposal for a post-conflict peace-building mission in Somalia — Japan supports the view expressed in the Secretary-General's recent report that, with the security situation being so uncertain, the establishment of such a mission at this time would be premature.

In the meantime, Japan will continue to closely follow the situation in Somalia. We stand ready to respond to urgent humanitarian and emergency needs as they arise.

The President: The next speaker on my list is the representative of Belgium. I invite him to take a seat at the Council table and to make his statement.

Mr. De Ruyt (Belgium) (*spoke in French*): I have the honour to speak on behalf of the European Union (EU). The Central and Eastern European countries associated with the European Union — Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia — and the associated countries Cyprus, Malta and Turkey, as well as the European Free Trade Association country member of the European Economic Area — Iceland — align themselves with this statement.

The European Union warmly welcomes today's public debate on Somalia and the opportunity it

provides for Member States to share their assessments of the situation in Somalia and their thoughts on the United Nations role both there and in the Horn of Africa as a whole.

I should like also to welcome among us Prime Minister Galaydh of the Transitional Government of Somalia and to thank him for his statement, which was very useful and informative.

The Transitional Government has been in place for nearly a year — that is, for a third of its mandate — and has had to confront many problems, as today's debate has shown. The European Union renews its appeal to the Transitional Government to pursue its efforts towards national reconciliation in a genuine spirit of compromise, by peaceful means and with due respect for all entities that have achieved a certain degree of stability. The EU encourages all parties in Somalia that have not participated in the Arta process to enter into a dialogue in the same genuine spirit of compromise, with a view to advancing and completing the reconciliation process among all Somalis.

The EU welcomes the creation of the National Commission for Reconciliation and Property Settlement. This Commission must function independently of the Government and constitute an important forum for dialogue under the ownership of all Somalis and with the support of the international community. As suggested by the Inter-Government Authority on Development (IGAD) Partners Forum, the functional cooperation between the various political and administrative entities represents an important confidence-building measure.

Regarding human rights, the EU believes that the crimes committed during the civil war at the end of the 1980s should not go unpunished. The administration of justice must be strengthened in order to make possible a fair trial for the perpetrators of those crimes.

The EU remains deeply concerned by the security situation in Somalia, and in Mogadishu in particular. Attacks against civilians and the staff of humanitarian organizations are unacceptable and must cease. Non-governmental organizations are doing exemplary work in difficult conditions, and we pay tribute to their efforts. The EU is also concerned by the presence of many anti-personnel mines in several regions. These mines present a great danger not only to the Somali population as a whole, but also to humanitarian staff working there. Thus it is important that the Mogadishu

airport and port be reopened, so that humanitarian aid can be brought in and also to avoid prolonging the political isolation of Somalia.

Allow me to address an issue that is very much in the news at the moment: terrorism. The EU urges the Transitional Government to cooperate with the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001) concerning counter-terrorism and with the United States Government on this question. The EU is itself currently considering how best to help the Transitional Government respond to the counter-terrorism Committee's requests.

The situation in Somalia is closely linked to that of its neighbours. So that peace may be established in the Horn of Africa, the EU calls for the resumption of political contacts between the Transitional Government and its neighbours, particularly Ethiopia. States in the region should abstain from military involvement in Somalia or from taking any other initiative that could jeopardize that country's sovereignty, political independence and unity. Traffic in arms should also cease.

The EU calls once again on the countries involved to respect the arms embargo imposed by the Security Council. The European Union supports all ongoing regional efforts to find a political solution to the Somali question, particularly those of IGAD and of the Organization of African Unity. The EU agrees with the Secretary-General that coordination of efforts among external actors is still needed and that a consultative mechanism could be useful to that effect. The Secretary-General's idea of forming a committee of friends of Somalia is worth examining.

The EU takes note of the recommendations in the Secretary-General's report. At the beginning of this year, the Security Council had wanted a peace-building mission to be established in Somalia and had asked the Secretary-General to draw up a proposal to that end. The Secretary-General currently deems that at this stage, the conditions for sending such a mission not been met. Security concerns remain. We agree with the Secretary-General that a thorough review of the security situation has to be carried out. We are in favour of a new security assessment.

All parties to the conflict should redouble their efforts to bring about the right conditions for the deployment of international personnel. In parallel, individuals and countries that have influence on the

parties involved should also act. New means should be put into play rapidly to bring Somalia out of its current impasse and to enable a lasting peace to be established.

The European Union, both collectively and through bilateral aid from its Member States, is participating in the reconstruction of the country. The Union is ready to examine possibilities for institution-building and support for good governance. We have taken note of the needs expressed by the Transitional Government regarding police training and the establishment of regional administrations, as envisaged in the Transitional National Charter.

A lasting solution for Somalia remain to be found. The parties must urgently pool their efforts in order for peace to be achieved. Peace must come to seem more attractive to the parties involved than the continuation of a latent conflict which has had such dire consequences for the population. We hope that the United Nations, the countries of the region and other countries interested in stability in the Horn of Africa will cooperate fully to this end.

The President: The next speaker inscribed on my list is the representative of Nigeria. I invite him to take a seat at the Council table and to make his statement.

Mr. Mbanefo (Nigeria): I should like to begin by congratulating you, Sir, and the Republic of Ireland, on your assumption of the presidency of the Security Council for the month of October. In the same vein, I would like to congratulate your predecessor, Ambassador Jean-David Levitte of France, for a very successful presidency in September.

I would like take this opportunity to felicitate Guinea, Cameroon, the Syrian Arab Republic, Bulgaria and Mexico on their election to the Council as non-permanent members for the period 2002-2003. Nigeria looks forward to working closely with them, as it has done with the outgoing members of the Council.

The important issue before the Council today is Somalia. The situation in Somalia continues to engage the attention of the international community, and our Organization in particular, as it has done over the past decade. In a presidential statement issued in November 1999, the Council reaffirmed its commitment to a comprehensive and lasting settlement of the situation in Somalia, bearing in mind respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence and unity of Somalia, in accordance with the principles of the

Charter of the United Nations. The Council also expressed its concern at the absence of a central authority, which had exacerbated the dire political, economic and security situation in the country.

In considering the plight of this State Member of our Organization, and the way forward in resolving its problems, the Secretary-General, in fulfilment of a Council mandate, has rendered to the Council his most recent report on the situation in Somalia.

In the period between the issuance of the current report, contained in document S/2001/963, and the previous one, contained in document S/2000/1211, issued in December 2000, significant developments have occurred in Somalia. The internal political situation has evolved to the extent that the Transitional National Government (TNG), led by President Abdikassim Salad Hassan, has begun to take hold and put in place the infrastructures of administration and a functioning State. A vivid and eloquent example of this happy development is the presence among us of the Permanent Representative of Somalia. It is, without doubt, a good omen that, after many years of effective representation being in abeyance, Somalia is finally able to send an Ambassador to the United Nations. Mr. Ali Khalif Galaydh, the Prime Minister of Somalia, is also in this great Chamber today, participating in and listening to this debate on the situation in his country.

My delegation would like to reiterate its support for the peace process that has made the present situation possible. In this regard, Nigeria would like to pay tribute to President Guelleh of Djibouti for his dedicated and tireless peace initiatives with regard to Somalia, which have led directly to the establishment of the TNG. It is worthy of note and praise that this fruitful initiative enjoyed the support of the United Nations, the Organization of African Unity, the League of Arab States and the European Union.

In the clearly daunting task of moving the peace process forward and creating a more stable environment in the country, the inclination of the TNG to reach out and bring on board all the parties yet to accept its authority and control over the entire country is most commendable. Nigeria believes that all Somalis, as stakeholders in the peace of their country, must put aside all parochial considerations and fully embrace dialogue. In the view of my delegation, this will pave the way for lasting peace, stability, national rehabilitation and reconstruction for Somalia. The

leaders of Africa, at the thirty-seventh summit of the OAU, held in Lusaka, Zambia, in July 2001, affirmed this position. The summit reiterated Africa's commitment to the unity, territorial integrity and sovereignty of Somalia. It expressed its support for the Arta process and called on the TNG to intensify efforts to build upon it with the support of the United Nations, in cooperation with regional and subregional organizations.

On the issue of the humanitarian and development situation in Somalia, and the response to it by the international community, the Secretary-General's report offers a grim and disturbing assessment. Food security in the country, especially in the southern part, has deteriorated as a result of a combination of factors, such as drought and other natural causes. As a consequence, an estimated 750,000 people are in danger of starvation and therefore in need of international food assistance. This situation is compounded by the prevalence of diseases such as cholera, as well as a lack of water and basic infrastructure. Although the United Nations and its partners have contributed to alleviating the emergency situation, much remains to be done if the humanitarian and development challenges facing Somalia are to be fully confronted and the TNG is to be given a fighting chance of consolidating the peace in the country.

In this regard, it is particularly disturbing that, according to the Secretary-General's report, only \$20.7 million — 16 per cent of the \$126 million requested for the Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for 2001 — has been provided by Member States. This assistance, as we all know, is required for humanitarian, recovery and development activities in the country.

The Secretary-General's report also asserts that the security situation in Somalia has not improved since February, when an earlier security assessment of Mogadishu was undertaken. It concludes, in paragraph 72, that the time is not ripe for a United Nations post-conflict peace-building office for Somalia, as there is "no single authority in the country that can assure security and unimpeded access to the United Nations even in Mogadishu".

The question that may be asked is what the United Nations and the international community at large can and should do to see Somalia through this delicate and critical transition period. I am of the firm belief that the peace process must be given full support

and encouragement. In the view of my delegation, one definite way of manifesting such support would be through the mobilization of necessary material resources, as well as the taking of symbolic, yet powerful, steps on behalf of the peace process.

Peace must be made attractive and irresistible to all, including those who otherwise might have little interest in embracing it. Nigeria believes that the United Nations must lead the way and be in the vanguard of this effort. It must see post-conflict peace-building as an urgent challenge in Somalia if that country is to enjoy lasting peace.

In this regard, my delegation urges the Security Council to urgently undertake a fact-finding mission to Somalia in order to ascertain the situation on the ground. These are hopeful times for Somalia. Many of us have waited long for this moment. We must not allow this opportunity to slip away. Somalia must never again be allowed to witness the horrors of the recent past.

The President: I thank the representative of Nigeria for his kind words addressed to me.

The next speaker on my list is the representative of Yemen. I invite him to take a seat at the Council table and to make his statement.

Mr. Al-Ashtal (Yemen) (spoke in Arabic): Allow me at the outset to express our sincere congratulations to you, Sir, on assuming the presidency of the Security Council for this month, a presidency that will be distinguished by your dynamism and perseverance, for which you are well known. We also thank your predecessor, Mr. Jean-David Levitte, Ambassador of France, who guided the work of the Council in an excellent manner. I also welcome the Prime Minister of Somalia and the Representative of the Secretary-General.

Yemen is linked to Somalia by the fact that we share the same sea and have deep-rooted historical ties, reflected in a network of cultural, commercial, economic and political bonds. We live in a region where we affect and are affected by what happens to each of us.

The collapse of the central Government 10 years ago led not only to fragmentation, factionalism, the spread of anarchy and the erosion of the State institutions in Somalia, but also to the creation of instability in the region as a result of which the arms trade seems to be flourishing. Furthermore, terrorist

organizations and groupings are growing in number, as are smuggling and piracy operations on the seas. Drug traffic has also spread, and the long Yemeni coast is full of helpless people who risk their lives to reach the safety of our shores. Amid this anarchy the brotherly people of Somali are experiencing a deterioration in their living standards, a lack of basic services and the spread of poverty and disease. We are indeed grateful to you, Mr. President, for convening this open debate on the deteriorating situation of Somalia at a time when the world seems to have grown accustomed to the collapse and indeed extinction of the Somali State.

We also thank the Secretary-General for his report on the situation in Somalia, as well as the efforts being made by the United Nations to restore peace and stability and to meet the basic and humanitarian needs of the Somali people.

The Arta process, which was hosted by Djibouti, is a bright spot in a series of sad events in Somalia represented by internal divisions, warring and violence among the factions. The Arta process has raised the flag of unity and peace. It has sought to bring together the largest number of civil society representatives and has emphasized dialogue as a way to restore peace and national unity and to rehabilitate the State. Because it represents an alternative to anarchy and war, it received wide popular support. The international community endorsed those steps. This was clearly evident in the participation of President Abdikassim Salad Hassan in the Millennium Summit and was a step towards restoring Somalia's sovereignty.

Today we agree with the Secretary-General that it is incumbent on us to pursue completion of the Arta process, despite the obstacles to the peace process and to the rebuilding of the State. We also wish to encourage dialogue between the Transitional National Government and Somali factions. In this regard, Yemen stands ready to make every effort to facilitate that dialogue, which must be supported by the neighbouring countries and regional organizations, including the League of Arab States and the Organization of African Unity, the Organization of the Islamic Conference and the European Union.

We look positively on the Secretary-General's proposal to set up a Committee of Friends of Somalia to emphasize ways and means to call attention to Somalia's needs in the area of national reconciliation, as well as to provide assistance in mobilizing funds for

reconstruction and development. We also support the proposal to establish a peace-building office in Somalia. We may also call for a fact-finding mission to Somalia. We emphasize once again the role of the United Nations, particularly the role of the Security Council, in deploying all efforts to help Somalia restore its sovereignty and national unity so that peace and stability prevail in that sister country.

The President: I thank the representative of Yemen for his kind words addressed to me.

The next speaker inscribed on my list is the representative of Ethiopia. I invite him to take a seat at the Council table and to make his statement.

Mr. Hussein (Ethiopia): I would like to take this opportunity first to congratulate you, Sir, on your assumption of the presidency of the Security Council for the month of October. We also welcome the fact that this open debate is taking place under your presidency. I also wish to thank last month's President, Ambassador Levitte of France, for the able way in which he led the Council's work. It goes without saying that both Ireland and France are friends not only of Ethiopia, but also of Africa. I just want to note that for the record.

Like other delegations before me, I welcome the Prime Minister of Somalia, Mr. Ali Khalif Galaydh. I am encouraged by the content of his statement.

A lot has been said here, and a lot has not been said. I would like to dwell more on the few things that have not been said.

If we look at the whole process that led to the Arta Peace Conference on Somalia, we see that there were, as some have indicated, previous processes, but, as has also been indicated, these processes were also very genuine. They took place in Djibouti. In fact, the first one on Somalia took place in 1991. It was held in Djibouti. Others were held in Ethiopia, Egypt, Kenya, Libya and Yemen. In Ethiopia's view, all these were genuine attempts to resolve the Somali question in the interest of the people of Somalia. We believed that they paved the way for what happened at Arta.

I want that also to be on the record, because some seem not to have that in their record, to judge from what they have stated. At least that was the implication — not by many, but by one or two speakers.

Ethiopia fully supported the Arta process from the beginning. I want it to be on the Council's record that even where the meeting took place was symbolic — the air-conditioned tent was provided by Ethiopia. It cost us more than \$250,000. To many this may not seem like a lot of money, but for a poor country like Ethiopia it was. We continue to support the Arta process. We believe that that process was a step forward for peace and reconciliation in Somalia.

We worked very hard so that this process would not unravel. In fact, if we look at the IGAD member States, we see that Ethiopia played a very important, and at crucial times, leading role to ensure that all were on board.

IGAD's last position on this matter was adopted in Khartoum last November, when a head of State from Somalia took part in one of its meetings for the first time after 10 years' absence. So that there is no confusion, I would like to cite the gist of IGAD's position, contained in a resolution stating that the heads of State and Government:

"1. *Affirm* that the Arta Peace Conference that resulted in the establishment of the Transitional Government for Somalia constituted a major achievement in the Somali peace process;

"2. *Urge* the Transitional Government and all parties and administrations of Somalia to create the environment that would bring into the process those that did not participate at the Arta Conference with the objective of widening and deepening the process of national reconciliation;

"3. *Insist* that the peace process in Somalia must continue and be completed through dialogue and not by resorting to the use of force;

"4. *Encourage* Somalia's neighbours and the current Chairman of IGAD to establish a mechanism that would enable them to continue to assist the Somalis to achieve full peace, national reconciliation, and unity".

This is a point also taken in the Secretary-General's report.

The resolution continues:

"5. *Affirm* the need for all necessary measures to be taken to ensure that the territory of Somalia is not used as a springboard by groups inimical to the peace and security of the subregion;

"6. *Reaffirm* IGAD's commitment to the unity and territorial integrity of Somalia;

"7. *Welcome* the participation of the Transitional Government of Somalia in the deliberations and activities of IGAD, bearing in mind that regular and continuing evaluation of progress towards peace and national reconciliation in the country will be carried out;

"8. *Urgently* call upon the international community to support the rehabilitation in Somalia through direct assistance to the Transitional Government and the regions which had established peace and stability through self-administration, as long as they are committed to the peace process." (S/2001/120, annex II)

Well, the implication of this summit position, which is the position of the region, including Somalia, is that if the Transitional Government has to be in place, then others who did not take part have to be on board. In fact an IGAD delegation was sent to Mogadishu to discuss this issue with the TNG and to continue this reconciliation process. At that time, for reasons known only to itself, the TNG rejected this. It referred to these groups as rebels, as warlords, and would not talk to them.

What happened as a result? Others did the same. They expressed rejection of the TNG; they said there was no such thing as a TNG, and therefore it was just another faction. So the TNG could go beyond this.

We have always been transparent. We have always been frank. I will not change that position today. I want the Council to know that for us in the region — in Ethiopia, in particular, and I can only speak for Ethiopia — we see that the Transitional Government itself is not of one mind. We believe that there are basically three groups. There are the extremists of *Al-Ittihad*, *Al-Islah* and the Muslim Brotherhood. There are also those who are ready for reconciliation. The first group, by the way, used to have what were called the Islamic courts and their militia, and they had longstanding, strong financial institutions through a number of activities. There is no need to go into the details; I think most members of the Council are familiar with them. There is a second group that is ready for reconciliation, but it lacks the financial and military muscle. There is a third group that shuttles between those two, and is used by either. Hence, when we talk with the TNG, there is no single

group with which one can continuously take up the issues, as we have done.

We are ready to help in this situation. Norway suggested that Ethiopia should try to facilitate and use its influence. We will accept this suggestion. We are ready to do it. But when we speak of these realities, some in the TNG — I will not say "all" — do not like it; they are not comfortable with it. I would even say that there are others who one could say are more Catholic than the Pope; they even go beyond the TNG. We will not accept this.

We are not partial to anyone, whether the TNG, the Somalia Reconciliation and Restoration Council, "Somaliland", "Puntland" or any other group. Ethiopia is not for the TNG; Ethiopia is not for the SRRC; Ethiopia is not for "Somaliland"; it is not for "Puntland". It is for Somalia and the people of Somalia.

At the moment we do not see, as the United States representative once said, any group or entity that has the political legitimacy and the support of everybody throughout Somalia. The Arta peace process is the best of the processes so far. But it is a still incomplete process that IGAD speaks of. By the way, the Transitional National Assembly and the Charter also speak about what came out of Arta. Even those who claim that we should not speak to this one or that one are not right. That is not what the Arta process said. We have the Charter; we have the positions.

Some have tried to pretend that the Somalia Reconciliation and Restoration Council is supported by one country, that one country established it, that one country is behind it. That reference — let us take away all the pretences — is to Ethiopia. This is because that group met in a place called Awasa in southern Ethiopia. It was the first time Ethiopia had facilitated meetings for Somalis. They have met many times; we simply facilitated this.

The Foreign Minister of Somalia, Mr. Ismail Mohamoud Hurre, said of the SRRC last June:

"Ethiopia is open to everyone. Many Somalis come to Addis Ababa and discuss matters with the Ethiopians. The SRRC are part of that. We are not averse to Ethiopia carrying on discussions with them, as it is all part of the reconciliation and peace process".

That was what the Foreign Minister of the TNG said.

Today the Prime Minister, Mr. Ali Khalif Galaydh, said that the Somali Government would welcome every positive effort by the neighbouring countries and the world community that can facilitate this process. He went on to say that they were prepared to engage those outside the Arta process through sustained dialogue and negotiations. We welcome this statement, but I do not welcome indications by delegations that any support for the SRRC or any connection to it is like revitalizing warlordism. We do not find this at all helpful for the reconciliation process. Nobody, least of all Ethiopia, which has the longest border with Somalia, wants to revive that.

The biggest problems of the last ten years have fallen on Ethiopia, a poor country. This includes terrorism, as well as taking up the burdens of our people, our brothers and sisters, who came from across the border. Next to Somalia, the largest concentration of Somalis in the Horn of Africa or anywhere in the world is in Ethiopia, where there are over 5 million Somalis, occupying more than one quarter of Ethiopian territory. One of the federated states includes more than one quarter of Ethiopia. That is where I myself come from. I am an ethnic Somali. There are more than 5 million of us. So, next to the Somalis of Somalia, the Ethiopians are the ones who are most affected and want the stability of Somalia.

However, our allegiance and support is for the people of Somalia. The TNG must encompass all Somalis, including those who, in the words of the IGAD summit, have not been part of the process. The Secretary-General's report and the Council on previous occasions have said that those who are not already on board have to be brought into the process.

Should we wait until all of them accept the peace process? No. We should engage those who are ready for reconciliation and peace, whether it is the Somalia Reconciliation and Restoration Council (SRRC) or any other group or faction outside the TNG. We should disregard and isolate those who are not for peace. Somalia's reconciliation process will not be complete if we do not engage all these groups that I have mentioned.

There are one or two more points I would like to touch on before I conclude. We would like to call on the Security Council to enforce the arms embargo against Somalia. This has been stated by some. We have in the past brought attention to the fact that arms

have been shipped into Somalia by air and by sea. This has made the situation in Somalia much worse and as a result we have been victims of terrorism carried out on our soil, deep inside Ethiopia, committed by groups coming from Somalia — Al-Itihad was one of them. They did not hide their identity and claimed responsibility for what they had done: explosions in several public buildings and mining and attacking rail and road transport. These groups did not cease to exist because it suddenly dawned on them that what they were doing was not good. They were stopped — at least until now — by actions taken by Ethiopia to defend itself after it was attacked. We took action in 1997 by destroying the terrorist bases inside Somalia. One of them was at Luuq. At least 26 multinationals were from outside the region. I can recall a number of them, most of whom are part of the same groups that make up Al-Qaida. Some may try to sell the idea that Al-Qaida and international terrorist groups are not in Somalia; we disagree. We have ample evidence. As we speak, my Government is taking action to provide security for more than one foreign embassy in Addis Ababa, as a result of threats made by these groups. We are not going to be like those who take ostrich-like actions. Some of you can afford to do that, as you are not neighbours of Somalia but live thousands of kilometres away. In that tranquillity, you can make statements that appear fine but, in reality, do not help the situation.

I would now like to touch upon one very serious issue, one of immediate concern to ordinary Somalis — a matter of life and death. Dire humanitarian needs can be due to several factors, but arise mainly as a result of the failure of the gu rains. These are the main rains that usually come in summer. Hundreds of thousands in Bakool, Bay, Gedo, Hiiraan and many parts of the northeast of Somalia need immediate assistance. We call upon the international community to assist if a tragedy is to be avoided there.

In Ethiopia, we already have, in our province in Warder, in the Degehabur, in Gode, and the surrounding areas, the thousands who have crossed into the Ethiopian part of the Somali region. These areas of Ethiopia themselves have also suffered. To the best of our ability, we are trying to assist in this particular case.

In conclusion, I would say, let us be positive. Look at some delegations, such as Norway, who have also accepted what I would call the legitimate concerns

of neighbouring countries. There is nobody to take action when such things as have happened several times take place over a border that is nearly 2,000 kilometres long. Another suffering country is Kenya. They will speak for themselves. Djibouti also has a border of about 70 kilometres with a very stable part of Somalia. Nonetheless, they have also been affected in one way or another.

So, when you look at this, I would appeal to the Council that the interest of the Somali people *in toto* should be seen. That is why we welcome all the positive steps that will be taken by the TNG within its capacity. I think we should not have any delusions that they are in a position, for example, to take actions against terrorism, even if they wished to, because, as I have said, there are some within the Government that are part of that problem.

The President: I thank the representative of Ethiopia for his kind words to me.

The next speaker inscribed on my list is the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic. I invite him to take a seat at the Council table and to make his statement.

Mr. Mekdad (Syrian Arab Republic) (*spoke in Arabic*): It is my pleasure, Sir, to congratulate your friendly country, Ireland, and to congratulate you personally on your assumption of the presidency of the Security Council for this month. We thank you for providing this opportunity to Member States to deliberate once again on current developments in Somalia with a view to finding a solution to the tragedy of the Somali people, who for so long have suffered war and its destructive effects.

Allow us also to express our appreciation to Ambassador Levitte, the Permanent Representative of France, for his presidency of the Security Council last month. Allow us also to express our pleasure at the presence of the Prime Minister of the Transitional National Government in Somalia and his delegation, who are with us.

All statements before the Security Council today have been unanimous in stressing the need for more attention on the part of the international community, and the United Nations, in particular, to the continuing difficult situation in Somalia.

The Syrian Arab Republic believes that the ongoing tragedy of the brotherly Somali people ought

to have come to an end long, long ago. The civil war visited upon Somalia for so many years has led to devastation in all fields: humanitarian, security, economic, social and cultural. While the international community and the United Nations have made strenuous efforts to find solutions to similar problems in other parts of the world — Africa, the Balkans and Asia — we note that the situation in Somalia has not received the necessary attention over the past decade.

The Somali people continue to suffer the scourge of war and its destructive effects. Dozens of resolutions and decisions of the United Nations addressing other conflicts and wars were not reduplicated in the case of Somalia. Where was Somalia when the United Nations and its various organs set out their positions on peacekeeping, post-conflict peace-building and the need to end massacres and violations of human rights?

In all the devastation visited upon Somalia, there was a glimpse of hope in the success of the Conference held in Arta, in the sister Republic of Djibouti, and presided over by President Ismail Omar Guelleh. The Conference drew together broad segments of Somali society. The Syrian Arab Republic welcomed the achievements of the representatives of the Somali people, who created the Transitional National Assembly and elected Mr. Abdikassim Salad Hassan President of the Somali Democratic Republic.

In his statement during the general debate of the General Assembly at its fifty-fifth session, Mr. Farouk Al-Shara', Minister for Foreign Affairs of Syria, stated that these two achievements were major pillars for the restoration of Somali state institutions. He called on the international community to redouble its efforts to help Somalis carry out the tasks of reconstruction and rehabilitation.

In solidarity with our brothers, the Somali people, the Arab Summit held in Amman on 26 and 27 March adopted a resolution calling on all factions and sectors of Somali society to cooperate to their utmost ability with the elected President and his Government to achieve security and stability and to ensure the territorial integrity, reconstruction and rehabilitation of Somalia. The Arab Summit set aside \$54 million to reintegrate and resettle militia members and to restore state institutions. The Transitional National Government has made great efforts at various levels to ensure national reconciliation and to attract regional and world support for its work. In this context, the 37th Assembly

of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), held in Lusaka, reaffirmed the commitment of the OAU to Somalia's territorial integrity, independence and unity. The OAU Council of Ministers stressed its support for Somalia's sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity and for all efforts to create a National Commission for Reconciliation and Property Settlement.

My delegation has considered the Secretary-General's report on the situation in Somalia, contained in document S/2001/963 of 11 October 2001. We thank the Secretary-General and his Representative for their efforts in support of the Somali people. The report includes a great deal of information on the various developments that have taken place in Somalia since last year. It accurately reflects the deteriorating economic and humanitarian situation, as well as the dire need of tens of thousands of Somalis for speedy humanitarian assistance to save them from certain death. In several paragraphs, the report stresses that dire poverty, the lack of employment opportunities and the total destruction of infrastructures and social services cannot be addressed in the absence of appropriate material and financial resources. The report states that many programmes linked to the Transitional National Government have obtained no assistance from international donors, including United Nations agencies.

In the light of the importance of achieving peace in Somalia and of preserving its sovereignty and territorial integrity, the Syrian Arab Republic is following with satisfaction the efforts of the Transitional National Government in Somalia. We call on all factions and sectors in that country to cooperate with the Government through a constructive national dialogue aimed at restoring peace, security and stability to Somalia. Syria appeals to all donor States to provide all forms of assistance to that Government in order to enable it to revitalize the institutions that were demolished in the civil war and to rebuild the country's infrastructure in order to achieve normalcy in the lives of the Somali people.

Syria believes that a Security Council mission to evaluate the situation on the ground and to prepare specific proposals would help to ensure a more effective role for the United Nations and the Security Council in helping the Government to extend its control over all Somalia. We believe that such assistance includes the deployment of an international peace-building mission to help the Transitional

National Government, which would make a real and effective contribution and demonstrate the international community's resolve to end the crisis in Somalia.

The Somali people has suffered for a very long time. The Security Council must not stop at merely hearing reports and statements or at adopting resolutions that remain dead letter and unimplemented on the ground. The time has come to act stoutly by adopting positions that can attain the fundamental objectives and fulfil the task of the Security Council: the maintenance of international peace and security throughout the world, including Somalia.

The President: The next speaker on my list is the representative of Qatar. I invite him to take a seat at the Council table and to make his statement.

Mr. Al-Nasser (Qatar) (spoke in Arabic): At the outset, I should like to extend to you, Sir, my congratulations on your assumption of the presidency of the Council for this month and to wish you every success in your work. I also thank your predecessor, the Ambassador of France, who presided over the work of the Council last month.

The Prime Minister of Somalia, Mr. Galaydh, has honoured the Council with his presence today, and we welcome him.

The people of Somalia have suffered much as a result of 10 years of civil war. International military intervention was needed to restore peace. We regret that such international efforts have not succeeded in realizing the Somali people's search for peace. Some political forces in Somalia have largely ensured the failure of any attempt by international forces to establish peace and create a coalition Government that would include all political factions.

Following the Somalia National Peace Conference, held at Arta, Djibouti, in which the Government of Qatar participated, we saw the formation of the Transitional National Government (TNG), led by President Abdikassim Salad Hassan. Now, we all look forward to supporting that young Government; we hope it will be able to establish unity and extend its authority throughout Somali territory, thus serving as the sole legitimate Government. That would restore peace and security, and, under its new leadership, the Government would be able to bring together all parties and factions and convince them to join in a governing coalition.

We know that the task facing President Abdikassim Salad Hassan — the restoration of peace and security — is an extremely difficult one in view of the present situation in Somalia. The long civil war has had negative social repercussions in Somalia, including the fragmentation of civil society. It is no easy matter to consolidate national unity in Somalia, especially given the meagre resources available to the Government.

Somalia still needs the international community's support for its fledgling Government. We consider it important that, through the Security Council and the United Nations in general, the international community should come to that Government's assistance. We must take the first step, asking the Representative of the Secretary-General to examine the situation in Somalia and then closely to follow developments in all their aspects. The task is also to ensure coordination among neighbouring countries and among relevant regional and international organizations.

My delegation urges the Security Council to call for respect for the territorial integrity of Somalia and to secure commitments from other countries to refrain from all interference in Somalia's internal affairs and from encouraging secessionist factions whose aim is to undermine the security and stability of Somalia. My delegation believes that if the status quo continues and if the international community fails to support the new Government, Somalia could become a haven for fugitives trying to evade justice. Indeed, we must eliminate all such sanctuaries and safe havens. That — like what is now taking place in Afghanistan — would be painful for the entire world.

I wish in conclusion to express our hope that the Security Council will shoulder its responsibility to return the fraternal country of Somalia to normalcy, and that it will make every possible effort to send a mission to that country to report on progress towards the restoration of peace and to help Somalia become a valued member of the international community.

The President: I thank the representative of Qatar for the kind words he addressed to me.

The next speaker is the Permanent Observer of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, His Excellency Mr. Mokhtar Lamani, to whom the Council has extended an invitation under rule 39 of its provisional rules of procedure. I invite Mr. Lamani to take a seat at the Council table and to make his statement.

Mr. Lamani (spoke in Arabic): At the outset, Sir, I take this opportunity to congratulate you on your assumption of the presidency of the Security Council for the month of October. We are confident that, under your able leadership, the Council will successfully complete the tasks before it. I wish also to thank you for convening this open meeting, which will help heighten the international community's concern with respect to the situation in Somalia. We hope that debates of this kind will continue, because they enhance the transparency of the United Nations and of the Council's decision-making process.

The international community warmly welcomes the progress along the path of peace and national reconciliation in Somalia that has come about thanks to the perseverance and commendable efforts of international and regional organizations and of neighbouring States, notably the Republic of Djibouti, whose active role in the quest for a lasting political settlement of the crisis in Somalia is well known.

We reaffirm our conviction that the United Nations should continue its search for lasting peace and stability in Somalia, in cooperation with the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), the League of Arab States, the Organization of African Unity and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, as well as with other organizations. Here, let me make particular mention of the tireless and praiseworthy efforts of the Secretary-General, Mr. Kofi Annan, and of the important role he is playing in this process.

We agree with the view expressed in the report of the Secretary-General (S/2001/963) on the need for a mechanism that would facilitate a uniform approach and exchange of information among all outside parties with an interest in a lasting peace in Somalia. We also welcome the Secretary-General's proposal on establishing a committee of friends of Somalia to focus on ways and means of drawing attention to Somalia's needs in the area of national reconciliation as well as to help mobilize resources for rehabilitation and development. We agree with the Secretary-General that the peace process in Somalia needs support, that the rule of law should be established and that national political and judicial institutions should be restored.

As the report says, the security situation in Somalia has not improved and remains, by and large, the same as it had been previously and that it has thus

not been possible to deploy a peace-building office in the country. But it is our view that a tangible United Nations presence in the area could help overcome the present obstacles.

Success in the process towards peace and national reconciliation has led to the formation of a parliament, the Transitional National Assembly, with the participation of all the country's factions and views, and to the appointment of a President, a Prime Minister and a Government. We affirm our support for the efforts of the Transitional National Government to promote the process of national reconciliation and reconstruction in Somalia, and we believe that the international community should provide the assistance needed to help rebuild infrastructure and administrative and other institutions.

It is indeed fortunate that His Excellency Mr. Ali Khalif Galaydh, the Prime Minister of Somalia, is present at today's meeting and that he had the opportunity to put Somalia's case before the Security Council. We believe that we are all obliged to help support the efforts of the Somali Government to regain control over the country and to put an end to the tragic situation stemming from the civil and tribal wars that have long afflicted the Somali people. In this respect, we are convinced that the primary and ultimate responsibility for the establishment of peace and stability in Somalia lies with the Somali people and its leaders. Support must be provided, however, by the international community if such efforts are to succeed.

The people of Somalia have suffered immensely and for a long time. It is high time that the international community assumed its responsibility in preserving international peace and security by providing humanitarian assistance, in view of the deterioration of the humanitarian situation of the Somali people. It is our hope that the United Nations agencies and its international partners will pursue and expand their humanitarian activities in Somalia to help alleviate the suffering of the Somali people.

The world is undergoing turbulent times today. Humanity is ill at ease, racked by war, terrorism, underdevelopment, religious intolerance, tension and instability. We all feel the upheavals in international life. Our international community is seeking to rearrange and reorder its priorities. This is why we say we should not postpone solutions to any problem, because issues of peace and security are serious, urgent

and interrelated. Thus, we believe that the situation in Somalia demands the immediate intervention of the international community, through the United Nations, to support the national institutions in Somalia, so that peace and stability can prevail and lead to economic and social development.

In conclusion, the Organization of the Islamic Conference reiterates the need for the international community to respect the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence and unity of Somalia. These are principles that have been emphasized by all the Islamic Conferences, be they ministerial or at the summit level.

The President: I thank Mr. Lamani for his kind words addressed to me.

The next speaker inscribed on my list is the representative of Iraq. I invite him to take a seat at the Council table and to make his statement.

Mr. Aldouri (Iraq) (spoke in Arabic): Allow me at the outset to express to you, Sir, our sincere congratulations on your assumption of the presidency of the Security Council this month. We are confident that your wisdom and skill will ensure success for your presidency. I cannot fail to express our appreciation to the Ambassador of France for his presidency of the Security Council last month.

We are grateful to the Secretary-General for his report on the issue under consideration today, and to his Representative for the statement he made this morning. We would also like to express our appreciation to the sisterly country of Djibouti for the efforts made on behalf of our brothers the Somali people to overcome the crisis in Somalia and for creating the necessary environment to set up the Transitional National Government (TNG). Finally, I am duty-bound to welcome the Prime Minister of the Transitional National Government and the delegation accompanying him, as they represent the State of Somalia.

We take part in the Security Council's meeting today to express our support to sisterly Somalia and its people. We also express, together with all other Arab States, our concern that Somalia become again a united, fully sovereign and independent State able to defend the vital interests of the Somali people, following the attempts by evil forces — external and internal — to tear apart the social and political fabric of its society and destroy its economic infrastructure.

We consider our support for the Transitional National Government a priority for achieving unity and comprehensive reconciliation with a view to re-establishing stability and security and reconstructing the country. We urge the Security Council in particular, and the United Nations in general, as well as the international community, to ensure that this matter is taken up seriously, proceeding from the purposes and principles of the Charter.

Such attention may solve some problems in Somalia. However, translating concern into programmes requires large financial allocations. We hope that Arab States will be able to cover some of these financial needs. In this regard, however, we would recall the responsibility of the international community to stand in solidarity with other States and to provide financial assistance to Somalia, when required, in order to enable it to fulfil its duty towards its people. Allow me to repeat our call for a redoubling of efforts to provide immediate assistance so as to enable Somalia to reconstruct and rehabilitate its society and re-establish stability and security.

The appointment by the Secretary-General of a Representative for Somalia responsible for following the developments of the Somali situation in all its aspects, in coordination with the Transitional National Government, the neighbouring States and regional and international organizations, will surely help solve some of the principal problems in Somalia, particularly those relating to the parties that remain outside the circle of national unity. It should also help in reinforcing State institutions, through the provision of financial and technical assistance from specialized agencies and funds.

The Government of Somalia, today more than at any time in the past, must be dealt with through an honest approach that is far removed from the maze of international political sensitivities, international polarization and narrow interests. Dealing with Somalia at the international level, particularly at the United Nations, in a neutral, unbiased and objective manner, distanced from the sensitivities of the recent past — and we trust that it shall be thus — will provide impetus towards unifying Somali society, following a comprehensive reconciliation. We believe that the current Transitional National Government in Somalia is working towards this objective.

Giving the Prime Minister of Somalia the opportunity to speak to the Security Council today and,

indeed, the very holding of this open debate to allow Member States, and Arab States in particular, to express their points of view, are in themselves positive developments. We hope that the Council will continue dealing with similar humanitarian situations in the same way, the solution of which may well contribute to international peace and security.

After having heard the statements made by some members of the Security Council today, we felt a clear sense of hesitation. The reasons cited call, we believe, rather for Council's intervention, not reluctance and hesitation in taking a position. As the Ambassador of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya said this morning, insisting on the need to hesitate will not help to solve Somalia's problem, but merely add to its deterioration. We therefore express the hope that the Council will adopt a more positive position so as to assist the Transitional National Government and the Somali people to overcome their problems and difficulties.

The President: I thank the representative of Iraq for his kind words addressed to me.

The next speaker inscribed on my list is the representative of Kenya. I invite him to take a seat at the Council table and to make his statement.

Mr. Jalang'o (Kenya): At the outset, my delegation would like to congratulate you, Mr. President, on your assumption of the presidency of the Security Council for the month of October. Our salutations also go to your predecessor, Ambassador Levitte of France.

Allow me to take this opportunity to address the Council on the report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Somalia, which was presented this morning by his Representative. This comprehensive report is most welcome to my delegation. We also express our appreciation for the detailed briefing presented this morning by the Prime Minister of the Transitional National Government (TNG) on the developments in Somalia and on ways and means of assisting Somalia.

My delegation wholeheartedly welcomes the TNG back to the fold of the international community to play its role on behalf of the people of Somalia, so long denied of that very important and vital opportunity.

As the Ambassador of Ethiopia mentioned a few minutes ago, Kenya as a neighbour of Somalia, also knows only too well the problems Somalia has gone through since 1991. We have shared Somalia's pain and

tears as both a neighbour and a friend. We therefore continue to support all the ongoing peace processes, including the Intergovernmental Authority on Development's (IGAD) task of implementing the mechanisms agreed upon at the Khartoum summit held in November 2000.

My delegation also joins the appeal that was made a few minutes ago by the Ambassador of Ethiopia for immediate humanitarian assistance for the thousands of refugees in neighbouring countries, including Kenya.

Many efforts have been expended through IGAD, the Organization of African Unity, the European Union, the United Nations and others to bring about a lasting solution to the Somalia problem, caused by the lack of central administration during the last 10 years. At long last, we see hope exemplified in the Transitional National Government of Somalia; and it is in this vein that we welcome among us, after very many years, the Prime Minister and head of the Transitional National Government of Somalia and the Permanent Representative of Somalia.

The Secretary-General notes in his report that "the security situation did not make it possible to deploy a peace-building office in the country." (S/2001/963, para 72)

However, my delegation welcomes the feasibility of setting up a Committee of Friends of Somalia, as noted in paragraph 66 of the report. As a member State of IGAD, Kenya will be ready to participate in the work of that Committee with other members of the IGAD Partners Forum.

Finally, my delegation calls upon the United Nations to redouble its efforts to assist the people and the Government of Somalia to return to normalcy as soon as possible through the establishment of workable national institutions, security and legal organs; and above all to facilitate economic recovery and development.

The President: I thank the representative of Kenya for his kind words addressed to me.

I now give the floor to Mr. David Stephen to respond to comments made and questions raised in the course of our meeting.

Mr. Stephen: I will refer briefly to a number of topics that were referred to me by members of the Council in the course of the debate.

The representative of Mauritius asked about the flow of arms, and whether we had any estimate on whether or not the flow of arms into the country had increased. The mandate and resources of my Office, which is located in Nairobi, not in Somalia, unfortunately have not allowed us to monitor the flow of arms into and out of the country. Allegations are made from time to time about arms coming into the country. Our practice is to urge those making those allegations to refer them to the committee set up under resolution 733 (1992). That is, I am afraid, all we can do as a political office with our existing mandate and resources.

However, members of the Council will note that in paragraph 54 of the report, where we note that President Daniel arap Moi of Kenya ordered a ban on trade between Somalia and Kenya on 28 July, one of the reasons for this ban was, according to reports, the President's concern about the flow of arms into Kenya from Somalia. It is very clear that as conflict escalates, arms become more valuable in the country. But then, when there is little conflict it seems that arms flow out of the country. This is one reason why the neighbouring countries, as members will have noted, are very concerned about the question of the flow of arms from Somalia.

Both the representative of Mauritius and the President, speaking in his national capacity, raised the question of security. The representative of Mauritius asked if I could give some estimate. As members know, security is completely different from the political activities of the Secretariat, and I would not presume to offer a professional view. But, speaking of Mogadishu, I visited the city in March one week before the taking of the hostages, and my impression at the time was that there was a good deal of tension in the city. I was then unable, for security reasons, to visit Mogadishu for nearly six months, but I returned for a brief visit on 7 September, and my impression — for what it is worth — is that the city was much less tense and that progress had been made in terms of policing during those months.

The meagre response of donors to the Transitional National Government was raised by a number of representatives and members of the Council, and the representative of Bangladesh specifically asked if I would comment on this. Obviously, this question should be directed to donors; I cannot speak on behalf of donors. But I think that there was, at the beginning of this process, a rather low expectation on the part of

donors. The experience of donors in Somalia in the past had not encouraged them to think that this was a venture that would be likely to succeed. But I believe that a number of donors are now engaging with the Transitional National Government, and that some assistance is in the pipeline.

Finally, the representative of Mali and the representative of Bangladesh asked about the group of friends. This, as the report makes clear, is a matter for further consultation. There is no blueprint. No scheme is being laid down, and I am sure that the Secretary-General will take account of the comments and remarks that have been made in the course of the debate, including the fact that various members have offered to participate in this activity, as he begins the consultations.

But it is designed for two basic purposes. One is to assist in the development of a uniformity of approach, which has been identified as one of the problems in the Somalia context — in other words, so that countries with an interest can see the arguments and understand the viewpoints of other countries; and, secondly, simply as a question of exchange of information in other contexts. I am thinking of Angola, which I think the Prime Minister of Somalia mentioned, but also in Central America — El Salvador and Guatemala — the exchange of information has been a very valuable function of such groups of friends, or friends of the Secretary-General, as they have been termed.

I think that is all.

The President: I thank Mr. Stephen for the clarifications he has provided.

I give the floor to the Prime Minister of Somalia, Mr. Ali Khalif Galaydh.

Mr. Galaydh (Somalia): I should very much like to thank the members of the Council and the other representatives, who have been very generous and warm in welcoming me and my delegation to this open debate on Somalia. The very kind words and the ideas on how best to help in bringing about lasting peace in Somalia have been very uplifting. Now we know that just about everyone in the Council is a friend of Somalia, so if all of its members are going to be reconstituted as friends of Somalia, I think that would be most welcome.

I should like to address three or four points that really have been central to the discussion. The first one

is the issue of the post-conflict peace-building mission. We know that Somalia suffers from what is called the Somali syndrome. It goes back to 1993. The people who authored those events are the very same people who are still the warlords, who are outside the Arta process. They are the very same people whom we are being urged to engage in dialogue. We would like to, but we would very much like the Council to be aware that what happened in October 1993 was not the doing of the Somali people. It was not the doing of the Transitional National Government or of anyone associated with the Transitional National Government. It was the work of the warlords. They are the ones who are still hampering peace in Somalia. From what I have heard today, people want to hear their ideas. If they had any ideas about peace and reconciliation in this country, they would have been forthcoming some time in the last decade or more.

We are caught up in a vicious circle, because if, supposedly, the security arrangements in Somalia and Mogadishu are not sufficient and not adequate to allow for the sending of United Nations personnel, then there will be no chance of promoting peace, security and stability in Somalia, because the donors will stay away. There will not be any meaningful assistance for reconstruction and development, and therefore we are caught up in this vicious circle.

I would like to submit to those who are a bit nervous about the safety and security of United Nations personnel — and we agree with them 100 per cent — that we have to strike a balance between the safety and security of a few United Nations personnel, important as their lives are, and the destiny of a whole country. Let me add that Somalia should not be judged any differently from the way other countries have been, and are being, judged.

Somalia, despite the Somali syndrome, is a Member of the United Nations. It has been a member of all of the regional and subregional organizations, and all we ask is to be treated like the other countries that have these post-conflict problems. The United Nations has not abstained or shied away from sending peace-building missions or peacekeeping missions to Sierra Leone, to Liberia, to East Timor, to Kosovo, to Bosnia — why, then, is Somalia being singled out for the very stringent, all-embracing criteria of total safety and security? This mystifies us.

What a good number of Council members have suggested broadly, as a way around this impasse, is the dispatch of a fact-finding mission to Mogadishu and to Somalia. It is an important issue not only for us, the Somali people, but also for the region and for international peace and security. As the French Ambassador said, it is not only a question of one mission being sent at some stage; there is a need for a frequent assessment of the security situation. Only then will the Council be informed adequately.

I should like to comment briefly on the issue of national reconciliation in Somalia. The Arta peace process was the brainchild of President Ismail Omar Guelleh. It has succeeded for one reason: because it was different from the 12 others that preceded it. The 12 others were mainly tailor-made for the warlords, for self-appointed characters who really did not have the mandate to speak on behalf of the Somali people, or their clans or sub-clans.

The Arta process was successful because it was a Somali process. It was centred on the deliberations of Somali civil society. There is no alternative to that.

I want to be very clear about this: there is no other game in town. If anybody has any other ideas, we would like to listen to them. It will not help to say, "We are going to have an open-door policy. Every Somali is entitled to be asked for his or her opinion". That is all well and good, but Somalia has gone through 10 long years, and the international community has been trying desperately to impose a solution on us. It will not work — period. There is no alternative. I suggest that members of this Council accept the facts on the ground: no warlord or group of warlords can bring peace and stability to Somalia. No couple of clan elders, or people with fancy résumés, can bring about peace and reconciliation in Somalia. The Somali people have spoken. They gathered in Arta — they spent six months there. That is the only game in town.

If there are those who think they can impose a solution on Somalia, they had better think twice, because that would be a futile exercise. If there are those who think that, because they have long borders with Somalia, a long, troubled history with Somalia or vital national interests in Somalia, they are guaranteed an entry into the Somali story and a role in determining its outcome, they can take their show elsewhere. That will not work in Somalia.

We welcome the friends of Somalia. We welcome the help of the international community, because we have been unable to measure up to this historic task. We have inflicted deep wounds on ourselves. We lost almost two generations, and we have no guarantee that we can even save the generation or two to come. We welcome the friends of Somalia. We welcome any positive, constructive suggestions to help us. You, Mr. President, have afforded us this opportunity to share with you our ideas, concerns and apprehensions. We feel that this Council should be treated more respectfully in terms of being given supposed facts produced by so-called experts.

In a great example of guilt by association, the representative of a Member of the United Nations, our neighbour Ethiopia, said that we knew that Al Qaeda had operated in Somalia and, on top of that, that there were even components of the TNG that were extremist — that is, they were in bed with Al Qaeda. Those are very serious allegations. Does Ethiopia have the facts? We heard all of these innuendoes. We heard all the self-serving assertions. We would like to see the facts. We will not shy away from discharging our responsibilities to our own people and to the international community. We heard of ships being sent from landlocked Afghanistan to Somali ports bringing arms and the Al Qaeda leadership. Those are preposterous assertions. They do not help our case.

I do not want to engage in mud-slinging in this Council; I feel that that would not be appropriate. But I would be less than responsible if I did not respond to the assertions that the TNG is in bed with Al Qaeda and fundamentalists. We would like to do everything possible to shoulder our responsibility in accordance with resolution 1373 (2001). We want to do it, not to help anybody else, but in our own self-defence — we are not doing anybody a favour. And if we have to do it with our bare hands, we will do so. But we would like the international community to be better informed. Those who are pretending to be in the know — the supposed cognoscenti — are not offering a way out of this difficulty, this global menace. And pointing fingers at Member States for self-serving purposes will not help anybody. It will not help this Council.

The call for humanitarian assistance to the blighted Somalis is most welcome. The best foreign aid for Somalis would be rainfall, but that has not been forthcoming for almost two or three seasons. We are not exaggerating; the situation is very difficult.

Coupled with that is the fact that the great majority of the Somali people are pastoralists and rely on livestock, and we cannot export the livestock because of the fear of Rift Valley fever. This combination of drought and the inability to export livestock has been very damaging to the entire livelihood of a large percentage of the Somali people.

I would like to say one or two words about the issue of economic and humanitarian assistance, and what has been given to Somalia. According to the General Assembly's humanitarian assistance report, Somalia has supposedly received about \$100 million in the past 12 months. More than \$50 million has supposedly been provided by United Nations agencies. Security is the most important issue for the country and for the Somali people, yet we are told that less than \$1 million has been provided for security — for police training, for salaries or even for food for the police and security forces. We find that a little baffling, because if security is the key to bringing about peace and stability to Somalia, and if the international community has given \$100 million, we would have thought that at least a good part of it would have been expended on security — on the police force, or on information-gathering, for example, to combat international terrorism. That is what has been done in the past 12 months.

In all honesty, we do not expect much to come from that source. We have been pushing for that, and in all of our discussions with donors and with the United Nations we have always said that the best way to help us is to help establish the police and security forces. Yet we have not received much, as indicated in the report to which I referred earlier.

How we can shoulder our responsibility in accordance with resolution 1373 (2001)? I have had some discussions with the Ambassadors of the United Kingdom, France and Russia. We would like to have bilateral discussions. If the European Union, or countries acting bilaterally, or the United Nations can help us with that, that is where our first priority lies.

Our second priority is in the area of national reconciliation. Yes, the people we are dealing with are warlords. We are dealing with people who have no idea what is to be done for Somalia and who have no vision for Somalia. Nonetheless, we would like to sit down with them, but nobody can impose a solution on us.

As for what we have received in the form of assistance from a neighbour, there are, despite the allegations, no arms coming by ship or by air; the only arms that are coming to Somalia are coming by truck, and they are coming from one source. It is not only small arms, unfortunately. It hurts me to say this: landmines are being planted in urban areas. If that is the gift; the signature, of a friend, it might be an oxymoron. If friends are for that, it hurts. Those weapons kill indiscriminately, mostly civilians.

I would like to conclude by thanking you very much, Mr. President, for affording us this opportunity. This has enabled us to know who has good will for Somalia, who are the friends of Somalia and who are not the friends of Somalia.

The President: I thank the Prime Minister of Somalia for his concluding statement.

As I said at the outset of this meeting, it has been a Council presidency priority for Ireland to ensure a long overdue open discussion on Somalia. We have, I believe, had a comprehensive and useful exchange of views today. In the coming days, members of the Security Council will work on a draft presidential statement, which will draw on the full discussion that we have just had. It is my hope that we will be in a position to finalize the presidential statement early next week and that the statement will demonstrate the commitment of the Security Council to support Somalia and the Somali people.

There are no further speakers inscribed on my list. The Security Council has thus concluded the present stage of its consideration of the item on its agenda.

The meeting rose at 5.15 p.m.



Security Council

Fifty-sixth year

Provisional

4393rd meeting

Friday, 19 October 2001, 5.45 p.m.

New York

<i>President:</i>	Mr. Ryan	(Ireland)
<i>Members:</i>	Bangladesh	Mr. Ahsan
	China	Mr. Chen Xu
	Colombia	Mr. Valdivieso
	France	Mr. Doutriaux
	Jamaica	Miss Thomas
	Mali	Mr. Keita
	Mauritius	Mr. Jingree
	Norway	Mr. Kolby
	Russian Federation	Mr. Konuzin
	Singapore	Ms. Lee
	Tunisia	Mr. Ayari
	Ukraine	Mr. Kulyks
	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	Mr. Eldon
	United States of America	Mr. Cunningham

Agenda

The situation in Angola.

Letter dated 12 October 2001 from the Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 864 (1993) concerning the situation in Angola addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2001/966)

This record contains the text of speeches delivered in English and of the interpretation of speeches delivered in the other languages. The final text will be printed in the *Official Records of the Security Council*. Corrections should be submitted to the original languages only. They should be incorporated in a copy of the record and sent under the signature of a member of the delegation concerned to the Chief of the Verbatim Reporting Service, room C-178.

01-59235 (E)



The meeting was called to order at 5.45 p.m.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

The situation in Angola

Letter dated 12 October 2001 from the Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 864 (1993) concerning the situation in Angola addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2001/1996)

The President: The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. The Council is meeting in accordance with the understanding reached in its prior consultations.

Members of the Council have before them document S/2001/966, which contains a letter dated 12 October 2001 from the President of the Security Council, forwarding the supplementary report of the Monitoring Mechanism on sanctions against UNITA, which has been submitted pursuant to paragraph 6 of resolution 1348 (2001).

Members of the Council also have before them document S/2001/985, which contains the text of a draft resolution prepared in the course of the Council's prior consultations.

It is my understanding that the Council is ready to proceed to the vote on the draft resolution before it. Unless I hear any objection, I shall put the draft resolution to the vote now.

There being no objection, it is so decided.

A vote was taken by show of hands.

In favour:

Bangladesh, China, Colombia, France, Ireland, Jamaica, Mali, Mauritius, Norway, Russian Federation, Singapore, Tunisia, Ukraine, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

The President: There were 15 votes in favour. The draft resolution has been adopted unanimously as resolution 1374 (2001).

The Security Council has thus concluded the present stage of its consideration of the item on its agenda.

The Security Council will remain seized of the matter.

The meeting rose at 5.50 p.m.



Security Council

Fifty-sixth year

Provisional

4394th meeting

Monday, 22 October 2001, 12 noon
New York

<i>President:</i>	Mr. Ryan	(Ireland)
<i>Members:</i>	Bangladesh	Mr. Ahsan
	China	Mr. Chen Xu
	Colombia	Mr. Valdivieso
	France	Mr. Levitte
	Jamaica	Miss Durrant
	Mali	Mr. Ouane
	Mauritius	Mr. Koonjul
	Norway	Mr. Kolby
	Russian Federation	Mr. Granovsky
	Singapore	Ms. Lee
	Tunisia	Mr. Tekaya
	Ukraine	Mr. Kuchinsky
	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	Sir Jeremy Greenstock
	United States of America	Mr. Cunningham

Agenda

General issues relating to sanctions.

This record contains the text of speeches delivered in English and of the interpretation of speeches delivered in the other languages. The final text will be printed in the *Official Records of the Security Council*. Corrections should be submitted to the original languages only. They should be incorporated in a copy of the record and sent under the signature of a member of the delegation concerned to the Chief of the Verbatim Reporting Service, room C-178.



The meeting was called to order at 12 20 p.m.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted

General issues relating to sanctions

The President: I should like to inform the Council that I have received letters from the representatives of Germany and Sweden, in which they request to be invited to participate in the discussion of the item on the Council's agenda. In conformity with the usual practice, I propose, with the consent of the Council, to invite those representatives to participate in the discussion, without the right to vote, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter and rule 37 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure.

There being no objection, it is so decided

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Kastrup (Germany) and Mr. Dahlgren (Sweden) took a seat at the Council table.

The President: I should like to inform the Council that I have received a letter from the Permanent Observer of Switzerland, in which he requests to be invited to participate in the discussion of the item on the Council's agenda.

In accordance with the understanding reached in the Council's prior consultations, if I hear no objection, I shall take it that the Security Council agrees to extend an invitation to the Permanent Observer of Switzerland to the United Nations to participate in the discussion, without the right to vote.

There being no objection, it is so decided

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Staehelin (Switzerland) took a seat at the Council table

The President: In accordance with the understanding reached in the Council's prior consultations and in the absence of objection, I shall take it that the Security Council agrees to extend an invitation under rule 39 of its provisional rules of procedure to Mr. Ibrahima Fall, Assistant-Secretary-General for Political Affairs.

There being no objection, it is so decided

The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. The Security

Council is meeting in accordance with the understanding reached in its prior consultations.

The Council will hear briefings from the Permanent Observer of Switzerland and the Permanent Representatives of Germany and Sweden.

I would wish to remind Council members of the understanding reached in our prior consultations that the format of this morning's meeting is not intended to set any general precedent.

As there is no list of speakers for this meeting, I would invite Council members who wish to speak or to ask questions to so indicate to the Secretariat as from now.

In accordance with the decision taken earlier in the meeting, I give the floor to the Permanent Observer of Switzerland to the United Nations.

Mr. Staehelin (Permanent Observer of Switzerland): First, I wish to congratulate you, Sir, on your assumption of the Council presidency and I wish to thank you for convening today's meeting and giving me the floor.

Over the past decade, sanctions have become an important tool in the hands of the United Nations Security Council and the number of sanctions regimes has increased significantly. Switzerland, as a non-Member State of the United Nations, applies United Nations sanctions on an autonomous basis. It thus underlines its commitment to the promotion of international peace and security and its solidarity with the international community.

My Government shares the concern that sanctions should be made more effective while minimizing the negative humanitarian impact on civilian populations, as well as the adverse economic effects on third States, that comprehensive sanctions regimes have. The concept of targeted sanctions addresses this concern. They are designed to focus on the individuals and groups responsible for the policies condemned by the international community, while ideally leaving other parts of the population and international trade relations unaffected.

In this context, targeted financial sanctions are one of the issues that have received particular attention. As a major financial centre, Switzerland has significant expertise and know-how regarding financial transactions. In cooperation with the United Nations

Secretariat, my Government organized a series of international expert meetings in Interlaken and New York to examine in an informal and technical setting the feasibility of targeted financial sanctions. This so-called Interlaken Process provided a forum for dialogue among representatives from national Governments and regional bodies, central bank authorities, the United Nations Secretariat, the private banking sector and academia. I wish to thank all those States and individual experts who participated actively in this process. Let me also express my thanks to the Secretary-General, who has encouraged this process, and to the members of the Secretariat, for both their participation and valuable support.

The Interlaken process focused on the practical and technical aspects involved in designing effective financial sanctions and ensuring their successful implementation. The key results so far have been as follows:

First, a better understanding of the specific technical requirements of targeted financial sanctions and the preconditions necessary for them to be effective.

Secondly, language modules and definitions that can serve as building blocks for future Security Council resolutions. Such standardized language elements would enhance a more uniform drafting and implementation of resolutions in this area, as well as unambiguous interpretation.

Thirdly, the identification of the basic legal and administrative requirements for national implementation of financial sanctions. This includes the development of elements for a national legal framework.

Finally, discussions also addressed the need for the United Nations to develop greater capabilities for administering and monitoring financial sanctions, including the provision of guidance and technical assistance to help States implement sanctions on a consistent basis.

With the aim of further developing and operationalizing the substantive work accomplished in the Interlaken process, the Swiss Government mandated a university institute, the Watson Institute for International Studies at Brown University, to undertake additional research. The outcome, which we are presenting to the Security Council today, and which

will be distributed to all Missions, is a handbook that reflects the results of the Interlaken process and the valuable contributions made by the participants. We hope it will prove useful to those responsible for drafting future resolutions imposing targeted financial sanctions and for implementing them here and in capitals.

Let me add that, of course, one of the essential preconditions to making targeted financial sanctions more effective is to be able to define the target clearly. And that also implies the effective identification of the actual economic beneficiary of assets. This is a key element also for the fight against money laundering and for tracking and blocking more effectively financial flows used for terrorist acts, as demanded by Security Council resolution 1373 (2001).

Switzerland, which has strict procedures for identifying not only bank customers, but also the actual economic beneficiaries of funds, has recently made concrete proposals in this regard in the Financial Action Task Force Against Money Laundering, a body established by the G-7. These proposals would lead to higher international standards by improving the effectiveness of know-your-customer rules.

(spoke in French)

Targeted financial sanctions are likely to be most effective when they are considered as part of a broader coordinated political and diplomatic strategy. Strategic choices regarding the types of sanctions to be imposed and their modalities depend on a thorough analysis of the vulnerabilities of the targeted country or actors, as well as on the political will necessary to enforce such measures and assess their effects.

Targeted sanctions focusing on financial measures are not sufficient alone to force Governments or other actors to alter their behaviour and comply with their obligations, but they represent an important tool that can be used in combination with other measures. In this respect, we were glad to see the German Government continue these reflections with the Bonn-Berlin process, which explored other forms of targeted sanctions, and we welcome of the Swedish Government's intention to cover new sanctions issues.

In conclusion, the Interlaken process has shown that the conceptual, technical and practical elements required to make targeted financial sanctions effective are available. It is now primarily a matter of mustering

the necessary political will at the international and national levels to translate this into reality.

Mr. Kastrup (Germany): I thank you, Sir, for convening this meeting. Like the previous speaker, the Permanent Observer of Switzerland, I am grateful for the opportunity to present the results of the so-called Bonn-Berlin process.

Today's session is another proof of the high importance attached to the question of sanctions by the Security Council. I am sure that we all share the same goals in this respect: minimizing the unintended effects of sanctions on the civilian population of the targeted country and on third countries. The results of both the Interlaken and the Bonn-Berlin processes are designed to help achieving these goals by introducing targeted or smart sanctions — in our case with respect to arms embargoes and travel bans.

Let me briefly recall the history. In 1998, Germany declared its preparedness, in close coordination with the United Nations Secretariat, to continue the process initiated successfully by Switzerland. Building on the experience gained by our Swiss colleagues on financial sanctions, we decided to involve civil society from the outset. Thus, we asked the Bonn International Center for Conversion, an independent organization with considerable expertise in the field of sanctions, to organize a series of conferences, seminars and workshops on the issues of arms embargoes and travel bans. The participants were diplomats and United Nations personnel, as well as experts from academia, non-governmental organizations and the private sector. In hindsight, this proved to be the right mix to tackle a difficult task, namely, to support the sanctions makers in the Security Council with model drafting language for resolutions and checklists for their better implementation.

The two types of sanctions — arms embargoes and travel restrictions — were obviously not selected at random. Rather, they were identified because they help to focus the unavoidable coercive element of any sanctions regime on those most responsible for a threat to peace and security. Dealing with both issues at the same time seemed sufficiently concrete and politically desirable.

I would like to submit today a handbook containing the practical results of the Bonn-Berlin process. It will be sent to all United Nations Member States and sets out model Security Council resolutions

on arms embargoes and travel-related sanctions, accompanied by an extensive commentary. It also reflects, in two other documents, national implementation of those types of sanctions. Finally, a last report makes suggestions for the monitoring and enforcement of arms embargoes.

Let me stress here that the Bonn-Berlin process and the handbook before the Council were construed not as representing the official view of the German federal Government, but rather as the result of the careful deliberations and discussions of various experts from different backgrounds. At the same time, however, my Government widely agrees with the outcome of the process. We are convinced that the documentation before the Council can be very helpful in conceiving efficient sanctions regimes and in minimizing unintended negative impacts on civilian populations and third States.

The primary aim of the United Nations is to maintain peace and security in the world. In order to maintain this goal, the Charter, in its Chapter VII, mandates the Security Council to impose certain coercive measures. The experience of recent years and months has shown that sanctions are and will remain an important tool of the Council in this context. All Member States are aware of the fact that imposing sanctions is a difficult step to take. All Council members, elected or non-elected, carry heavy responsibility in this regard. When the Council members decide to apply sanctions, they speak on behalf of the whole membership of the United Nations.

Generally speaking, sanctions should not be a punishment; rather, they should lead to compliance with the United Nations Charter. Amongst the States Members of the United Nations, there is consensus that a sanctions regime should neither hit the innocent civilian population nor affect non-target nations. It should focus on those responsible for the threat to international peace and security. Through sanctions, these people should become aware that the community of nations does not tolerate behaviour hostile to international peace and security, acting across borders or at home. In order to achieve this aim, thorough deliberations and careful drafting of resolutions are of the utmost importance.

I hope that members of the Council will agree that, in the past, not every sanctions regime has been successful in this regard. The only measure for success

is a halt to unacceptable behaviour. Some sanctions have not led to compliance with the United Nations Charter; others have had disproportionately negative side effects on civilian populations and/or on third States and, in the worst cases, a combination of both. Even the most equilibrated and fine-tuned sanctions still depend on a prognosis of the aggressor's behaviour. If a tool proves ineffective, it should be our obligation to reconsider and re-evaluate whether a change would serve better. A flexible response to continued outrageous misbehaviour is a sign not of resignation, but of a smarter use of the legal tools.

My country is of the opinion that only targeted sanctions can achieve their goals. "Targeted" means concentrated on crucial issues, such as finances or arms, and focused on a specific group; it also means regular reconsideration of the sanctions regime and its consequences.

The model resolutions included in the handbook that is before members should be regarded as a valuable point of reference that merits close consideration by the Council. We would hope that those texts will help Council members to draft or re-draft targeted sanctions to improve their efficiency.

I cannot conclude without mentioning that even the most precise sanctions resolutions can fail if some Member States lack the political will to implement them. The recommendations set out in our documentation are aimed at achieving a better level of national implementation. But it remains a question of commitment and willingness on the part of every single Member State to lead coercive measures to success: to compliance with the United Nations Charter by the State concerned.

Let me express my thanks to the Secretariat for its helpful role and its active participation. I would like also to thank the numerous Members of the United Nations that have participated in the process and enriched it.

Finally, let me thank you again, Mr. President, for this opportunity to share the results of the Bonn-Berlin process with the Security Council.

The President: I now have the pleasure of giving the floor to the State Secretary for Foreign Affairs of Sweden, Mr. Hans Dahlgren.

Mr. Dahlgren (Sweden): This Security Council meeting on the use of sanctions is of direct relevance to

the challenges that are on the minds of all of us these days. The search for effective tools in addressing threats to international peace and security is more urgent and more important than ever before. It can therefore only be right now to focus on the search for improved ways and means to deal with, and to contain, the sources of aggression and conflict.

Sanctions represent an important part of the Security Council's set of instruments for carrying out its responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. If sanctions can be improved and be made more effective, it will also strengthen the authority of the Council. It will make it easier for this body not only to say what is right, but also to do what is right.

The aim of sanctions, traditionally, has been to maximize their effects on the will, the capacity and the behaviour of decision makers — to the extent that they will change their behaviour — while minimizing the damage to others, such as innocent civilians. That is the theory. In practice, the story is often different.

We have seen how Council decisions, even those with a substantial economic impact on the target, have led to little or no change in behaviour. We have seen too many sanctions being violated or circumvented. We have seen numerous side-effects, whereby vulnerable groups have been the hardest hit.

It is no wonder that there is a sense of frustration here. I felt that frustration myself some years ago as Chairperson of the sanctions Committee on Sierra Leone. I remember standing there on the border between that country and Guinea and seeing how easy it was to break the oil embargo just by taking another road through the jungle.

So one question has been whether one can make these sanctions more effective and at the same time more humane. And that question has in turn triggered the search for smart sanctions. That search has been taken a good bit further through the excellent initiatives of the Governments of Switzerland and of Germany. What Ambassador Staehelin and Ambassador Kastrup have just reported are, to our mind, important contributions to the improvement of financial sanctions, travel restrictions and arms embargoes. That goes both for the theory behind them and for their practical applications.

Yet we have also learned through the activities in Interlaken, in Bonn and in Berlin that much more can be done to develop the concept and the practice of smart sanctions. And I am pleased to announce that the Government of Sweden is now ready to continue the important work already done by Switzerland and Germany. Through what we will call the Stockholm process, we will invite a broad range of Government representatives, non-governmental organizations, regional organizations, academics and, of course, United Nations actors to participate in the endeavour. This is a project that will be carried out for a period of one year, with a concluding seminar next autumn.

One particular focus of that process will be on the implementation and monitoring of targeted sanctions, and on suggesting improvements, building on what has already been done in the processes so far. That includes the issue of how to achieve the more coherent and effective enactment of Security Council resolutions into national legislation. It includes how the United Nations and its Member States can better ensure truly effective monitoring of compliance and enforcement: there is much lacking there still. We will also look at how Member States can best be assisted in implementing sanctions regimes, and at what technical and financial support might be called for.

Another theme will be more conceptual. If it were possible to find a clearer understanding within the international community of both the scope and the limitations of sanctions, then it might also be easier in practice to pursue a more effective sanctions policy. We shall look at how that might be done.

My Government looks forward to an active interchange with other Member States and with other actors in this process. We hope that it can help us all to move on in the pursuit of making sanctions a more effective tool for the Security Council to use. It is to you, Mr. President, and to your 14 colleagues that we all look to make use of these tools, especially in the light of new and emerging threats. There is no better illustration of how well that can be done than the Council's historic decision to adopt, by consensus, resolution 1373 (2001).

The President: Before inviting members of the Council to put questions or make observations, I shall now give the floor to the Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs, Mr. Ibrahima Fall, to give a briefing.

Mr. Fall: Mandatory measures imposed under Article 41 in Chapter VII of the Charter are today, more than ever, an important tool available to the Security Council in seeking to maintain or restore international peace and security. However, concerns have been expressed over the negative effects that comprehensive sanctions regimes can have on civilian populations and on neighbouring and other affected States. Difficulties in implementing Article 50 of the Charter have also reinforced the need to consider possible improvement of the sanctions instrument. In his reports to the General Assembly on the work of the Organization and in his report on Africa, the Secretary-General has underlined the need for a mechanism that renders sanctions a less blunt and a more effective instrument. Efforts towards developing the concept of smart sanctions, which seek to pressure regimes rather than peoples and thus reduce humanitarian costs, are therefore to be welcomed. Sanctions need continued refining to strengthen their effectiveness and to ease any possible negative impact, thus consolidating support by the international community.

Member States, intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations and academic experts, with substantive support from the Secretariat, have been making efforts to contribute to attaining that objective. It should be noted that the recent sanctions measures imposed by the Security Council have been targeted.

The series of Interlaken expert seminars hosted by Switzerland in 1998 and 1999, with substantive support from the Secretariat, on targeting Security Council financial sanctions explored the basis for cooperation among Member States, intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations and experts in the field, as well as the design and application of targeted Security Council financial sanctions against decision-making elites. After having heard what the representative of Switzerland has just said, it is not necessary to come back to the outcome of the Interlaken expert seminar, except to note that the monitoring mechanism concerning the sanctions against UNITA is currently attempting to put some of the Interlaken recommendations into practice by tracing the financial transactions of UNITA. I am also hopeful that the knowledge gained at Interlaken can be successfully tapped and put to use within the context of the recently established Security Council Committee on Counter-Terrorism.

The Bonn-Berlin process, which took place from 1999 to 2000, reviewed the successes and shortcomings of arms embargoes and travel bans. Here also, I will shorten my statement, after what the representative of Germany has just said about the results of the Bonn-Berlin process. Many of the suggestions made there and discussed in the Security Council Working Group on General Issues on Sanctions have subsequently contributed to the improvement of sanctions resolutions.

Work, such as that which took place in Interlaken and Berlin, should continue on smart sanctions, and I would particularly like to welcome the fact that Sweden will be taking on this role of building on the previous work, this time in the context of expert seminars on, among other things, the monitoring and implementation of Security Council sanctions. Here also, I do not need to elaborate further after what the representative of Sweden had to say.

If sanctions are to continue to be a useful tool at the Security Council's disposal in the maintenance of international peace and security, a constructive dialogue on their implementation and monitoring must take place. Pragmatic solutions must be found to the difficulties of monitoring sanctions. This task is the primary responsibility of Member States, but many of them lack the capacity to monitor their implementation and require assistance in carrying out this responsibility. Such assistance could be provided to interested Member States by a duly augmented sanctions secretariat and by competent regional organizations. The Security Council can encourage State compliance by continuing to devote greater attention to mitigating the negative effects of sanctions measures on civilian populations and third States. Providing support and inducements for neighbouring States could also greatly enhance the potential effectiveness of sanctions.

The Security Council might also consider taking steps to assist, upon request, Member States in developing greater legal authority and administrative capacity for implementing Council sanctions. Indeed, many Member States do not have the necessary legal and institutional capacity for implementing these measures. To assist them, the United Nations could develop examples of model legislation, as was done during the Interlaken process, that could enable interested Member States to make the necessary

adjustments in their domestic laws and regulations to permit compliance with United Nations sanctions.

The Security Council has addressed this issue of constructive dialogue and effective support through the establishment of expert panels and mechanisms, and some sanctions committees are looking into improving cooperation with regional and international organizations involved in the implementation of Security Council sanctions. A number of Member States advocate the establishment of a permanent sanctions monitoring mechanism to ensure better targeting and implementation of smart sanctions and to bring information on non-cooperation and non-compliance to the Council's attention. This framework might allow more systematic follow-up for those who violate sanctions or who do not cooperate with sanctions committees, as well as provide a point of contact between the Security Council and other international and regional organizations dealing with sanctions, such as the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and Interpol.

What is needed most is better coordination between all parties involved in the implementation of sanctions regimes. Sanctions committees have recently been establishing strong cooperation with international and regional organizations such as ICAO and Interpol, that are involved in the implementation of Council sanctions regimes. The Chairmen of the Angola, Liberia and Sierra Leone sanctions committees are also discussing ways of increasing cooperation among their committees with a view to holding a joint meeting.

The Security Council might also make more frequent use of humanitarian assessments before the imposition of sanctions, and continue to monitor the humanitarian impact once sanctions have been imposed, as has recently been the case with Afghanistan and Liberia.

The use of mandatory sanctions is, as pointed out by the Secretary-General, "a valuable tool available to the Security Council, permitting the United Nations to bring pressure to bear without recourse to the use of force". The Secretary-General has also stressed the importance of continuing "efforts to integrate smarter, more targeted sanctions into an overall preventive strategy". Targeted sanctions can have important deterrent and preventative roles, and I urge members to consider the use of sanctions in this context in the future. Security Council sanctions can also be seen as a

calculated response by the international community to emerging breaches of international law.

By way of conclusion, I feel it would be remiss of me not to reiterate that an enhanced substantive support to the various sanctions committees, and a more effective administration of sanctions regimes by the Secretariat, would require the commitment of adequate resources. Within the modest resources available, the Secretariat is doing its utmost to support the work of the sanctions committees. Developing more effective Security Council sanctions policies, however, will require specialized expertise and analytical capacity of staff supporting those Committees.

Such technical expertise and enhanced analytical capacity would enable the Secretariat to manage a credible monitoring system in cooperation with Member States and regional organizations and to assess the effectiveness of the sanctions measures. Technical expertise is urgently needed in the Secretariat in such areas as military technology, illegal arms trafficking, illicit diamonds, customs regulations and investigations, and international finance and asset management. Greater availability of legal expertise is also needed. In short, making sanctions smarter will not be enough. We must also provide the necessary means, and the will, for them to succeed.

The President: I thank Assistant Secretary-General Fall for his briefing.

Mr. Levitte (France) (spoke in French): Today's debate is extremely important. I would first like to thank Ambassadors Jenö Staehelin and Dieter Kastrup for their statements. I also congratulate them on the quality, detail and thoroughness of the results achieved in the Interlaken and Bonn-Berlin processes. The way in which they were carried out was remarkable and exemplary on several counts. We would like, through State Secretary Hans Dahlgren, to thank Sweden for its readiness to continue this work.

In the first place, this approach was remarkable because it was grounded in a willingness to cooperate and undertake a constructive exchange between members and non-members of the Security Council, on the one hand, and the United Nations and civil society, on the other. In fact, the booklet before us owes a great deal to the enlightened contribution of academics, researchers, private sector professionals, non-governmental organizations and research institutes. We warmly thank all of them.

The processes took place in an exemplary way within the context of a targeted approach to sanctions. It should be recalled that sanctions are meaningless unless they are part of a comprehensive political strategy. We must never lose sight of their objectives. The better they are targeted, the greater the pressure exerted where needed, all the while reducing the risk of negative and undesired effects on innocent civilian populations and third States. The best possible implementation will ensure the maximum effect. When we are all committed to an unprecedented effort to combat terrorism, in a struggle that has, in particular, taken the form of economic sanctions against Osama bin Laden and his associates, no one can doubt that the results of the Interlaken process will make a valuable and immediately useful contribution. Moreover, what can be said of arms embargoes if not that their effective implementation is a matter of urgency, for if they were truly effective they would make it possible to end wars because of a lack of arms supplies.

The booklet that has just been submitted to us is of excellent quality and has come at the right time. Allow me to take this opportunity to focus on two specific points that have emerged from the conclusions submitted to us — conclusions that, as the Council is aware, are of particular importance to the French delegation.

First, the Security Council must conclude its normative work on sanctions and adopt the conclusions of the Working Group on General Issues on Sanctions as quickly as possible. That group has done excellent work under the chairmanship of Ambassador Chowdhury of Bangladesh. We have every confidence in the ability of Ambassador Richard Ryan to lead our work to success under his presidency.

In addition, it seems to us that, as our friend Ibrahima Fall has just emphasized, the time has come to set up, under the authority and control of the Security Council and its sanctions committees, a unified, permanent instrument to monitor sanctions and the traffic in raw materials in armed conflicts.

We need a unified instrument. Two years of experience with the various ad hoc panels of experts created by the Council to monitor sanctions against UNITA, Sierra Leone, Liberia and Afghanistan, or to inquire into the illegal exploitation of the natural resources of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, have demonstrated that the problems and the kinds of

traffic are the same from one regional crisis to the next. The networks and those responsible for violating sanctions and illicit trafficking are frequently the same, and in each case the same causes produce the same effects.

For example, the trafficker Victor Bout appears in every report. The panels of experts have worked in the same countries, with the same institutions, and have asked the same sorts of questions. Some experts have even had to modify their itineraries in order to avoid arriving at the same time, or just after, their colleagues from another panel. The membership of the various panels has been remarkably similar for a very simple reason: the Council and its sanctions committees always need the same kind of expertise which is lacking in the Secretariat. It is also the same expertise that we need to monitor sanctions and to control and investigate the role in armed conflicts of illicit trafficking in raw materials. This is why we systematically find in one committee after another an expert on diamonds, an expert on arms trafficking and yet another expert on financial networks.

The mechanism that we propose would be an instrument available to both the Council and the sanctions committees under its authority. It would be entrusted with specific tasks and called on by the Council to draft separate reports on the various questions being examined. It would be a matter not of mixing everything up, but, on the contrary, of gaining the full benefit of the synergies that exist between the different subjects and crises, which, although not the same, are linked and interconnected, particularly on the African continent.

A considerable amount of frequently overlapping data has been compiled by the various panels. It is time to use them and deal with them in a more cohesive way. In short, it is time for the Council to be more systematic and to set up an instrument that would avoid any duplication of panels with similar competencies. We would waste less energy, time and money.

The second reason for setting up this new instrument is that we also need a permanent monitoring instrument. Particularly with regard to the sanctions against UNITA, experience has shown that it is imperative to ensure continuity of monitoring for as long as sanctions are in place. Otherwise, a disastrous political signal would be sent. That was our experience

last week in our debate on UNITA and the requests made by the Government of Angola.

Sanctions must, of course, be limited in duration, but they should be effectively implemented for as long as they are in place. To accomplish that, their implementation must be the subject of both monitoring and assistance. In that regard, creating a permanent and unified monitoring instrument would, as Mr. Fall emphasized, make it possible to establish long-term working relations with regional and technical organizations, such as the Organization of African Unity, the Economic Community of West African States, the Southern African Development Community, Interpol, the World Customs Organization and the International Civil Aviation Organization, whose cooperation is indispensable in order to ensure respect for sanctions.

France took note last week, in the course of our consultations on the extension of the Monitoring Mechanism on Sanctions against UNITA, of the interest of the membership of the Council in our ideas and of the readiness of all to engage in a serious discussion, with a view to reaching consensus as speedily as possible on the issue. In this spirit, my delegation intends to submit an updated proposal and to call for discussions at the expert level, with a view to reaching a unanimous decision of the Council. We believe that a consensus-based approach is indispensable in dealing with this important issue.

Mr. Kuchinsky (Ukraine): We are very grateful to you, Mr. President, for convening this important meeting of the Security Council on a question to which we attach the utmost importance. We would like also to thank Assistant Secretary-General Ibrahima Fall for his very informative briefing.

We are glad that the topic of general issues of sanctions is now being considered in an open format and is no longer relegated to the place it had occupied in the last several months — as a footnote to the Council's monthly schedule of work. We hope that from now on the Council will be resuming its involvement in this important issue.

I should like to thank the representatives of Germany, Sweden and Switzerland for their initiative in calling for this discussion and for the introduction of the "end results" booklets of the Bonn-Berlin and Interlaken processes in such a lucid and user-friendly form. I hope that the reports of the Security Council

will one day become as analytical and useful as the booklets that were circulated today. These very important initiatives have become a significant part of a general process that has brought about visible improvements in Security Council policy in the area of sanctions in recent years.

I hope that the Council will carefully consider the results of the Interlaken and Bonn-Berlin processes and apply them in its work. I said, "I hope", Mr. President, because the Council's record in this area is less than perfect. I cannot but express my deep regret at the prolonged foot-dragging in the consideration of the draft outcome of the Working Group on sanctions, which, among other things, contains specific references to the Interlaken and Bonn-Berlin processes.

Whatever our individual and national attitudes towards the results achieved by the Group, we cannot simply disregard its work and the draft outcome presented by the Chairman. We realize that it is practically impossible to achieve full consensus on all issues related to the question of sanctions, and compromises had to be worked out among delegations. I believe that the results we have achieved thus far are the best we can do under the circumstances. Sooner or later, we should make our final decision on the report, and I think that it is high time for the Council to do so.

I cannot say that my delegation is entirely happy with the provisions of the draft recommendations. Many of our proposals, unfortunately, were not reflected in the paper. The same can be said about many other delegations.

While we realize that we cannot get everything we want, at the same time, we consider that it would be inappropriate and counterproductive to throw away what has been achieved during all these months of negotiations.

Finally, I think that we cannot seriously consider sanctions-related issues without reviewing ways to strengthen the capacity of the United Nations in this area. The establishment within the United Nations of an office or unit to monitor targeted sanctions as well as the illicit exploitation and trafficking of high-value commodities in armed conflict should be considered an important part not only of the sanctions policy as such, but also of the Council's conflict-prevention strategy in general.

The President: I still have a large number of speakers on my list. With the concurrence of members of the Council, I shall suspend the meeting now. The Council will, of course, need to resume discussion of this item at a later date.

The meeting was suspended at 1.15 p.m.



Security Council

Fifty-sixth year

Provisional

4394th meeting

Thursday, 25 October 2001, 10.30 a.m.
New York

<i>President:</i>	Mr. Ryan	(Ireland)
<i>Members:</i>	Bangladesh	Mr. Ahsan
	China	Mr. Shen Guofang
	Colombia	Mr. Valdivieso
	France	Mr. Levitte
	Jamaica	Miss. Durrant
	Mali	Mr. Ouane
	Mauritius	Mr. Koonjul
	Norway	Mr. Kolby
	Russian Federation	Mr. Granovsky
	Singapore	Ms. Lee
	Tunisia	Mr. Jerandi
	Ukraine	Mr. Kuchinsky
	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	Sir Jeremy Greenstock
	United States of America	Mr. Cunningham

Agenda

General issues relating to sanctions

This record contains the text of speeches delivered in English and of the interpretation of speeches delivered in the other languages. The final text will be printed in the *Official Records of the Security Council*. Corrections should be submitted to the original languages only. They should be incorporated in a copy of the record and sent under the signature of a member of the delegation concerned to the Chief of the Verbatim Reporting Service, room C-178.



The meeting was resumed on Thursday, 25 October 2001, at 10.50 a.m.

Miss Durrant (Jamaica): My delegation wishes to thank you, Mr. President, for organizing this meeting. We wish, in particular, to thank the Permanent Representative of Germany, Ambassador Kastrup, for presenting the report entitled *Design and Implementation of Arms Embargoes and Travel and Aviation Related Sanctions*. We would also like to thank the Permanent Observer of the Swiss Confederation, Ambassador Staehelin, for presenting the report entitled *Targeted Financial Sanctions: A Manual for Design and Implementation*. We were also pleased to welcome to the Council the State Secretary of Sweden, Ambassador Hans Dahlgren, and we wish to thank him for his Government's expressed willingness to continue both processes. In the same vein, we wish to express our appreciation to Assistant Secretary-General Ibrahim Fall for his timely suggestions for follow-up actions by the Council and the Secretariat.

When the Council debated this matter in April of last year, my delegation pointed out that, if the Security Council is to maintain sanctions as a credible instrument, we must take concrete steps to ensure that we get sanctions right rather than impose flawed regimes that may be either ineffective or unenforceable. Indeed, over the past few years the international community has paid increasing attention to the issue of sanctions imposed by the Security Council. The commentary has often been negative, primarily because of the negative humanitarian effects of comprehensive sanctions on civilian populations.

In part as a response to those criticisms, and also in recognition that comprehensive sanctions are no longer a tool acceptable to many of the members of the Council, there has been a shift by the Council in its approach to the design of sanctions to targeting measures at the individual or individuals responsible for the behaviour or policies condemned by the international community, and at those elites or groups who directly benefit from such behaviour or policies. Indeed, a broad consensus has emerged in support of sanctions that are designed to affect only those individuals whose behaviour we wish to change.

Furthermore, the Council now recognizes the need to consider fully the possible negative impact of sanctions on the humanitarian condition of civilian

populations and on the economies of third countries. We must now ensure that sanctions regimes have no such unintended effects. Recent sanctions on Ethiopia and Eritrea, Sierra Leone, Liberia, and the Taliban regime of Afghanistan have all been targeted. In designing those sanctions the Council borrowed extensively from the preliminary work of the Bonn-Berlin and Interlaken processes, as well as from the work of its own Working Group on General Issues on Sanctions, which was established last April. Implementation and monitoring of those sanctions have also followed, to a large extent, the recommendations contained in these two reports. It is a testament to the value of the recommendations contained therein that even before they were finalized, the Council had already begun to pay heed to them.

The two reports that are the results of the Bonn-Berlin and Interlaken processes provide us with a set of modalities to not only design but also to implement and monitor targeted sanctions covering most of the regimes on arms embargoes, travel and aviation-related sanctions, and financial sanctions. My delegation is pleased to have had the opportunity to participate in both meetings of the processes. We fully appreciate the efforts of the Governments of Germany and of the Swiss Confederation in providing the resources for these two important undertakings on targeted sanctions, and for spearheading a dialogue with civil society and academic experts. We believe that the manuals — if fully utilized by the Security Council, the Secretariat and Member States — will help to make the use of sanctions a more effective tool of the Council in enforcing its decisions. It will also allow for a more speedy and efficient response as the need arises.

My delegation has also subscribed to the premise that for sanctions to be effective, they must be implemented within a prescribed time frame and be subject to close monitoring and periodic review in order to ensure their continued usefulness and validity, as well as to evaluate their impact on vulnerable populations and neighbouring States. However, while the Council has begun to design sanctions accordingly, their design, implementation and monitoring have not yet been streamlined. It is in this context that the results of the Interlaken and Bonn-Berlin processes can provide useful tools for the Security Council, if we use the guidelines provided in the manuals.

We therefore hope that the procedures and recommendations — particularly those on arms

embargoes, travel and aviation-related sanctions — will be carefully studied by all the sanctions committees, because arms embargoes are perhaps the most common measure used by the Security Council in seeking to maintain international peace and security. They are also one of the most frequently violated of sanctions regimes. As we have seen from past experiences, arms embargoes affect a number of actors in the financing, sale and trafficking in arms. In the same vein, we believe that the recommendations on financial sanctions could also be very usefully applied in the implementation resolution 1373 (2001).

In order to derive maximum benefit from the recommendations, it is important for the Council to adopt a new and comprehensive approach, and to be consistent in its implementation and monitoring. It will be recalled that the Working Group established by the Council under the chairmanship of Ambassador Anwarul Chowdhury of Bangladesh to develop general recommendations on how to improve the effectiveness of United Nations sanctions was asked to examine a number of issues, including the working methods of sanctions committees and inter-committee coordination; the capacity of the United Nations Secretariat to effectively monitor the implementation of sanctions; coordination within the United Nations system and coordination with regional and other international organizations; the design of sanctions resolutions, including the conditions for the maintaining or lifting of sanctions; assessment reports and the ongoing evaluation of sanctions; monitoring and enforcement; the unintended impact of sanctions; humanitarian exemptions; targeted sanctions; and assisting Member States in implementing sanctions.

The Working Group undertook an extensive review over a period of several months. Its work benefited from inputs by experts on all of the issues covered. However, the report of the Group has been before the Council for several months, but so far we have failed to take action on it. The observations and recommendations contained in the reports that came out of the Bonn-Berlin and Interlaken processes have again drawn the Council's attention to the imperative that the Council must streamline its work on the design, implementation and monitoring of sanctions. Our debate highlights the importance of the Council's acting on the Working Group's report and adopting, without delay, the recommendations contained therein.

The Bonn-Berlin and Interlaken processes, taken together with the recommendations the Council now has before it, will provide the necessary tools to ensure better implementation of the Council's current and future sanctions measures. We must also build on the useful work done by the monitoring mechanisms and panels of experts. We also look forward to the follow-up to be carried out by the Government of Sweden to, *inter alia*, examine how to achieve more coherent and effective enactment of Security Council resolutions in national legislation.

In conclusion, I wish to recall that — as we alluded to in our statement last April — in addition to reform and policy-making, improving the effectiveness of sanctions requires the enhancement of internal institutional mechanisms within the United Nations system, including the development of a more effective monitoring capacity within the Secretariat, adequate staffing, streamlining of procedures and the harmonization of the guidelines and working methods of the sanctions committees, visits by representatives of the sanctions committees, technical expertise and support, and improved cooperation with regional organizations, non-governmental organizations and international financial institutions.

We believe that the Security Council must work with the General Assembly to ensure that the Secretariat receives the necessary budgetary support in order to assist the work of the Council's committees on sanctions.

I wish to thank you again, Mr. President, for organizing this meeting and for allowing us to exchange views on this important matter, which assists the Council in carrying out its mandate for the maintenance of international peace and security.

Mr. Harrison (United Kingdom): May I begin by saying that my delegation is very grateful to the Governments of Germany and of Switzerland for their leadership and their initiative in taking forward the Bonn-Berlin and the Interlaken processes, and we are also grateful for what the Swedish Government is doing in taking forward the process from now on.

We think that these processes have enabled experts and others, working in a very wide forum, to produce some very valuable results. We particularly welcome the guidance that has been produced on best practice in drafting United Nations sanctions resolutions and on drafting legislation to implement

sanctions at the national level. What we will need to do now is to build on the valuable work that has already been done.

We believe that the focus of that work should now shift to national implementation and enforcement of sanctions. In this context, we think that there may be useful lessons to be learned from the Group of Eight's Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF). This Task Force has produced guidelines on the actions that countries should take to trace funds and to scrutinize clients, and other ways to counteract money laundering.

We wonder whether perhaps the next step in the Interlaken process could be to draw up similar guidelines for enforcing financial sanctions and for benchmarking the steps that countries have taken to enforce sanctions against those guidelines.

The next logical step after that is the enforcement of sanctions. We agree that one way to improve enforcement would be to improve the United Nations capacity by creating a small, permanent monitoring unit, complemented by a roster of experts and by the Secretariat, which would be charged by the Security Council with monitoring and reporting on the effectiveness of sanctions regimes. My delegation looks forward to early progress on this idea.

Finally, and speaking on behalf of the Chairman of the Counter-Terrorism Committee, I can say that my delegation will study what positive lessons can be drawn from the Bonn-Berlin and the Interlaken processes for the work of the Counter-Terrorism Committee established under resolution 1373 (2001). In particular — and this was a point that Assistant Secretary-General Fall made in our first discussion last Monday — there may be some relevance for the establishment of models for legislative and executive action for States to follow when they identify gaps in the structures they have established to implement resolution 1373 (2001).

Mr. Kolby (Norway): The recommendations that have emerged from the Interlaken and Bonn-Berlin processes on financial sanctions, arms embargoes and travel- and aviation-related sanctions are useful and provide valuable tools for the Security Council in its work. Norway supports these initiatives and recommendations to improve the effectiveness of sanctions.

Targeted sanctions exercise pressure on the decision-makers and are designed to avoid negative consequences for the general population. Targeting individuals responsible for policies that threaten international peace and security would increase the effectiveness of sanctions. In designing sanctions, attention should be given to ruling elites, rebel movements and terrorists and the means of financing their actions. The objective should be to change or restrict their behaviour and to shield the civilian population from excessive suffering.

The manual emerging from the Interlaken process will be a valuable tool in the efforts to employ standardized terms that conform to definitions used in the financial sector when imposing financial sanctions.

Moreover, a system to enhance international cooperation to prevent illegal financial transactions should be developed. In this respect, resolution 1373 (2001), adopted recently, on threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts, and the subsequent work of the Counter-Terrorism Committee provide us with a model for implementation which could be further explored for other sanctions regimes.

With the manuals now put forward by the Swiss and German Governments, we have reached a milestone in regard to drafting model resolutions. We are grateful for the initiative taken by the Swiss and German Governments and for the support they have given. We must now focus on the implementation of these recommendations. We will, on our part, work to ensure that the models are reflected in future sanctions regimes or when amending existing regimes.

Sanctions can be effective only if they are respected and properly implemented at the national level. The manuals give useful practical guidance related to the legal and administrative requirements for implementation. The effective implementation of targeted sanctions will be a major challenge in the time ahead.

In our view, there is a huge potential for increased efficiency through more concerted efforts, both globally and regionally. Again, we would in this respect highlight the follow-up of resolution 1373 (2001) through the establishment of the Counter-Terrorism Committee. We would also like to underline the need for adequate technical and financial assistance to United Nations members in implementing provisions of the resolution.

The proposal to establish a permanent unit for targeted sanctions is a welcome one and deserves further discussion in the Security Council. A sanctions unit could provide valuable support for the relevant sanctions committees in the fulfilment of their tasks. Furthermore, it would enable us to accumulate institutional experience drawn from the different sanctions regimes.

Lastly, we would like to thank Sweden for its initiative to follow up the Interlaken and the Bonn-Berlin processes. Norway looks forward to working with Sweden and others to further enhance sanctions regimes in order for the United Nations to effectively exercise its responsibility for international peace and security while minimizing the suffering of the civilian population.

Mr. Koonjul (Mauritius): My delegation greatly appreciates the work carried out by the Government of Switzerland and the Government of Germany through the Interlaken process and the Bonn-Berlin process on the important subject of sanctions. We commend their efforts, contributions and suggestions for developing and enhancing targeted sanctions regimes which form part of the paraphernalia for exercising pressure on States that act in defiance of international law.

Both reports are the fruit of extensive and intensive consultations and appear to have taken on board the views of a large number of players. The reports will be a useful guidance to members of the Security Council and the Secretariat in formulating future sanctions regimes.

Since its inception, the United Nations has made use of sanctions for diverse purposes — to stop territorial aggression, restore democracy and the rule of law, promote human rights, fight terrorism and contain the proliferation of arms, among others. Until 1990, the United Nations hardly ever used sanctions to achieve the desired goals. It is only since the last decade of the twentieth century that sanctions have been frequently imposed. In the 1990s, the Security Council imposed sanctions in 12 instances, and some of them are still in effect.

The question that needs to be asked is whether the sanctions regimes have really worked — whether they have achieved the desired results. In most cases, we find that they have not. Studies carried out on the success of sanctions regimes have revealed that the overall success rate has been paltry. If we were to

probe deeply into the reasons for their failure, we would come to the following conclusions.

First, the continuing defiance of and failure to observe sanctions gradually erodes their effectiveness. Secondly, there is an absence of clear objectives and targets in the sanctions regimes. Thirdly, extraneous interpretations of sanctions regimes are made by those desirous of giving wider meaning to sanctions. Fourthly, a large number of States lack the capacity — legal, administrative and financial — to enforce sanctions. Fifthly, the economic and humanitarian costs outweigh the benefits of the sanctions regimes.

In order for a sanctions regime to be effective and enforceable, it is important that we set realistic and achievable benchmarks. Firstly, sanctions should be established and applied only in accordance with the provisions of the United Nations Charter. Hence, there is a need for more explicit, unambiguous and results-oriented resolutions. Secondly, sanctions cannot be imposed on a State in perpetuity, and must be clearly targeted. There must be a sunset clause, based on either results or time frame. Thirdly, sanctions should be imposed incrementally, with a gradual ratcheting up of the pressure. Fourthly, sanctions should be reviewed and assessed regularly by the Council. Fifthly, sanctions regimes should, at all costs, avoid collateral damage, especially to innocent civilians.

It is no surprise that, throughout the history of sanctions regimes, very little heed has been paid to the effects of sanctions on the innocent civilians of the targeted State and on neighbouring States. It is imperative that such a negative impact be removed, or at least minimized. The only way to achieve that goal is to consider the imposition of targeted or smart sanctions regimes wherever appropriate, in the form of financial or arms embargoes or of travel and aviation-related sanctions. We believe that sanctions regimes can and must be crafted in ways that shield civilians from unnecessary harm. Indeed, the two processes address these concerns at great length.

The standardization of language and terminology for use by the Security Council in all future sanctions regimes, as proposed in both booklets, is therefore most welcome. This would provide a pragmatic and realistic answer to the questions raised by many States and concerned parties about inconsistencies and inadequacies and about the punitive side of sanctions regimes. We agree with the introductory remarks in the

booklet on targeted financial sanctions that smart, or targeted, sanctions apply to only a subset of the population. We echo the observation that no targeted sanctions can achieve the desired goals in isolation. They must be considered as part of a broader, coordinated political and diplomatic strategy.

We should give serious thought to the proposals contained in the two reports before the Security Council today. The Interlaken and Berlin processes deserve our commendation for taking a realistic view. We hope that the Security Council will give due and deserved consideration to the proposed model resolution and guidelines for a future course of action.

My delegation firmly believes that Security Council resolutions must be implemented by all Members of the United Nations. What we see most often is non-observance and even overt flouting of these resolutions by Member States. We are of the view that a committee entrusted with the responsibility of monitoring the implementation of all Security Council resolutions, including those relating to sanctions, would enhance the effectiveness of sanctions resolutions. The committee would report and make recommendations on how gradually to increase or decrease the pressure of sanctions on the basis of any development.

We commend the decision of the Swedish Government to continue with its work on sanctions, and we hope that all efforts combined will result in the development of a fair and effective sanctions regime that will promote, in the most pragmatic and realizable way, the aims and objectives of the United Nations Charter.

Mr. Franco (Colombia) (*spoke in Spanish*): I would like to begin by expressing our gratitude to Ambassador Kastrup of Germany, Ambassador Staehelin of Switzerland and the State Secretary for Foreign Affairs of Sweden, Mr. Hans Dahlgren. We would also like to thank the Assistant Secretary-General, Mr. Ibrahima Fall, for his introductory statement.

Colombia would like raise five specific points. The first relates to the effectiveness of sanctions. The Bonn-Berlin process has prompted us to reflect on the key importance of this issue for the work of the Council, in three areas in particular, the first of which is the Security Council's image and the way in which it is perceived. If sanctions are not fair, if they do not

have the proper basis and support the Council's work will be perceived as inappropriate and improper and its relevance will be questioned. Secondly, if sanctions are not effective, the image and the legitimacy of the Council will be compromised. Sanctions must work; in other words, they must produce the anticipated results.

Thirdly, the Bonn-Berlin and Interlaken processes have prompted us to think about the need for the Security Council to communicate with other actors — not only with non-members of the Council but, in particular, with protagonists that are relevant to the implementation of such sanctions. I am referring specifically to banks and other financial organizations, private sector enterprises, academic institutions and civil society organizations that have a relevant role to play in the implementation and monitoring of sanctions.

The second point that I would like to raise relates to the effects of sanctions. The challenge is to produce changes in the conduct of actors whose activities represent a threat to international peace and security. The difficulty for the Security Council, however, is how to produce that change in behaviour without affecting those who are not a threat to international peace and security — the civilians.

Sanctions always have a negative effect, but they should have multiple positive impacts on international peace and security. The negative effect should be a factor that can be controlled and for which contingency measures can be put in place to provide appropriate compensation for the anticipated negative effect. The case of Liberia — a subject on which discussions have already begun in the sanctions Committee, and which we will continue to debate in the Security Council — provides a concrete example that prompts us to consider such consequences.

I do not want discuss that case in detail at this time, but I would like to highlight it, because we will have an opportunity to consider the regional components of this issue: the role of other actors in ensuring a positive development of the regional situation, as well as the effects of sanctions — not just expected effects, but also unexpected inputs relating to humanitarian assistance for Liberia.

The third point relates to the concept of smart sanctions. This is not a static concept; it is a dynamic concept. New technologies, new ideas, new political circumstances and new international challenges should

make us think dynamically about this aspect. Therefore, the proposal to create a standing monitoring mechanism deserves study to see if it or is not compatible with the need for us to adjust ourselves to specific circumstances. In this context, we recognize the Stockholm process, since perhaps we can find, among the objectives described by Secretary of the State Dahlgren, an informal opportunity to discuss in depth the benefits and the difficulties of this mechanism before doing it in the Security Council.

The fourth point relates to the implementation of Security Council resolution 1373 (2001). With the implementation of Article 41 of the Charter, a new path with great challenges has opened. Resolution 1373 has not created sanctions, but its implementation and monitoring could lead the Council to undertake measures. In other words, we are creating a normative structure that will allow this organ to adopt decisions by means of smart sanctions. This could constitute an additional vein of reflection for the Stockholm process, as it involves substantively domestic legislative processes and steps and actions taken at that level to implement them.

Finally, I will conclude by echoing what other members of the Council have said regarding the importance of adopting the conclusions of the Working Group on Sanctions.

Mr. Cunningham (United States): I would like to thank Swiss Ambassador Staehelin, German Ambassador Kastrup and Swedish State Secretary Dahlgren for their informative and very valuable briefings the other day and for the important work on sanctions in which their respective Governments have been engaged. This work is very useful to the Council and to the international community more broadly, and we commend them for making the effort.

The United States wants to make sanctions a more effective policy tool. We have all accomplished a lot already in that regard in the last year or so, and as Ambassador Dahlgren noted the other day, present circumstances demand that we refine and further improve our use of multilateral sanctions to address threats to international peace and security.

We all agree that sanctions must remain a viable policy option, and while we can make improvements, in point of fact, past sanctions regimes have been and continue to be effective, as noted in a number of studies that we have discussed in the Council and in

various working groups over the past couple of months. They have been a vital policy instrument to modify the behaviour of a State or entity that poses a threat to international peace or that has committed an act of aggression. Sanctions provide us with an approach greater than persuasion, but less than the use of force, to employ the collective will of the international community.

Of course, some countries will try to avoid compliance. There will always be violation of sanctions. That is to be expected, but that does not mean that the regime itself is ineffective. We have ample instances of where sanctions regimes have influenced behaviour. But, of course, we want to and we will continue to make improvements.

American representatives actively participated in the Interlaken, Bonn and Berlin discussions, and we look forward to engaging in the Stockholm process when the Swedish Government hosts the next round of meetings to discuss sanctions verification and implementation. These discussions help support our work in the Council to reinforce sanctions as an effective policy tool, including through the increased use of better targeted sanctions, and to do our best to ensure that sanctions are both effective and humane. We want to do the best job possible to see that sanctions imposed by the Security Council pose the minimum risk to civilian populations.

In that regard, I cannot help but observe that there is some irony underlying the Council's efforts to develop and impose effective sanctions. Despite our best attempts, what can we do when a dictatorial regime itself holds its own people hostage? What are we to think when a State or Government denies its own people food, medicine and shelter, items the international community is willing to provide to those most challenged?

We see that situation, unfortunately, now in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere. On Iraq, we endorsed a new approach to sanctions this past spring but have been blocked in our persistent attempts to improve the oil-for-food programme and the Iraq sanctions regime. This should be done, and we will continue to seek agreement on this most pressing issue.

While the United States recognizes the importance of minimizing the humanitarian impact of sanctions, members of the international community must also reflect on the humanitarian impact of not

imposing sanctions. Such a decision also has consequences. This is a heavy responsibility for Security Council members and one that we all should take most seriously.

Much has already been done at this point to improve sanctions as a policy tool, both inside and outside the Council. We will continue to support efforts to improve the effectiveness of sanctions while minimizing their unintended consequences. We also will join with other interested parties in exploring how to make sanctions monitoring and implementation as effective and consistent as possible.

Mr. Ouane (Mali) (*spoke in French*): My delegation wishes to thank you, Mr. President, for having taken the initiative of convening this public meeting to consider general questions relating to sanctions. We thank Mr. Ibrahima Fall, Assistant Secretary-General, for his exhaustive, accurate and detailed introduction to the topic.

We also thank the Swiss and German Governments for their important contributions to improving our sanctions regimes through the Interlaken process on financial sanctions and the Bonn-Berlin process on smart sanctions, particularly embargoes on weapons and travel. We thank the Swedish Government for its initiative to pursue the Interlaken process and the Bonn-Berlin process, and we welcome the participation of the Swedish Secretary of State in our debates.

We hope that the results and specific recommendations emanating from these processes will be useful tools that will help the Council determine the best time to impose sanctions under Chapter VII of the Charter.

If sanctions are a useful tool that the Council can employ in specific circumstances, under the Charter, it is also true that because of their negative and undesired effects, they have become a source of legitimate concern for the international community. That is why the Council must develop sanctions regimes that are functional and cause the minimum of undesired secondary effects.

In this connection, sanctions — the best coercive measure — must not be decided on before exhausting all other means of peaceful settlement of disputes envisaged by the Charter. We also believe that inasmuch as sanctions are provisional and temporary

tools, they must include certain humanitarian exemptions, so that help can be given to the most vulnerable sectors of the population and to minimize their effects on the civilian population and on third States.

Furthermore, we believe that the sanctions should be lifted as soon as the Security Council's requirements have been met, because this would enhance not only their legitimacy, but also their acceptance by the international community, whose will they should reflect.

We welcome the new steps taken by the Council for the imposition of well targeted sanctions, with a time limit, aimed at changing the conduct of individuals or groups that are well identified. Studies of the decade of sanctions imposed by the United Nations have demonstrated that the sanctions have rarely achieved their goals, though they have caused untold suffering for civilian populations. A continuous evaluation of their socio-economic impact is therefore needed.

Finally, my delegation regrets that, despite the outstanding work accomplished, it has not always been possible to reach consensus on the reports of the Council's Working Group on sanctions. My delegation gives its full support to the recommendations contained in the report proposing concrete measures for the Security Council to enhance the effectiveness of existing sanctions regimes, as well as a specific orientation for any future action.

Mr. Konuzin (Russian Federation) (*spoke in Russian*): We are grateful to the representatives of Germany and Switzerland for introducing the studies that they had carried out within the context of the Bonn-Berlin and Interlaken processes. We are also grateful to the representative of Sweden for the willingness of his country to continue studying the application of sanctions.

The issue of sanctions has taken up a great deal of the Security Council's work in the last decade. Sanctions constitute a powerful tool for bringing an impact to bear on people. Their effectiveness depends directly, however, on the correctness of the Council's assessment of the level of the threat to international peace and security. This is why the question of principles and the way in which they are applied deserves the most serious attention.

Before resorting to an embargo regime, the Council must estimate any possible negative effect of the restrictive measures on the population, who are not directly politically responsible for the actions of official authorities, and any potential harm to the interests of third countries.

This is why the introduction of sanctions is an extreme measure to be applied only where all other methods of bringing political impact to bear have been exhausted, and when the Security Council determines that there is a real threat to the international community. Sanctions must be introduced strictly in accordance with the provisions of the United Nations Charter and the norms of international law. They must seek clearly stated objectives; they must be carefully targeted; they must be subject to regular review; and they must set forth clearly the conditions for lifting them. It is impermissible to introduce measures that have no set time period.

We welcome the trend for the Council to take decisions with a prescribed time frame for sanctions. Examples of successful action by the Council in this connection are, we believe, the resolutions on sanctions against the Taliban and sanctions on Liberia.

We will carefully study the booklets on focused sanctions. We are sure that these reports will be much in demand among many States within the United Nations and outside. We believe that the reports will help States in their work on the finer points of resolutions on the application of sanctions and will also be helpful with regard to existing practical regimes for implementing decisions at the national level. This latter issue will be of particular interest to States, because it falls within the competence and responsibility of States that have an obligation to report to the Security Council on measures that they have taken to comply with the sanctions.

Ms. Lee (Singapore): We join our colleagues in thanking the representatives of Switzerland and Germany for their presentations and for their very useful manuals on the Interlaken and Bonn-Berlin processes, which they distributed at our meeting on Monday. We applaud the laudable efforts of the Governments towards the improvement of financial sanctions, along with arms embargoes and travel bans.

As time is short, Mr. President, we hope that you will let us make a targeted statement of three key points.

First, in relation to the presentation by State Secretary Dahlgren of Sweden, we would like to express our sympathy for the frustration that he endured as Chairman of the sanctions Committee on Sierra Leone. As the Chair of the sanctions Committee on Liberia, we have experienced similar highs and lows. For example, as the Chair, we have had to facilitate the implementation of a travel ban list. Since this list was promulgated in June, we have experienced many of the difficulties discussed in the seminars and workshops organized under the two processes, in particular for the removal of targets from such lists. While we have noted the suggestion from the Bonn-Berlin process that this could be dealt with by empowering the sanctions Committees to keep such lists up to date, the reality is that United Nations sanctions Committees do not have the resources to do this, nor is there any institutional follow-up within the United Nations system to monitor the implementation of sanctions.

Secondly, United Nations sanctions, if designed and implemented properly, can do much good. However, as Mali, Colombia, Jamaica, Mauritius and other delegations have highlighted, the image of United Nations sanctions has not been good. The United Nations and United Nations sanctions are often blamed for the economic woes of the targeted country. This may be due in part to the unintended side effects of the sanctions. However, in our view, much of the problem can be attributed to the less than effective implementation of United Nations sanctions to date. As such, while the United Nations may have won the Nobel Peace Prize jointly with the Secretary-General this year, the credibility of the United Nations in relation to the implementation of sanctions has eroded badly in the last 10 years. We must arrest this slide.

Thirdly, as sanctions are one of the most important tools of the Security Council, the Council needs to ensure that its objectives are achieved without disproportionate humanitarian effects. As the United States has noted, this is to ensure that sanctions remain a viable policy tool. As such, we were pleased to learn that the Stockholm process, will focus on the implementation and monitoring of targeted sanctions. We would like to express our support in advance for the Stockholm process, in the hope that its work will result in more effective implementation of United Nations sanctions.

Mr. Jerandi (Tunisia) (*spoke in French*): Mr. President, we thank you for organizing this important meeting of the Council to deal with the question of sanctions imposed by the United Nations. It has enabled us to hear interesting statements by the Ambassador of Germany and the Observer of Switzerland on the outcome of the Bonn-Berlin and Interlaken processes, and to hear the State Secretary of Sweden. We thank them all very much.

This meeting also offers members of the Council an opportunity to speak once again on the matter of sanctions. This gradual emergence of a debate in the Council on sanctions should be encouraged so that we can maintain an ongoing consideration of ways and means of making the sanctions tool a measured, sensible and effective way of maintaining international peace and security.

As emerged from last year's Council debate and from numerous discussions in the General Assembly and other forums, outside the United Nations, this is a crucial moment for our Organization. We must take a new look at this tool of sanctions, put at its disposition by the Charter as a last resort after all methods for the pacific settlement of disputes provided for under Chapter VI of the Charter have been exhausted.

United Nations practice, particularly during the last decade, has shown the need for a number of changes that, while enhancing the effectiveness of sanctions, would reduce their impact on civilian populations — which we have seen can be devastating — and protect the interests of neighbouring countries with major economic ties to the targeted countries.

We feel that these three goals mean that the United Nations must take a new approach to sanctions, guided by the principle that sanctions should remain an integral part of an overall strategy for conflict settlement and prevention, with all its political, economic, social and human components, since sanctions clearly are not an end in themselves. Attention should be paid to setting a time-limit for sanctions. In short, an overall vision of the problems and their solutions is needed.

To deal seriously with the humanitarian dimension, we must systematically review the impact of the sanctions contemplated — if they turn out to be necessary — before their imposition and then periodically during their application. We also have to

make provisions for the necessary humanitarian exemptions — food, medical, religious and so on.

As for the impact on third countries, my country has always highlighted the need to meet their concerns and deal with the economic problems they face because of the application of sanctions by the Security Council, in accordance with Article 50 of the Charter. We must seek ways to make this goal a reality, because the implementation of sanctions is the collective responsibility of the international community as a whole.

My delegation strongly believes that the Council must seek to promote a new sanctions practice. To this end, the Council, which last year set up a working group to draw up recommendations on the general issues of sanctions, should not consider the report submitted by the Working Group after several months' work under the leadership of Ambassador Chowdhury, with a view to its adoption. The draft report is not entirely satisfactory, but it should be carefully studied and supported by the Council so that we can move towards its application. Despite its shortcomings, it provides for important changes with regard to various aspects of the matter.

Mr. Shen Guofang (China) (*spoke in Chinese*): First, I join colleagues in thanking you, Mr. President, for arranging this important meeting. I also thank the representatives of Switzerland and Germany for their briefing. We believe that the Interlaken process and the Bonn-Berlin process are very beneficial to the Council's discussion on the question of sanctions. The briefing they have given us and the booklets they have distributed are also very helpful to our discussion.

I also thank the State Secretary of Sweden for his statement. I am pleased that Sweden will organize relevant activities to continue the discussion on sanctions. China will actively participate in the Stockholm process, and hopes for its success.

Sanctions are a mandatory tool bestowed by the Charter on the Council to fulfil its duty of maintaining international peace and security. Over the past 10 years the Council has resorted to sanctions more frequently, which has caused the international community increasing concern over the tremendous damage done to civilians by comprehensive sanctions. Making sanctions smarter and more clearly targeted, avoiding or reducing their humanitarian consequences, and effectively resolving the economic problems caused by

sanctions to third countries: all these questions require careful and thorough consideration by the Council.

The Chinese delegation has always stressed that sanctions are only a means, and not an end in themselves. Recently there has been much talk about the so-called exit strategy of peacekeeping operations. We also need an exit strategy for sanctions — that is, when deciding to impose a sanctions regime, the Council should consider and decide how to end the sanctions once the goal has been reached. There should be no more sanctions with no clear objective, no time limit and no well-defined conditions for lifting them.

Last year the Council held an open debate on the question of sanctions and established a Working Group. Under the leadership of Ambassador Chowdhury of Bangladesh, the Working Group produced a draft report after in-depth consultations. The draft report is comprehensive and detailed, and contains positive and pragmatic recommendations. We hope that it will be adopted and implemented as soon as possible.

The President: Council members will recall my undertaking at the beginning of Ireland's presidency to

explore the possibility of bringing to a conclusion the matter of the report of the Working Group on the general issues of sanctions. As Council members are aware, the Chairman's proposed outcome was circulated among Council members in February this year, but it has not yet been possible to agree on a final text.

I consider it important to achieve agreement on this text. A very small number of differences still remain. While they relate to issues of some sensitivity, they are in my judgement by no means insurmountable. Over the past two weeks we have met with all the concerned parties on a number of occasions in order to obtain a clearer understanding of the outstanding points of contention and thereby to attempt to identify possible means of overcoming these few remaining obstacles. Those discussions are still ongoing. I would hope to report back soon to Council members on further developments.

The Council has thus concluded the present stage of its consideration of the item on its agenda.

The meeting rose at 11 50 a.m.



Security Council

Fifty-sixth year

Provisional

4394th meeting

Thursday, 25 October 2001, 1:30 p.m.
New York

Corrigendum

Cover page

The name of the representative of Colombia *should be* Mr. Franco.

